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TOUCHE ROSS & CO.
111 EAST WACKER DRIVE 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601
July 8, 1971
Mr. Francis M. Wheat, Chairman
Study Commission on Establishment of
Accounting Principles 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
634 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90014
Dear Chairman Wheat:
Enclosed is the official statement of Touche Ross & Co. 
with regard to the reconstitution of the Accounting Principles 
Board or its successor. The statement is essentially the same as 
the draft letter dated June 25 which was supplied to you and your 
group at our meeting in Chicago.
The Touche position paper does not deal with the possible 
creation of an appeal mechanism, in which you indicated considerable 
interest. My personal views on that subject are these:
1. In the present professional environment, I regard the 
APB as having primary responsibility for formulation 
of standards, with the SEC constituting an appeal 
mechanism of a sort in areas of both professional 
principle and discipline.
2. I reject the possibility of a professional volunteer 
appeal group within the American Institute of CPAs as 
being a somewhat Impractical and unconvincing super­
board
3. It is difficult for me to understand how, within the 
Executive Branch of the Government, an appeal group 
could be constituted in such a way as not to cause 
confusion within the White House orbit, as between the 
SEC and some kind of an appeal mechanism. However, 
it is my understanding that the report of the 
President’s Advisory Council on Executive Reorganiza­
tion, Chaired by Roy Ash, deals with this problem in 
relation to all administrative agencies. It could well 
be that adoption of the Ash recommendations would 
solve part of the problem. Perhaps a study of that 
report will give your group some present suggestions 
with respect to a layering of accounting responsibility 
within the Executive Branch.
4. If there is to be an appeal procedure -- and the idea 
does have considerable merit -- then I could best con­
ceive that some special court within the judiciary 
might be the most workable and objective approach to 
the subject. After all, at the present time, the
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natural succession of appeal is from the SEC to the 
regularly constituted court system (as in the 
Appalachian Power matter).
As I told you in the Commission hearing held in our office, Touche 
has not addressed itself explicitly to the appeal problem because 
we regard improvement and strengthening of the APB itself as a first 
and primary professional effort.
We appreciate very much the time you spent with us and the 
opportunity to be heard. If there is anything further we can do by 




Chairman, Board of Directors
RMT:jb
Encls.
cc: Michael Pinto (10 copies with 
enclosures)
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STATEMENT OF TOUCHE ROSS & CO.
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
Controversy over accounting principles and criticism of 
the operation of the Accounting Principles Board has existed for 
some time. Touche Ross & Co. has made various suggestions for 
improving the methodology of accounting principle formulation and 
for reformation of the APB. We are pleased that the Board of 
Directors of the American Institute of CPAs has established a 
Commission for this work and has specified a broad and comprehensive 
charter. The Wheat Commission, and its charter of study, has the full 
support of Touche Ross.
In the course of its work, the Commission will examine the 
history of the formulation of accounting principles within the 
Institute and will study alternative approaches in great detail. 
As it is impossible for us to present a balanced summary of the 
many aspects of this problem in any brief statement, we will be 
pleased to meet with, or contribute to the input of the Commission, 
in any manner which may be desired.
Touche Ross has made public on numerous occasions its 
position on needed reformation of the APB. This statement will pro­
vide a summary of our views which can serve as a basis for more 
extensive discussions.
THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES ENVIRONMENT
Accounting, in its highest professional form, is a dynamic 
and conceptual discipline. It is conceptual in the sense that it 
must convert data into information by placing that data in proper 
context. It is dynamic in the sense that the concepts incorporated 
within the discipline have changed over time and can be expected to 
change even more dramatically in the future.
At the same time, the application of these concepts takes 
place in a growing and changing economic environment which imposes 
immediate short-term time constraints on professional deliberations. 
The affairs of the market place cannot wait upon the formulation of 
accounting theorems and postulates and frequently demand pragmatic 
solutions to immediate problems. Yet, these solutions, initial or 
as modified, must ultimately relate to each other in some logical 
framework if the affairs of the market place are to be communicated 
to the public in a timely and comprehensible context.
We believe, then, that two major problems must be addressed 
in the formulation of accounting principles or rules. In the longer 
run, the concepts underlying the accounting discipline must be 
identified and set forth so that the practitioner is able to convert 
economic data accurately into information which serves the needs of 
his public. In the short run, individual accounting problems need 
to be resolved on a day-to-day basis with or without the benefit of 
an established conceptual framework. Ultimately short-term solutions 
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will either be consistent with such a conceptual framework or will 
be revised. Accordingly, it is imperative that accounting principles 
(or standards, or conventions, or whatever they may be called) be 
established by a body of totally committed, outstanding professionals 
who act in the present with full awareness of the needs of the future.
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION1
1. For a useful definition of a profession, see Abraham Flexner, "Is 
Social Work a Profession?”, School and Society, Volume I, No. 26, 
p. 904.
The public accountant, works for his clients under the con­
straints of public responsibility. Other client relationships are, 
indeed, possible. The CPA, however, assumes as his ultimate client the 
general public. The CPA, thereby, takes upon himself a judicial or 
arbitrating role in the reporting of economic transactions at the enter­
prise level. The CPA serves the public by attesting to the acceptability 
of reported transactions. The CPA serves his client by bringing to bear 
the public requirements which that client will ultimately have to satisfy. 
In this function, the public accounting profession has perhaps the 
broadest possible coverage of economic activities -- dealing with 
companies in every segment of the economy.
We believe that it is important to preserve and enhance the 
independence of the public accounting profession. To do this, the 
profession must remain self-regulating — both ethically and techni­
cally. We believe that the determination of accounting rules and 
principles outside of the profession may result in reduced independence 
within the profession. If public accountants have no responsibility 
for. the appropriateness of accounting treatment — but only for 
conformance with established rules — it is likely that their role 
will evolve to one of advocacy rather than independence. We expect 
the activities and functions of the public accountant to change over 
time. We believe, however, that the diminution of the CPA’s independent 
force in the business environment would be a significant social loss.
THE PUBLIC TRUST
The role we have described for the public accountant is one 
of continued and enhanced public responsibility. The accounting 
principles and rules set forth to guide or direct the activities of 
the profession must be determined under the most severe constraints 
of the public interest. We believe, therefore, that the body establish­
ed for this purpose must be independent of client, accounting firm, or 
any other private interests and must function in an open, public-like 
manner.
The body which establishes accounting principles must, as 
a primary responsibility, serve the needs of the public. It must inter­
pret and identify public needs and act to meet the time constraints 
Inherent in individual situations. This body must recognize the needs 
and problems of industry, government, and the accounting profession
TOUCHE ROSS & CO.
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itself — but it must always be responsive first to the needs of the 
public.
THE TOUCHE PROPOSAL2
2. For further detail, see Robert M. Trueblood, "Ten Years of the APB”, 
Touche Ross Tempo, September, 1969.
Touche Ross believes that the best solution to the problem 
of establishing accounting principles is the creation of a small full- 
time Accounting Principles Board. Such a group would be chartered to 
deal with new developments involving accounting and accountability as 
they emerge, to conduct a significant level of research in development 
of the underlying conceptual framework of the accounting discipline, and 
to anticipate future accounting needs that will be imposed by the public.
Reconstitution of the Board
We recommend that a five or seven man full-time and fully- 
compensated group of the best professional accountants in 
the country be appointed to the Accounting Principles Board. 
Membership should be without consideration of firm affiliation 
or other background so long as each member has the required 
ability and an appreciation of practice considerations. Each 
member should dissociate himself from his prior affiliation — 
be it a practicing firm, university, or business enterprise.
Structure
The small top level Board should be supported heavily by 
competent staff, with significant involvement of the financial, 
business, and academic communities.
Scope of Activities
The profession must accept full responsibility for leadership 
in financial reporting and accounting at all levels — early 
warning systems, fundamental research, applied research, 
evolvement of objectives and principles, and practice pro­
nouncements.
The historic separation of accounting and auditing cannot be 
logically sustained. Accordingly, the reconstituted Board 
should, as a minimum, have surveillance over the proper content 
of the auditors’ report. Consideration should be given to 
having the Board define research needs, objectives, principles, 
and procedures in auditing.
The current practice of involving the business community in 
early discussions of projected opinions is helpful and should 
continue. However, we believe it would be a mistake to look 
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to the business community or to other accounting organiza­
tions for significant leadership in solution of the 
profession’s larger technical problems. The practicing 
profession, through the Institute and the reconstituted 
Board, can neither share nor delegate its own main 
responsibility in these matters.
Levels of Performance
The boundaries between research specification of overall 
objectives and purposes, formulation of principles, and 
applications in practice should be well defined and carefully 
observed.
In the pyramidal structure of a revised Board operation, the 
broad base would be staff and research.
The full-time Board would itself undertake the design or 
approval of a framework of objectives and purposes. The 
Board would formulate statements of principles compatible 
with established objectives. Under the surveillance of the 
Board, practicing firms and the AICPA staff would add the 
necessary details of procedural application. The SEC would 
continue to exercise its monitoring, its back-up authority, 
and its catalytic role.
Resources
We expect that full accomplishment of the reconstituted 
Board’s objectives might cost as much as $8,000,000 or 
$10,000,000 annually. Although this is a considerable in­
crease over past institutional expenditures, the major 
public accounting firms in the country today in fact spend 
this much, in the aggregate, in direct, contributed, and 
Imputed costs for AICPA support and in practice research and 
guidance. If all firms were willing to look towards the 
Institute and its reconstituted Board for guidance, information 
research, and leadership — and if all firms were willing to 
pool their resources in support of concentrated and coordinated 
activities — the overall additional cost to any individual 
firm would be minimal. Under such funding, the Board would 
have the serious obligation to issue frequent and full 
reports on its research, deliberations, and activities to all 
members and to all firms.
We believe that up to 50% of the proposed budget should be 
devoted to research, with academic Institutions assuming a 
prominent role in research activities. We realize that it is 
unlikely that basic research will result in immediate practice 
opinions. Accordingly, the Board must be prepared to spend 
money freely, but not indiscriminately, in large research 
efforts with little prospect of immediate payoff.
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This statement is made constructively — in the spirit and 
vigor of youth and growth, without institutional or proprietary bias or 
dogma. Any requests for elaboration or clarification will be gratefully 
considered.
Robert M. Trueblood 
Chairman, Board of Directors 
Touche Ross & Co.
July 8, 1971
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Director, Bureau of Accounts 
and Statistics  
Civil Aeronautics Board 1
1. Establishing accounting principles--scope of the task.
a. Enunciation of principles assesses professing responsibility whereas 
promulgation of standards, alone, invites evasion of principles;
b. Principles delineate common denominator elements of immutable laws which 
remain immutable whether observed or unobserved;
c. Standards are judgment guidance mechanisms to the use of principles 
and vary with the purposes served;
d. Principles, being immutable, provide the accounting truth system with 
a definition base which, through its enveloping disclosure principles, must 
be sufficiently broad to meet any information need;
e. Standards, as judgment mechanisms, facilitate particular accounting 
applications but are unreliable as guidelines for extension of basic account­
ing precepts;2/ and
f. Standards and principles are frequently motivated by counterchecking 
forces which can be effectively mobilized only through independent bodies.
2. Should the primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards re­
side in a governmental body or a nongovernmental body?
a. Principle articulation represents a coalescence of multisourced beliefs 
which transcend government;
1/ The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board or any other staff member.
2/ The emphasized "financial" and "operating" lease differentiation standards, 
for example, provide no guidance to the more relevant leasing question of 
delineating the investment or timing aspects of prepaid and postpaid right 
purchases regardless of their limits. Further, the stated objective of 
reasonableness in the imputation of interest exposure draft is hardly an 
acceptable principle in all circumstances for ascribing something to a trans­
action beyond that which is self-described. Moreover, the idea that a given 
precept may be true prior to a selected date but untrue after that date can 
hardly contribute to confidence in the professed truth system.
508
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b. Standard promulgations range from specialized to generalized application 
instruments inherently within the purviews of a hierarchy of authoritative 
government, public and private bodies;3
c. Principles are self-authoritative and enforceable, up to excommunica­
tion, within the community accepting their organized system of belief;
d. Standards are authoritative by edict and enforceable, up to banishment, 
within the community subject to the police powers of their prescribing bodies;
e. Government is an accounting user, is not immune to principles and 
through its individual specialized arms may be equal to, but is no more 
competent than, other organized bodies;
f. Regulatory bodies, and particularly the SEC, have statutory needs which 
must be and can be accommodated within essential generalized accounting 
standards without sacrificing those standards;
g. Regulatory standards, public standards and professional standards for 
accounting are intertwined but distinctive and can only be acknowledged 
and reconciled through a process of pre-development liaison;
h. Professionalism is essentially independence, standing on visible prin­
ciples, which can collectively speak only through quasi-public spokesmen- 
bodies transcending any individual government, public or private bodies; and
i. Spokesman-authority for accounting principles and the responsibility 
which accompanies authority already reside predominantly, even though not 
exclusively, within the AICPA--the sponsor of those conceptions upon which 
United States practice certification and practice enforcement universally 
rest.
3. Composition of a nongovernmental standards Board.
a. Accounting credibility is accepted when authoritative objectivity is 
readily apparent through checks and balances between the following four­
pronged accounting formulation processes (see attached Chart):
(1) Authoritative counseling on needs (the governed).
(2) Authoritative enunciation and monitoring of the belief system 
(the legislators).
(3) Authoritative sponsoring and monitoring of uniform practices 
(the executives).
3/ The July-August 1971 CPA carries (page 4) a particularly pertinent question 
concerning the parallax of accounting principles accompanying a shift of 
vantage points as between the United Kingdom and the United States.
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(4) Authoritative enforcement of the belief system and its implement­
ation practices (the judiciary).
b. Accounting Advisory Counsel membership must deliberately elicit needs 
of the full spectrum of accounting use—within economic regulation as well 
as the financial market;
c. Accounting Principles Board membership should reflect legal and economic 
expertise as well as accounting expertise;
d. Accounting Standards Board membership should contain regulatory expertise 
and its staffing could serve all the conceptualized AICPA bodies in suffi­
cient depth to satisfy internal research and external inquiries--using 
groups represented on the Accounting Advisory Counsel for significance 
screening; and
e. Financing could come, with budgeting limited to receipts, from primary 
beneficiaries in combinations of the following:
(1) Fees for membership.
(2) Fees for each AICPA examination sitting.
(3) Royalties for each certified statement issued by a qualified AICPA 
member.4/
(4) Fees for disseminated information.
(5) Fees for special services.
(6) Grants from public and private institutions.
4. Methods of operation of a nongovernmental standards Board.
a. Flexible procedures must be accorded each accounting body to elicit 
effectively the widest feasible authoritative views;
b. Public hearings can provide a wide spread feeling of participation and 
can focus public attention but are not effective to a deliberation or co­
alescing of ideas and should be used sparingly as judgment indicates to 
each particular body;
c. Public participation in a meaningful sense requires that knowledgeable 
views be publicly solicited, disclosed and weighed through full and open 
responsible proposal, respondent comment, authoritative issue-disposing 
opinion and appeal processes;
4/ As a corollary, the standard certification statement could cite the practi­
tioner’s qualifications in AICPA membership as well as the State(s) of 
certification.
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d. Delegation of authority is essential to balanced, expeditious actions 
and could empower an Accounting Standards Board to:
(1) Issue Tentative Accounting Principles Opinions to become opinions 
of an Accounting Principles Board unless review is undertaken by 
that body within 60 days;
(2) Promulgate standard practices and interpretations subject to appeal 
of conformance with accounting principles within 30 days to the 
Accounting Principles Board;
(3) Answer inquiries and provide technical staff support to all 
accounting formulation and enforcement programs; and
(4) Review and accept or reject appeals of any actions taken by either 
itself or the Accounting Principles Board and, if accepted, either 
transmit recommended action to the Accounting Principles Board or 
modify involved Accounting Standards Board actions.
e. Abrogation of authority need not follow delegation of authority and the 
widest feasible forum of expression consonant with responsible timely action 
can be accorded the public and each member or body of the organized account­
ing authority group along the following lines:
(1) Review of any actions by the Accounting Standards Board, including 
Tentative Accounting Principles Opinions and rejections of appeals 
could be initiated by any one member of the Accounting Principles 
Board, any three members of the Accounting Advisory Counsel or any 
two of its own members, and
(2) Review of any actions taken by the Recounting Principles Board 
could be returned for reconsideration by that body upon request 
within 60 days by all Accounting Standards Board members, two 
thirds of the Accounting Advisory Counsel members or by a majority 
of its own members.
5. Accounting research support for a nongovernmental standards Board.
a. Abstract research as contrasted with action research is rarely accepted 
or financially supported;
b. Action research is the essence of rationalizations behind enunciating 
principles, promulgating standards, or adjudicating conflicts in their 
implementation;
c. Conduct of research is a continuing process within a multiplicity of 
diverse authorities and groups;
- 4 -
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d. Research functions as work processes involve largely reviewing, abstract­
ing, compiling and organizing the ideas expressed or actions taken by diverse 
authorities and groups;
e. Research findings are elements of decision-making advanced, delineated 
by and channeled through the crucible of multiple group views;
f. Opinions represent the coalescence of views and research findings under 
the expertise for synthesis inherently provided by the multiple bodied 
decision-makers;
g. Research programs, as distinct from decisional processes, are susceptible 
of very wide value judgments in relation to budgetary allotments of reason­
ably accessible finances; and
h. Research financing should be held to that essential to decision-making 
and dissemination of basic information which cannot be requested of existing 
instrumentalities or brought to bear upon particular matters through the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Managing Partner of Ernst & Ernst
Since the title of my comments is “Why Aren’t We Solving Our 
Problems?’’, many of you are probably anticipating another blast 
at the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants. While it would be easy for me to be 
critical of the recent trend of the Board towards making narrow, 
restrictive, and illogical rules, the basic fault for this does not lie 
solely with the APB. The Board has been operating in an atmos­
phere which has not been conducive to the acceptance of broad 
principles. Unfortunately, when the Board has attempted to pro­
mulgate such principles, the practicing public accountants and the 
related statutory authorities have not always insisted that they be 
put into practice. 1 believe that this is the real reason why we 
haven’t solved our problems.
One of the outstanding examples of public accountants and 
statutory authorities not insisting that APB pronouncements be 
followed is the manner in which business combinations were 
treated during the 1960's. I believe it would be worthwhile to 
review some of the pronouncements of the Board and its pre­
decessor committee and to observe the effectiveness of them. In 
1950, the predecessor committee issued an Accounting Research 
Bulletin which unanimously approved the pooling of interest 
concept and the conditions under which its use would be appro­
priate. In 1957 another bulletin — No. 48 — was issued extending 
and clarifying the pooling concept. In 1965, in Opinion No. 6, the 
Board unanimously reaffirmed the pooling concept set forth in the 
1957 bulletin. Once more in 1966, in Opinion No. 10, the Board 
reviewed ARB No. 48 and made no changes in the basic concept 
of poolings except to confirm the general practice of recognizing 
poolings consummated after the end of the year but before the 
issuance of financial statements.
With this amount of attention directed by the APB to the 
problems of business combinations during the hectic Sixties, it 
would be reasonable to assume that the accounting for business 
combinations was well under control. But was this really true? As 
some of you knew at the time, and as all of us have learned since, 
this was an issue completely out of control. From the early to the 
mid-Sixties, actual practice had so eroded the concepts of the 
1957 pronouncement that almost all of the so-called criteria for a 
pooling of interest were disregarded. As a result of this complete 
deterioration, almost any combination could be a pooling unless 
cash or its equivalent was used as the medium of exchange. Even 
when cash was used there came into being a creature known as a 
part-pooling, part-purchase which amounted to a half-man, half­
woman approach. As far as I am concerned this has to rank as 
our all-time low point in debasing accounting principles.
During the mid-Sixties, a senior staff member of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission stated in a paper prepared for a pro­
fessional development course that ARB No. 48 had “ . . . been 
interpreted with increasing liberality over the years, so that many 
transactions previously considered to be a purchase may now be 
treated as a pooling or a part-purchase, part-pooling.” He went on 
to state that “The general principle has been that any combination 
may properly be treated as a purchase, but that a pooling is per­
missive only and not mandatory.”
Is there any wonder that the APB, after reiterating the principles 
to be followed on business combinations, would become discouraged 
with the manner in which these principles were ignored in actual 
practice, with the full acquiescence of a statutory authority?
All of us remember the puzzled and indignant reaction of the 
general investing public during the late 1960’s when it became 
increasingly aware of the disservice caused by the failure to follow 
the designated principles for business combinations. Even then, it 
was this adverse public reaction to a slumping stock market which 
identified the problem rather than the actions of practicing 
accountants or statutory authorities.
The business combination issue in the Sixties thus contributed 
significantly to the serious credibility gap that exists in financial 
reporting today. Since the APB had repeatedly endorsed the 
accounting philosophies to be used for business combinations, 
the logical question is “Why weren't they followed?’’. This failure, 
I believe, represents the most significant problem we have in 
accounting today. It would be well for us to take a careful look 
to see what happened.
The criteria for poolings were eroded gradually — case by case. 
First the relative size test went out the window. Next continuity of 
management was ignored. Then continuity of business was 
considered to be unimportant. Then came the creative packages of 
convertible securities of literally all types and varieties; and finally, 
warrants and even more imaginative schemes to effect poolings. 
This continued until we no longer had a logical basis to be followed 
in accounting for business combinations. Each time financial 
statements containing a further breach of the pooling principles 
were made public and went unchallenged, they became the new 
low-water mark for everyone to try to lower even further. This 
situation finally climaxed in 1970 when APB Opinion No. 16 was 
adopted which, while blessing the pooling concept, spelled out 
extremely rigid rules — no longer “principles” but “rules” to be 
followed in the determination of accounting for mergers.
To make absolutely certain that there would be no erosion of 
the rules promulgated by Opinion No. 16, the Nev/ York Stock 
Exchange, mindful of the disregard of previous opinions, decided 
not to depend solely upon the practicing accountants or the 
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statutory authorities to determine whether or not a business com­
bination qualifies as a pooling. Before it will approve listing of 
common stock to be issued in a pooling transaction, the Exchange 
now requires a statement from the applicant explaining in detail 
how the combination complies with each of the many pooling 
rules. A written, favorable opinion from the independent account­
ants must accompany this statement. The Exchange then makes 
its own independent judgment on whether or not the combination 
qualifies as a pooling.
The president of the American Institute recently had this to say 
about Opinion No. 16:
“These are not new rules in accounting for poolings of interest. 
We had an accounting guide on poolings many years ago.
Neither the accounting profession nor the Securities and Ex­
change Commission supported the criteria that was established. 
As a result the criteria was no longer effective. So the APB took 
a stronger stand on the accounting for mergers and acquisitions. 
It established new criteria which isn’t identical but almost the 
same as the old guideline.”
While many of us engaged in the practice of public accounting 
feel that the trend of the APB towards making “rules” in place of 
“principles” is wrong and harmful, in view of what happened to 
the principles espoused for business combinations, it is under­
standable why the Board has changed the thrust of its role.
One final comment about Opinion No. 16. The Board faced a 
major dilemma in deciding whether or not the new rules adopted 
in 1970 should be made retroactive to correct the abuses in re­
cording prior business combinations. The Board knew that many 
balance sheets contained assets which had been booked during the 
1960’s on an inconsistent basis as a result of the pooling break­
down. Should the Board insist on retroactive application of 
Opinion No. 16 so that assets would be uniformly stated, or should 
it close its eyes to the mess and make the opinion non-retroactive? 
The Board concluded that no attempt should be made 
to go back and straighten out prior business combinations.
Much has been and is being said about the desirability of uni­
formity and most of the discussion is generally directed toward 
obtaining uniformity between companies. Because improper pool­
ings have not been corrected, many instances of non-uniformity 
exist today — not only between companies, but within individual 
companies in valuing assets acquired in business combinations. 
Many transactions have been recorded as poolings in the past 
which would not qualify today, which means that the carrying 
amount of the assets have been recorded on a completely different 
basis than similar assets will be recorded in future business com­
binations. It is interesting to note that the reports of certifying public 
accountants continue to show the familiar “consistent with prior 
year” where in many cases this undoubtedly is not necessarily 
correct.
I believe the breakdown of accounting for business combinations 
occurred primarily because there were two separate and distinct 
bodies—the APB and the SEC—attempting to establish accounting 
principles, with the practicing accountants not only going along 
with the SEC on a case-by-case basis but in many cases either 
originating or encouraging the fragmentation of the principles. 
These two separate and distinct bodies attempting to establish 
accounting principles is the primary reason, I believe, why we aren’t 
solving our problems.
The investment credit issue points out another example of a 
confusing and intolerable situation caused by divided responsibility 
for determining accounting principles. Without attempting a 
complete post-mortem on that issue, let’s look at the following 
chronology:
1. The Revenue Act of 1962 provided for an investment credit.
2. In December of that same year the APB issued Opinion
No. 2 which in part stated that:
a. of two possible methods for including the investment 
credit in net income, one should be used and the other
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should not be used; and
b. there are two “equally appropriate” methods for balance 
sheet presentations.
3. One month later, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release 
No. 96 which in part stated that:
a. the Commission will accept either of the two methods 
for including the investment credit in net income; and
b. it is the Commission’s opinion that one of the alterna­
tive balance sheet presentations should not be used.
4. In March 1964 the APB issued Opinion No. 4 which stated 
in part that:
Because of what happened after the issuance of Opinion 
No. 2, including specifically the issuance by the SEC of its 
accounting release, the Opinion has not attained general 
acceptance; therefore, the alternative method for including 
the investment credit in net income is also acceptable.
As a result of having two separate groups involved in establishing 
accounting principles, a very confusing and chaotic situation 
resulted.
Finally, I would like to examine some of the recent actions 
which have been initiated in an attempt to identify and solve our 
problems. As a result of a conference in January of this year, at 
which 21 accounting firms were represented, the AICPA appointed 
two study groups. One, called the “Study Group On How Account­
ing Principles Should Be Established”, is comprised of seven 
members headed by former Securities and Exchange Commissioner 
Francis M. Wheat. Professor David Solomons, of the University 
of Pennsylvania, who will be speaking at this meeting, is also a 
member of the group.
While we have had many other AICPA-appointed study groups 
or committees in the past which have accomplished little in solving 
our basic problems, there is a significant difference in the com­
position of this group. For the first time, the AICPA has included 
a lawyer, a financial analyst, and a prominent industrialist. All 
to go back and straighten out prior business combinations.
Much has been and is being said about the desirability of uni­
formity and most of the discussion is generally directed toward 
obtaining uniformity between companies. Because improper pool­
ings have not been corrected, many instances of non-uniformity 
exist today — not only between companies, but within individual 
companies in valuing assets acquired in business combinations. 
Many transactions have been recorded as poolings in the past 
which would not qualify today, which means that the carrying 
amount of the assets have been recorded on a completely different 
basis than similar assets will be recorded in future business com­
binations. It is interesting to note that the reports of certifying public 
accountants continue to show the familiar “consistent with prior 
year” where in many cases this undoubtedly is not necessarily 
correct.
I believe the breakdown of accounting for business combinations 
occurred primarily because there were two separate and distinct 
bodies—the APB and the SEC—attempting to establish accounting 
principles, with the practicing accountants not only going along 
with the SEC on a case-by-case basis but in many cases either 
originating or encouraging the fragmentation of the principles. 
These two separate and distinct bodies attempting to establish 
accounting principles is the primary reason, I believe, why we aren’t 
solving our problems.
The investment credit issue points out another example of a 
confusing and intolerable situation caused by divided responsibility 
for determining accounting principles. Without attempting a 
complete post-mortem on that issue, let’s look at the following 
chronology:
1. The Revenue Act of 1962 provided for an investment credit.
2. In December of that same year the APB issued Opinion
No. 2 which in part stated that:
a. of two possible methods for including the investment 
credit in net income, one should be used and the other
After the American Accounting Association was informed that 
the Institute was making its own study, it tabled any further 
action pending completion of the Institute’s report.
So now we are faced with at least one additional study regard­
ing the development of accounting principles and how they are to 
be implemented. Everyone involved in accounting and financial 
reporting is anxiously awaiting the results of this study. Herbert 
Knortz, president of the International Association of Financial 
Executives and senior vice president and comptroller of Inter­
national Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, said in a recent 
article:
“Credibility is the fragile asset of accounting management and 
the public accountant. In the interest of the public weal, this 
credibility must be preserved. An avalanche of public dissent 
is already trembling on the brink. In my opinion, change is 
going to take place and half measures are unlikely to succeed. 
Therefore, financial professionals must make certain that 
accounting principles become representative of the views of all 
and that credible financial reports are assured through principles 
which are rooted in economic realism.’’
1 agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Knortz’s views. The Institute’s 
study group has an opportunity to lead the way in eliminating 
the confusion regarding the establishment of accounting principles. 
It cannot do this merely by making routine suggestions for changes 
in the Accounting Principles Board. This was done before by other 
study groups with no ascertainable improvement.
In order to make major progress, I believe that the study group 
will have to include the following as part of its recommendations:
1. There should be only one group determining accounting 
principles and this group should restrict itself to principles 
and not to rules.
2. This new principle-making body should be selected by a 
committee comprised of such people as the presidents of the 
American Institute of CPAs, the American Accounting
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Association, the New York Stock Exchange, the Federation 
of Financial Analysts, and The Financial Executives Institute. 
The principle-making body should include representatives 
whose backgrounds are other than strictly accounting, such 
as economists, financial analysts, and other financial experts. 
This would, of course, eliminate the requirement that mem­
bership be confined to CPAs.
3. Practicing professional accountants and their clients must 
accept and follow the principles that would be promulgated 
by this new principle-making body. It should then follow 
that statutory authorities, such as the SEC, should not 
attempt to establish accounting principles on a case-by-case 
basis, but should concentrate their activities on making 
sure that reporting companies and their independent 
accountants follow and disclose compliance with the 
prescribed principles.
If the foregoing recommendations were made and adopted, we 
would be on our way to solving our problems. We would be able 
to eliminate the confusion that presently exists for companies and 
their independent accountants as a result of being caught between 
conflicting decisions of two rule-making bodies. This manner of 
operation would call for much more professional courage and 
independence on the part of practitioners in insisting that proper 
accounting be followed, and would result in far better financial 
reporting by the business community.
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STEPHEN A. ZEFF 
Professor of Accounting 
Tulane University
The following proposal is intended to address one of the principal 
criticisms directed at the work of the Accounting Principles Board, to-wit, 
the slowness with which it turns out Opinions. This proposal provides for 
a Board of (about) twenty-four members, divided into panels of eight members 
each. Each panel would deal with specific questions before the Board, and 
its decisions would be definitive and final. The full Board would rule on 
questions of precept—underlying accounting and reporting objectives and 
concepts—that constitute the framework within which the three panels would 
issue Opinions on specific accounting and reporting questions. Appeals 
from decisions of the panels may be made to the full Board only when it is 
alleged that the panel’s decision is not consonant with the precepts 
enunciated by the full Board, where it is contended that the Board has not 
ruled on a pertinent precept, or where the validity of a precept ruled 
upon at a prior time is itself under challenge. The full Board would not 
be obliged to rule on all such appeals. A procedure should be devised 
comparable to the certiorari petitions to the U.S. Supreme Court.
COMMENTS. (1) At the base of this proposal is the belief that not 
all Big Eight Firms should be represented on any one panel. Since the 
inception of the enlarged Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1938, the 
large CPA firms, lately the Big Eight, have always been represented. This 
policy was perhaps desirable when, in the early days of the old Committee, 
it was imperative to gain their support in achieving "general acceptance." 
Today, in view of the "Special Bulletin," under which members of the 
Institute are obliged (once the amendment to the Code of Professional Ethics 
is passed) to disclose departures from recommendations of the Board, the 




is no longer the imperative it once was. Furthermore, it must be decided 
whether the Board is to be a ’’deliberative body” or more so a political 
body in which each large firm may "lobby" for its favored opinion. In 
recent years, the view has gained ascendancy that the Board is indeed 
deliberative and that general principles and objectives are needed to 
guide its work. It should no longer be seen as a body in which decisions 
are predicated on what each member "likes," regardless of overall objec­
tives, agreed-upon concepts, and the preponderance of empirical evidence. 
Unless accounting advances beyond this stage of special pleading and 
personal briefs, it will not solve its central problems.
Several representatives of Big Eight Firms, perhaps as many as four, 
could be on any panel. The membership of each panel would not alter from 
decision to decision, except as the composition of the Board itself changes.
The U.S. accounting profession could learn from the experience in 
Canada and Great Britain, where the membership of counterpart committees 
does not necessarily include representatives of all the biggest firms at 
all times. The 1970-71 Accounting and Auditing Research Committee (Canada) 
had no representative from Deloitte & Co. In 1969-70, it had no representa­
tives from Touche Ross & Co. and McDonald, Currie & Co. In 1970-71, the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee (Great Britain) was without repre­
sentatives from Whinney, Murray & Co., Arthur Young, McClelland Moores & Co. 
and Arthur Andersen & Co. Moreover, two of the Committee's eleven members 
were partners in Touche Ross & Co., one from London and the other from 
Birmingham.
Representation from the Big Eight has been a blind spot in the profes­
sion for too long. Foremost among the criteria should be the quality and 
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representativeness (of the profession and other sectors) of members of the 
Board. That all the large firms be represented at all times should be dis­
tinctly subsidiary, if it should be a criterion at all.
(2) In some sense, the notion of panels formally acknowledges the key 
role played by subcommittees in the present Board. These smaller bodies do 
the great share of the investigatory and drafting work, and much depends on 
the effectiveness with which they carry out their tasks. One supposes that 
considerable time is consumed in meetings of the full Board in hearing the 
divergent points of view of eighteen members, and he wonders if the time is 
all well spent. A smaller body composed of able individuals not only would 
call on the views of a fair number of qualified persons, it would be likely 
to act much more expeditiously than can the present Board. It would seem 
that more would be gained by the Board’s ability to cover a wider range of 
vexing questions in a shorter period of time, than would be lost by the 
absence of some eight or ten points of view in each panel (i.e., in compari­
son with an 18-member Board which would deal with all questions). The 
Board’s current practice of holding formal hearings on controversial subjects 
would give each panel the opportunity of becoming exposed to viewpoints not 
already espoused by its members.
I realize that this proposal ignores other issues: should the Board 
remain within the Institute, should members include non-CPAs, and the like. 
These issues must be resolved on their merits, and I do not propose to 
address them at this time. I have deliberately abbreviated the presentation 
of this proposal in order to conserve the Commission’s time. On request 
from the Commission, I would be pleased to comment further along this line.
UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTANCY 
COLLEGE OF COMMERCE 
25 EAST JACKSON BOULEVARD 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604 
WEbster 9-3525
September 29, 1971
Mr. Michael A. Pinto 
Administrative Secretary 
of the Study Group
New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Pinto:
This letter is intended as an input for the Group’s deliber­
ations rather than as the expression of a wish to participate in 
the public hearings.
In seeking an answer to the first ’pertinent question', it 
may be helpful to review how the term "accounting principles” first 
found its way, 39 years ago, into the suggested form of accountant’s 
report. The enclosed xerox copy from Memoirs and Accounting Thought 
of George O. May,[Paul Grady, editor (New York, N.Y., The Ronald 
Press, 1962), pages 73 and 74,] states that in the early drafts "the 
words ’principles’ and ’practices’ were used almost interchangeably”, 
and that ”it was natural that the form of report should use either 
the word ’practices’ or ’principles’”.
In common use, the word ’’principle” has inherent in it the 
quality of a generalization (cf. Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, Unabridged, page 1803); ’’accounting principles”, on the 
other hand, is primarily a reference to a collection of detailed, 
specific pronouncements of the APB and its predecessor committee. 
The word ’’principles” in ’’accounting principles” represents, then, a 
term of art whose meaning, namely: a collection of detailed specifics, 
differs materially from the meaning it has in common usage, namely: 
a generality.
Precedent exists for revising accountancy’s terms of art if they 
tend to cause confusion in the minds of less sophisticated users of 
accounting information: Gone are the contra-asset ’’reserve”, and 
’’earned surplus”. Adoption of the term ’’principle” in the original 
accountant’s report does not appear to have been based on conceptual 
considerations. There seems little reason to retain ’’principles” 
if ’’standards” (or procedures, or practices, or what-have-you) can 






From: Paul Grady, ed., Memoirs and Accounting Thought of George O. May 
(New York, N.Y., The Ronald Press, 1962), pages 73 and 74. 
Perhaps the words of greatest interest in the certificate arc: "In ac­
cordance with accepted principles of accounting consistently maintained 
by the company during the year under review." 1 discussed the word 
“principles” in an article which appeared in the Journal of December, 
1937, commenting on the essay of Mr. Gilbert R. Byrne which had ap­
peared in the November issue of the Journal. Mr. Hurdman dealt with 
the words “consistently followed by the company during the year under 
review” in his paper at the 1938 meeting of the Institute. It will be ob­
served that the Committee spoke of the five propositions contained in 
Exhibit I to the letter of September 22, 1932 as “principles.”
In 1931, when the Special Committee on Development of Accounting 
Principles was considering whether these propositions should be accepted 
formally by the Institute membership, the appropriateness of the term 
“principle” was questioned by Mr. Lewis Ashman, and in its report 
printed in the 1931 yearbook the Committee used the expression “rules 
or principles.” Its successor, the Committee on Accounting Procedure, in 
its first bulletin dropped the word "principle” and substituted the head­
ing “rules formerly adopted.”
A reference to the correspondence between the Exchange and the In­
stitute which preceded the suggestion of the form of report or certificate 
will show that the words “principles” and “practices” were used almost 
interchangeably. Tims, in describing the history of accounting develop­
ments, the Institute committee in its letter of September 22, 1932 spoke 
generally of “conventions” and “principles.” The Stock Exchange, in its 
letter to corporations of January 31, 1933, asked six questions, the last of 
which was—
Whether such system in their opinion conforms to accepted accounting 
practices, and particularly whether it is in any respect inconsistent with any 
of the principles set forth in the statement attached hereto. (Italics supplied)
The nine accounting firms, in their letter of February 24, 1933 used 
this language:  
Your sixth question, apart from the specific reference to the principles 
enumerated, aims, we assume, to insure that companies arc following account­
ing practices which have substantial authority back of them. (Italics supplied)
They also expressed their agreement with the five general principles 
enumerated in the memorandum. 
In the Institute’s letter of December 21, 1933 it agreed that any form 
of accountant’s report should answer the questions contained in the Stock 
Exchange letter of January 31, 1933.
In these circumstances, it was natural that the form of report should 
use either the word “practices” or “principles.” The earlier drafts gen­
erally used the former, but in the final draft the word “principles” pre­ _ 
vailed.
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Office of the Controller United 
Aircraft
October 6, 1971
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
Study on Establishment of 
Accounting Principles
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10019
Dear Sirs:
Statement of Views on Establishment 
of Accounting Principles
We are pleased to have the opportunity to express our 
views on how to improve procedures for establishing accounting 
principles. We believe this study is a most important endeavor 
which hopefully will lead to better and more informative financial 
reporting.
During the past few years, it has appeared to us that 
the Accounting Principles Board, in some respects, may not have 
been as responsive as desirable to the accounting and financial 
requirements of industry. It is not entirely clear as to why this 
may have occurred, although there appears to have been a tendency 
on the part of the APB to give too little weight to the fact that 
the company, rather than the auditor, is primarily responsible for 
financial and accounting operations including the preparation and 
publication of financial statements. Also, there may have been a 
tendency to forget that a primary purpose of accounting is to 
provide financial discipline in operating the business and that 
company management has the primary responsibility to administer 
such discipline.
As a result, it sometimes seems as if it is thought that 
it is primarily the security analyst who requires meaningful finan­
cial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and that little attention is given to the 
needs of creditors, stockholders and management. Therefore, in 
presenting our comments and suggestions to improve the means for 
establishing accounting principles, we presume that the purpose of 
accounting and financial statements is to serve all interested 
parties.
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Our observations lead us to believe that a body entrusted 
with accounting rulemaking*  should not be restricted to certified 
public accountants mostly engaged only as auditors. It would appear 
that an accounting rulemaking body should include individuals having 
direct responsibility for financial and accounting matters as well 
as those responsible for auditing.
* It is a misnomer to call APB pronouncements "Opinions” when in 
fact these documents practically have the effect of law, at 
least as far as publicly owned companies are concerned.
There is also a question as to whether the establishment 
of accounting principles should continue to be the sole responsi­
bility of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
which is almost completely devoted to the practice of public account­
ing. Additionally, we question whether it is fair to saddle Institute 
members with all the significant costs of conducting necessary re­
search and promulgating accounting principles. In raising these 
questions, we do not suggest that the AICPA does not have a responsi­
bility for accounting principles -- on the contrary, we would hope 
that the Institute would continue as an active participant in this 
area, but in partnership with others who have similar responsibilities.
We suggest that a reorganized APB be created to include, 
by formula, a broader representation consisting of individuals from 
both public accounting and industry with perhaps minority repre­
sentation from the banking industry and from the investment community. 
It would appear about eleven members might meet the test of being 
representative and at the same time be a workable group. Such a 
Board might consist of four auditors in the active practice of public 
accounting, four financial executives who would be the chief financial 
and/or accounting officers of publicly owned companies and one member 
employed in the banking industry. In addition, to further enhance 
the breadth of a new Board, inclusion of one member representing the 
major stock exchanges, and one member representing the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, would be appropriate.
We would suggest that only the public accounting members 
be required to be certified public accountants although each member 
should have had extensive experience in financial and accounting 
affairs.
Since it is doubtful whether the AICPA should properly 
sponsor such a broadly based body, we suggest that consideration be 
given to having the Board be administered jointly by the major stock 
exchanges in the United States. These institutions more than any 
others have the most extensive contact with both company and stock­
holder. We envision that the exchanges would be responsible for 
the appointment of each member, strictly within the confines of 
the eleven member formula, but would be expected to consider most 
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seriously nominations by interested groups. For example, it 
would seem appropriate that the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants suggest names for the auditor appointees. 
Similarly, the Financial Executives Institute would possibly 
suggest qualified financial executives for appointment. The 
American Bankers Association and the Securities Exchange Commission 
could nominate members, and exchanges themselves could have sole 
responsibility for naming one member.
It would appear necessary for the Board to have a full- 
time research staff, the costs of which would be borne by the 
exchanges out of their fees charged to listed companies.
We recognize that the means by which these suggestions 
might be best carried out require careful study and effective 
communications with all affected institutions. However, in order 
to achieve any significant improvement in APB operations, we believe 
that it is most desirable that the representation on the Board be 
broadened to include the direct participation of stockholders, the 
auditing profession, and industry financial executives. We suggest 
that the Study Committee pursue such a course.




AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY A. CARL TIETJEN
The title, Establishment of Accounting Principles, as 
well as a reading of the charge to the committee, raise a question 
of whether the study may fall short of maximum usefulness because 
it is too narrow. The title and charge seem to imply that the 
thirty-seven year old concept of ’’generally accepted accounting 
principles” is untouchable, and that the only issue relates to who 
should determine such principles and in what manner. However, the 
charge fortunately contains this sentence: "It will also involve 
consideration of entirely new approaches." The committee’s 
"Memorandum of Pertinent Questions" also holds promise of a broader 
study. Therefore, this paper was prepared on the assumption that 
the committee is open to any and all suggestions for improvement 
in financial reporting.
The first step should be to drop the term "generally 
accepted accounting principles." This concept started out as 
little more than a nice sounding phrase, but over the course of 
several decades it has gravitated inevitably and with increasing 
speed toward a rule book, ever thicker and more complex. One need 
look no further than the half century of experience with the 
internal revenue code to conclude that improved financial reports 
are not likely to come from detailed mandatory prescriptions.
Technique is important in financial reporting but of even 
greater importance is the integrity of the people involved. All 
experience with tax practice and financial reports seems to indi­
cate that "the greater the rules, the lower the integrity." 
Therefore, at this time the profession should move toward empha­
sizing and strengthening the integrity factor, with less emphasis 
on detailed technical rules. Present techniques are quite adequate 
to produce useful financial reports, if the people preparing such 
reports desire that they be useful.
The present concern in the financial community with the 
credibility of financial reports arises not nearly so much from
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technical shortcomings as it does from a low order of integrity on 
the part of some managements and a misguided sense of professional­
ism of some independent accountants. While the transgressors are 
a minority, the belief seems to be widespread that this minority 
has been growing. In the writer’s opinion, that is the most 
important reason behind the creation of the present study group.
What is most needed by both management and independent 
accountants at this time is not further escalation of technical 
rules but broad standards that will give them sound guidance in 
"what they are attempting to do," not "how to do it." In seventy- 
five years the organized accounting profession has never set forth 
the goals of financial reporting. If a client were to ask the 
simple and logical question, "what must I do to achieve excellence 
in my financial reporting?"—there is nothing the AICPA has pro­
duced that could be handed to him that would be responsive to his 
question.
With respect to broad standards or goals, fortunately 
the accounting profession has a precedent in its auditing standards 
which were formulated over twenty years ago. This was a reasonable 
effort toward answering the "what" question in the auditing area. 
During the years since auditing standards were adopted the profes­
sion has issued a number of technical auditing statements for the 
purpose of satisfying the "how" question in specific situations 
that arose in applying the broad standards. Most independent 
accountants seem to share the writer’s view that auditing standards 
and the supporting interpretive statements have been quite success­
ful in raising the quality of auditing practice over a period of 
two decades.
It is proposed that the narrow outmoded concept of 
"generally accepted accounting principles" be abandoned and re­
placed by a broader concept consisting of three interrelated 
elements as described hereafter:
1. Accounting standards, to be adopted officially by the AICPA 
and incorporated in its educational and other programs. 
These standards would give broad guidance to management and
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independent accountants with respect to their responsi­
bilities for financial reporting, and would become the 
basis for accountants’ opinions. (Appendix A)
2. A broad-based review board or council, with a membership 
large enough to include at least one representative of 
each of the principal groups having a stake in financial 
reports, including, of course, management and the 
accounting profession. Its basic objective would be to 
uphold accounting standards by reviewing apparent devi­
ations and taking appropriate action where required. 
(Appendix B)
3. A technical group (currently the APB) whose function 
would be to supply such technical guidance as was re­
quired to support accounting standards. It is believed 
that adoption of standards and creation of a strong 
review body would remove from the technical group much 
of the pressure now centered on the APB, which has been 
attempting to cover too much ground too quickly, and in 
effect, taking over a large part of the responsibility for 
financial reporting from the managements and independent 
accountants of individual companies. (Appendix C)
It will be recognized that this approach is one of 
enlightened self-regulation, which fundamentally would continue to 
place responsibility for financial reporting in the hands of the 
accounting profession and its clients. Granting that financial 
reporting in the sixties fell short of the ideal, the writer 
nevertheless believes strongly that a free profession and free 
business should be given every chance to justify continuance of 
their logical roles in financial reporting and in our society as 
a whole.
* * *
Appendix D gives summary information on the writer’s 
experience and qualifications.
A. CARL TIETJEN 




Attached is a reprint of a recent comprehensive article 
which discusses the need for accounting standards and includes, 
on pages 8 and 9, a tentative codification of such standards.
The accounting standards contemplated here are, of 
course, standards in the same sense as were the auditing standards 
proposed in 1947 by the AICPA Auditing Procedure Committee when 
they stated:
’’Auditing standards may be said to be differentiated 
from auditing procedures in that the latter relate 
to acts to be performed, whereas the former deal 
with measures of the quality of the performance of 
those acts, and the objectives to be attained in the 
employment of the procedures undertaken.”
It has become common in recent years to refer to 
pronouncements of the APB as ’’standards.” It takes only brief 
reflection to realize that these pronouncements deal with 
accounting practices or methods, not standards in the qualitative 
sense as defined so clearly by the Auditing Procedure Committee. 
Accounting practices and methods are, of course, important, but 
they should be viewed in their proper perspective as merely acts 
to be performed in attaining the quality standards.
Accounting standards will not be a panacea, but they 
should form a sound basis for progress in the quality of finan­
cial reporting. In practice, standards would have the effect 
of giving the independent accountant equal responsibility with 
management for financial reports, and thus strengthen his 
position of independence greatly.
Qualitative standards are desirable in any complex 
activity where personal integrity and competence are major 
factors. Standards appeal to the best in people; stultifying 
rules breed resentment in people which defeats the purpose.
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APPENDIX B
REVIEW BOARD OR COUNCIL
The membership should be representative of all important 
groups having an interest in financial reporting, except government. 
That is because government representatives would tend to overshadow 
the private members. Moreover, government agencies normally have 
their own channels for reviewing financial reports of publicly 
owned companies.
The review function is visualized initially as a self- 
regulatory arm of the AICPA, financed by it. Inclusion in its 
membership of non-AICPA members should assure objectivity. Added 
assurance could come from a provision that the chairman be a person 
of outstanding ability and prestige from outside the profession.
Adequate representation would require membership of at 
least twelve and perhaps twice that number. Conceivably the 
chairmanship would be a full-time paid job, with some form of 
remuneration for other outside members. Term of office should be 
sufficiently long to enable a member to become familiar with the 
job and make a contribution to the work of the group—probably a 
minimum of three years. Adequate technical staff assistance 
should be provided by AICPA.
For maximum effectiveness, the review group should have 
the power to publicize its decisions, but the legal implications 
of such power would require careful consideration.
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TECHNICAL GROUP
If standards were adopted and a strong review body 
created, it seems likely that much of the pressure now borne 
by the APB would be removed. Unless a "fresh start" is deemed 
essential, perhaps the basic structure of APB could be salvaged. 
A change of name would be needed, however, since the term 
"principles" is to be dropped.
The technical group’s function would be to supply 
technical guidance as required to support accounting standards, 
particularly the standard relating to accounting practices and 
methods. It is strongly recommended that future pronouncements 
be confined to important questions, be technically sound, be as 
short and concise as possible, and be phrased as broad guidelines 
instead of as detailed mandatory rules.
The most important qualifications for membership in 
this group should be demonstrated technical expertise and a 
disposition to work cooperatively with others. The majority 
should be members of the practicing profession, with minority 
representation of other interested parties except government. 
In view of its changed role, the number of members could 
probably be reduced to say twelve. None need be full-time or 
salaried, but they should be prepared to devote substantial 
time. AICPA should provide adequate staff assistance as well 
as the entire financing. Term of office should be a minimum 
of three years.
APPENDIX D
EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS OF A. CARL TIETJEN
In practice with Price Waterhouse & Co. continuously since 1935, 
Thirteen of these years were in St. Louis, five in Cleveland 
and the remainder in New York. Also had major special assign­
ment experience in Western Europe.
Admitted to partnership in New York in 1956
Started firm's formal research department in 1958 and continued 
in charge until 1966, concentrating on client financial 
reporting problems.
Chairman of firm's Accounting Committee 1960 to 1966
CPA in several states; member AICPA and other professional 
societies
AICPA experience includes membership on Practice Review Committee 
and advisory board for ARS No. 7
Lectured on advanced accounting, Washington University (St. Louis) 
1945 to 1948
Contributor to professional journals for the past twenty-five years.
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GEORGE GIBBS, CPA, Ph.D.
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Claremont Men’s College 
Claremont Graduate School 
California
Formerly
Director, California Society of Certified Public Accountants
President, California State Board of Accountancy
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1. ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES - SCOPE OF THE TASK
One answer to the question "What is meant by the term accounting principles?" 
is that there have been really two categories included under this term (a) basic 
ideas or fundamentals , which I have called principles,1 and (b) procedures, some 
with several acceptable alternatives. It may be that the word "standard" should
2 be employed in this system, as suggested by Professor Solomons.
It is important to remember the distinction between fundamentals and 
procedures. The fundamentals are really a body of doctrine, which must be re­
ferred to by thinking men and women as a basis for making decisions as to which 
procedure should be adopted as the standard to be followed by the members of 
the profession. In an intelligent system there will often be room for several 
acceptable alternatives, assuming that the particular procedure is fully disclosed 
and also that the significance of the choice is disclosed.
The fundamentals will change very slowly, if at all, while the procedures, 
including alternatives, will change and specific rules as to how to follow the 
procedures will need to be promulgated by the Board.
Attached hereto is an "Accounting Theory for the Preparation of Financial
3 Statements" which presents an outline for all types of organizations:
A. Underlying Conditions in the Economic World
B. Principles (which now may be called Fundamentals):
- Disclosure
- Materiality





C. Assumptions (necessary in the preparation of financial 
statements for a particular legal entity)
D. Procedures (with some examples of alternatives)
The lack of definition of "principles” (or "fundamentals”) by accountants 
was clearly stated by Mr. McMonnies of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Scotland in a review of three publications of the Accountants*  International. 
Study Group. He found confusion both as to terminology and content. For 
example, consistency, which I have called a principle, and would be one of the 
fundamentals, was called both a "standard” and a "convention" and he found that 
other writers referred to consistency as a "principle," "requirement,” "criterion,” 
"tenet,” and "attribute."4
It is no wonder the public is confused when we continue, as we have done 
since the 1920's, to say in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. Also we have never cleared up the idea of "generally accepted." 
By what groups in the financial community are these items generally accepted? 
They cannot be made so by edict!
Obviously, if the practice of accounting is to be changed, then the wording 
of the "Auditors Report Letter" must be changed. Probably there should be 
several versions, not just one as at present. It should really tell the reader 
more than it does now as to the opinion of the auditor, how and why he arrived 
at it.
A recent booklet, The Auditors Report .... Its Meaning and Significance, 
prepared by both bankers and Certified Public Accountants, stated that "No bank 
officer anywhere is qualified to make loan judgments on the strength of audit- 
reports unless he is fully conversant with the concepts and viewpoints that are 
set out in the paper that follows."5 This would seem to be conclusive except 
that in the booklet it states that "generally accepted accounting principles"
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are "that group of concepts and related practices for dealing with accounting 
matters."6 It refers to the Accounting Research Study No. 7 by Paul Grady 
which lists 121 items, called principles, but which are in reality largely 
7 
descriptive of procedures. No distinction is made between fundamentals and de­
tailed procedures. There cannot be 121 fundamentals.
2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESTABLISHING BOARD
The primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards should 
reside in a non-governmental body especially since we are members of a pro­
fession. It should set standards such that there would be no need for duplica­
tion by government agencies or other private organizations. Thus, the Securities 
Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service and other Federal and state 
agencies would be relieved of some of their present duties. Individual standards 
could be referred to by other organizations and by government agencies when re­
quired. Government agencies would need to supplement the standards with specific 
rules in certain cases. An interesting study, pointing out the need for more 
cooperation both between government agencies and between government and the 
profession, was published by Arthur Andersen & Co. in 1965. Their solution in­
cluded a proposal for "United States Court of Accounting Appeals” which would 
have solved some of the conflicts between Federal government agencies but would
  
still leave ample work for the Board.8
3. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD
The Board should be composed of not more than nine men, chosen for life 
tenure and serving full time at an adequate salary. They should be Certified 
Public Accountants but so chosen that the majority represents the medium and 
small practitioners rather than being dominated by the larger firms. The Board 
activities should be directed from a city 'other than New York to avoid undue 
influence of the financial world, perhaps San Francisco or Denver. The cost
-3-
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of the Board activities should be borne by the members of the profession.
4. METHODS OF OPERATION
The methods of operation could be improved by permitting alternative 
procedures provided that the significance of the choice of a particular 
alternative was adequately disclosed. If the basics are straightened out and 
we stop being illogical such as is exhibited by the following statement used 
internationally, nationally and found i the Rules of the State Board of 
Accountancy of California, the most populous state in the Union.
"The term ’accounting principles' is construed to include not only accounting 
principles and practices but also the methods of applying them."9 How can 
intelligent men pass rules like this? How can A include A, B, and C? It is 
logically impossible.
Having recently commented on drafts of 6 proposed pronouncements of the 
present Board, I am convinced that the operation could be improved. In one case 
I recommended the deletion of 46 repetitions of the phrase "generally accepted 
accounting principles."
5. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
There are several types of activities included under the term Research, or 
should it be Search if it is the first time a subject is really being studied?
A. Interpretations. Any written procedures 
promulgated by the Board will call for in­
terpretations. However, it is improper to 
suddenly state that interpretations written 
by 2 staff men bring about a situation wherein 
it can be stated that "members (of the AICPA) 
should be aware that they may be called upon 
to justify departures from the interpretations."10 
Staff should be advisory only, not "judicial." These 
interpretations should remain "unofficial."
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B. Investigation. Before any action is taken 
toward adoption of a procedure the staff of 
the Board should investigate the problem 
and report to the Board. This report should 
include references from many sources including 
the results of more systematic searchers, both 
in the United States and other countries,11 
but should be succinctly summarized in order 
to permit the Board to make decisions intelligently.
C. Systematic Searches
Many persons should be encouraged to make 
searches for the answers to the problems and 
if enough is done and the new Board acts 
promptly, then it is hoped that the confidence 
of bankers, government officials, business 
men, investors, analysts and the general public 






George Gibbs, "Accounting Principles: 'Generally Accepted by Whom’?," 
Accounting and Business Research, (London: Number 1, Volume 1, December . 
1970), p 39.
2
David Solomons, letter to George Gibbs dated September 23, 1971.
3George Gibbs, "Accounting Theory for the Preparation of Financial 
Statements," mimeograph, 11/1/71, 2 pages.
4P. N. McMonnies, "Accountants are an Unprincipled Lot: True or False?" 
The Accountants Magazine, (Scotland: June 1969), p. 325.
5National Conference of Bankers and Certified Public Accountants, The 
Auditors Report, its Meaning and Significance, 1967, preface.
6Ibid., p. 13.
7Paul Grady, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for 
Business Enterprises, Accounting Research Study No. 7 (New York: American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1965).
 
8Arthur Andersen & Co., Establishing Accounting Principles - A Crisis
in Decision Making, (1965), p. 31.
9California State Board of Accountancy, Notice to Licensees Concerning 
Rules 58.1 and 58.2, (California Office of State Printing, January 1970), p. 13.
10Commerce Clearing House, Accounting Principles, (Chicago: Supplement 
No. 8, October 1971), p. 1.
11Price Waterhouse & Co. Guide for the Reader of Foreign Financial 
Statements, 1971. A distinction is made between principles and practices 
in this excellent summary.
Claremont Men’s College Dr. George Gibbs
553 ACCOUNTING THEORY FOR THE PREPARATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1. UNDERLYING CONDITIONS IN THE ECONOMIC WORLD:
a. Money used as a measure of value and as a medium of exchange.
b. Legal entity must be designated, as the data must have boundaries.
(Such as individual, corporation, non-profit corporation, trust, 
partnership, government).
c. Relevancy: Financial statements must be baaed on relevant data.
d. Objectivity of data to be used (facts only, not impressions or
wishful thinking).
e. Periodicity - time periods needed are usually only a portion of the 
 entire life of the entity. (Month, quarter or year).
f. Valuation basis to be declared such as historical, adjusted for price 
level, appraisal or present value.
2. PRINCIPLES:
a. Disclosure - "raison d’ etre” of the statements. The basic principle
b. Materiality - all substantial items to be disclosed in statements. 
Matter of judgment as to amount and nature of item.
c. Consistency - necessary in order to permit comparison of data ox the 
entity from period to period.
d. Capital vs. income: (Proper determination of income).
-matching expenses with income
-matching current expenses with current income
e. Comparability - between like entitles (there is a trend toward move 
disclosure of differences rather than an emphasis on comparability 
per se).
f. Conservatism - If value of assets in doubt, understate and continue 
search for liabilities. (Lawsuits usually cost more than anticipated
3. ASSUMPTIONS: (Vary as to different entities being considered).
-If the statements being prepared, arc for a commercial corporation in the 
United States, for the current year, then the following assumptions are 
necessary:
Page 1 of 2
554That it is a legal entity - a corporation organized under the laws 
of one of the 50 states, with stock issued publicly, listed on the 
NYSE and thus under the jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange 
Commission. Also Federal and State income taxes are involved.
That it has yearly audited statements with quarterly interim reports.
Date of year-end to be determined. It can be last day of any month.
c. That it is a going concern - assume that the management plans to 
continue and not liquidate nor be forced to liquidate. (In the case 
of liquidation different values are given to many assets and the 
claims of creditors are arranged in order of priority).
d. That it has a traditional costing system including historical cost 
less depreciation for long-life assets and valuation accounts for 
accounts and notes receivable. No attempt to reflect effects of 
change in the value of money due to inflation or deflation. If re­
quired, a separate set of statements, reflecting change in the value 
of money could be prepared. Also a separate set of statements re­
flecting “current values” prepared by an independent appraiser
could be prepared or present value of future flow of income.
4. PARTIAL LIST OF PROCEDURES (with certain alternatives):
Assets: Accounts receivable valuation - a. Estimated bad debt loss.
b. Direct charge off as bad debts occur.
Inventory - a. method: Last in first out system, first in-first out 
or average value.
b. possible write down of slow moving 
or obsolete stock.
Costing system in manufacture
-Choice of various methods of handling underapplied fixed 
overhead when operations are at less than capacity. 
Direct cost or absorption cost.
Long-life assets-
-Depreciation decisions necessary:
a. Cost calculation if owner built machinery or building. 
Problem of inclusion of overhead,
b. Life of asset to.be estimated.
c. Method of depreciation to be chocen.
d. Salvage value to be estimated.
Liabilities at recorded values
Contingent (pending) liabilities - establish money value if possible.
Tax basis - choice of practices resulting in different net income for 
“statement" or “income tax” basis. Includes choice of depreciation methods 
or treatment of installment sales collections. (Note: Differences give rise 


















Professor David Solomons FCA 
Wharton School of Commerce 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Pitzer Hall, Claremont, California 91711
October 22, 1971
Dear David:
At your suggestion I called Frank Wheat and had lunch with him. He asked 
if I could come to the meeting November 3 and 4 in New York and I now believe 
that I can. I plan to come to New York, Tuesday the Second, and stay at the 
Tudor Hotel on East 42nd Street as I have work to do nearby at the headquarters 
of the Episcoal Church. (I have been Treasurer of the Diocese of Los Angeles 
since 1948). I will plan to be at the meeting Wednesday and Thursday.
At your suggestion I have sent copies of my article to Mr. Pinto. As to 
terminology I have no real objection to the use of the word standard and perhaps 
it would be better to use it and also use it for Auditing. Thus, we would have 
Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards.
Frank outlined the charge of the Committee to be mostly interested in who 
was to be on the Board, how they were to be chosen and how it should operate? 
These are very important matters and I will be interested to sec what solutions 
are proposed. However, it seems true that the scope of the activities of the 
Board is just as important as the procedure of selection of members and the 
manner of operation!
Thus, it appears that the delineation of what I called "principles” and you 
might call "basic standards” are most important as the Board needs these as guide­
lines in making its decisions. Thus, there is reason to distinguish between the 
basics which include what I suggested might be called the “essential elements” and 
the procedural details. The essential elements were: appropriateness, conservatism, 
etc. Perhaps comparability should be added. (We could agree to use practice as 
the term to denote all that the accountant does). In other words, it does seem to 
me that we need some agreed upon doctrine (if you wish) as a back drop to support 
the decisions made with the detailed determinations. When we discuss, as an example, 
pooling, vs. purchase, we use words disclosures of a material fact and also com­
parability so we do use the basics in determining which procedure to recomment.
One problem that I think the new board will have to tackle is book base vs. 
tax base and the concommittant item — deferred income taxes. If the Board is to 
remain independent of government then it must answer criticism from government 
agencies. The IRS has suggested that financial statement presentation be the same 
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no need for the Board at all. This would be a calamity as government seems to go 
”by the book: and is not imaginative or flexible! Therefore, the Board must tackle 
the real issues and must have guidelines for solving these real issues. However, 
sometimes I think that in some cases tax base and book base should be the same i.e. 
installment sales. It seems to me that the tax base procedure of recording income 
when the cash is received is a more intelligent solution for the stockholder and 
also the corollary of showing only the next 12 months installment receivables as 
current assets is advisable. A recent case involving millions of dollars was re­
lated to the installment problem.
As I told Frank I am preparing a paper for the October 20-22 meeting of the 
Western Association of the Collegiate Schools of Business in Tucson, Arizona. 
The conference topic is "Managing the Management School -- New Ideas for Old Deans" 
and I am on the panel for Academic Planning.
I hope to contribute 
endeavor to put some more
to the thinking of the meeting November 3 and 4 and will 
ideas in writing.
Sincerely yours
George Gibbs, C.P.A., Ph.D.
Professor of Economics and Accounting
GG/vc
Enclosure (1)
CC: Francis Wheat, Esq.
Michael A. Pinto











The Accounting Policies Committee 
of 
The Independent Natural Gas Association of America
The Accounting Policies Committee of the Independent Natural Gas 
Association of America (Committee) wishes to respond to the invitation to the 
public hearing on the Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles. The 
Independent Natural Gas Association of America is a non-profit trade associa­
tion whose membership includes most of the long-distance natural gas trans­
mission companies in the United States.
The Committee agrees with the statement of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in its Bulletin No. 4 issued in October, 
1970 that the responsibility for the reliability of an enterprise’s financial 
statements rests with its management.
With this recognized ethical and legal responsibility and with their per­
sonal interest and concern as well as their expertise, business financial 
managements must have an active part in the establishment and development 
of accounting principles and of financial reporting policies and practices, 
which will assure that financial reporting conveys meaningful information on 
a consistent and comparable basis to the investing public and others. The 
responsibilities of financial management to report meaningful financial infor­
mation cannot be delegated, and the financial accounting and reporting by 
which those, responsibilities are discharged should not be controlled by require­
ments established by the presently constituted membership of the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB).
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Since its establishment, the APB membership has been selected by the 
AICPA and the majority of its members are Certified Public Accountants in 
public practice. The Committee believes that the APB membership should 
contain equal representation from the accounting profession and from business 
financial management, and some lesser number of members selected from 
other groups such as financial analysts and academicians.
In addition to changing the make-up of APB membership, the Committee 
also believes that:
(a) Serious consideration should be given to making the APB function 
a full-time activity.
(b) The total membership of the APB, in order to be effective, should 
be established at not more than twenty and not less than twelve.
(c) Pronouncements or opinions of the APB should require the affirma­
tive vote of at least two-thirds of its members.
 
(d) The term of APB membership should be so established that the
APB will maintain a continuity of purpose and direction, with 
new replacement members coming in at suitable intervals on a 
staggered basis.
(e) Financing for the APB program should be undertaken, on some 
equitable basis, by the independent accounting firms. This manner 
of funding will assure uniformity in spreading the costs of this 
activity over the entire business community through the accounting 
fees paid by business concerns.
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(f) The research facilities of the AICPA and similar research resources 
* of business financial management and other groups should be made 
available for use by the APB.
(g) The newly constituted APB, from the time research studies are 
commenced, should seek advice and participation of all interested 
parties on such studies. It also should conduct information con­
ferences and public hearings on the subject matter, issue exposure 
drafts when appropriate, disseminate information concerning 
pertinent views expressed by respondents, and provide for rebuttal 
type responses to such views.
In summary, the Committee believes that business financial management 
is in a unique position of accountability to its stockholders, to the general in­
vestment public, to the financial community, to governmental agencies and to 
others for the accounting principles relied upon in keeping its accounts and 
records, and for the caliber of its financial reporting, and that, accordingly, 
its responsibility in these areas carries with it a right and an obligation to play 
a major role in the establishment of such principles and reporting practices.
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Arthur Young & Company
277 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
October 12, 1971
Mr. Francis M. Wheat, Chairman
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Wheat:
The review, which your Study Group has undertaken, of the 
process of determining accounting principles can be of value to the 
entire business community, in particular to organizations that 
issue financial statements, to persons and groups that use them, 
and to members of the accounting profession, who report on them. 
Some of the existing dissatisfaction with the way the process has 
worked is justified, and we believe it was essential that a study 
be undertaken. We are writing to ask the Study Group to consider 
our views on a number of matters we think are pertinent to its work.
Under whose auspices?
The central question for the Study Group is: Under whose 
auspices are accounting principles to be determined? Various an­
swers have been suggested. Among these are the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, representing independent public 
accountants; the American Accounting Association, representing 
accounting educators; an organization such as the Financial 
Executives Institute, representing industry; the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, representing the Federal government; and the 
New York Stock Exchange, representing users of financial statements.
The AICPA should continue to perform the principle­
setting function. We have reached this conclusion primarily be­
cause we believe that public accounting firms, acting through the 
Institute, are able both to provide a foundation of authority for 
accounting principle statements and to supply the accounting com­
petence that must be brought to bear in setting the principles. 
Providing the authority foundation and supplying the competence 
are not separate functions but are dual aspects of a single func­
tion; we know of no other body that can perform it as well.
We do not urge the perpetuation of the status quo as an 
objective for the Study Group, nor do we believe that performance 
cannot be improved. We do urge the Group not to recommend changes 
unless the new ways promise to bring clearly superior results with­
out creating equal, offsetting disadvantages.
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Without significant exception, the Opinions issued by the 
Accounting Principles Board have been accepted by U.S. corporations 
as a basis for their financial statements. We believe that this 
condition has resulted from the combined impact of the influence of 
the accounting firms and the regulatory power of the SEC. The 
firms have exerted this influence despite their outright disagree­
ment in some instances with the conclusions expressed in the Opin­
ions and despite the existence in other instances of practices that 
are as easily defended as practices approved in the Opinions. We 
believe they have been willing to do so only because the APB is 
composed primarily of representatives of accounting firms and func­
tions under the auspices of the professional organization of CPAs.
To be sure, the SEC has the regulatory authority to deal 
with these matters without any help from the accounting profession. 
However, absent the influence of the accounting profession the 
Commission would, we believe, have been swamped in adversary pro­
ceedings, including court actions, that would have so altered its 
method of operation as to disrupt the money markets and impede the 
prompt flow of disclosures to stockholders. Instead, the mechanisms 
of the accounting profession have made it possible for the Commis­
sion to deal expeditiously, and at an appropriately high level, 
with a curtailed number of problems.
As is true of the authority foundation, the competence 
brought to the APB by members of accounting firms is, we believe, 
unobtainable from any other source. These practicing CPAs are men 
of incomparably broad experience; moreover, they are in close touch, 
both directly and through their partners, with the problems with 
which the APB must deal.
Against this background, none of the alternatives prom­
ises significant improvement. None of the other organizations 
that might be considered could bring to bear the breadth of exper­
ience and the depth of understanding available in accounting firms 
(although each has points of view and expertise that ought to be 
brought to bear in determining accounting principles). More im­
portant, none of them, except an agency of government, could expect 
to be effective in enforcing compliance with the statements that 
would be issued. And, even if placing the primary enforcement 
responsibility in regulatory hands were conceptually desirable 
(we think it is not), this course would entail significant prac­
tical disadvantages, including a requirement for a very large 
staff.
On the question of whether the principles body should be 
an agency of government, we think it significant, and consistent 
with our conclusion, that the SEC has in general foreborne to 
exercise its statutory prerogative to determine the principles to 
be followed in financial statements required to be filed with the 
Commission. The Commission, in its nearly forty years of existence, 
has exercised a restraint in issuing regulations, at least in the 
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accounting area, which may be unprecedent in the history of our 
Federal bureaucracy. It is reasonable to believe that the health 
and vigor of the securities industry and of the accounting profes­
sion are due in large part to this restraint and that these factors 
have not been at the expense of the public welfare but rather have 
been to its advantage.
It has been suggested that the principles body ought not 
to be under the auspices of the AICPA because of the possibility 
that a CPA member may be unduly influenced by the views of a client 
of his firm. We disagree. It is a strength, rather than a weakness, 
of the APB that its public accountant members have access to the 
experience and views of their clients. Further, in many instances 
different clients of a member’s firm will have contrasting points 
of view. This concern over undue influence undervalues the funda­
mental concern of CPAs for their tradition of independence. Further, 
those who raise this issue may overlook the fact that members of the 
principles body, whoever they were, would be subject to pressures 
from varying sources, including employers, colleagues, assorted 
individuals and groups and their own prior published positions. 
CPA members are at least as likely to appreciate and protect the 
public interest as members Chosen from other groups would be. It 
might be possible to select persons who would appear to be free of 
possible influence, but we question whether, if such persons could 
be found, they would be sufficiently in touch with the business 
world to deal with the problems of establishing accounting princi­
ples .
Who should serve?
We turn now to the question: Who should serve on the 
principles body? For reasons already stated, we believe a prepon­
derance of the members should be CPAs in public practice. At the 
same time, we recognize that persons in other business disciplines 
have viewpoints, experience and expertise which are relevant to 
the task of determining accounting principles. Hence, the principles 
body should make maximum use of assistance available from persons 
not among its members. Such influence, of coarse, can be (and has 
been) availed of by receiving briefs and by conducting hearings, 
and we think these procedures should be continued. We believe, 
however, that more direct participation by representatives of 
other disciplines can improve the quality of the statements of the 
principles body. Further, we think that providing for such par­
ticipation can help to make the body’s statements more palatable 
to other groups who have an interest in them.
One way to make it possible for persons in other disci­
plines to participate directly would be to set aside seats on the 
body for persons who are not practicing CPAs, for example, account­
ing educators, corporation executives, economists, securities 
analysts, lawyers. It would be difficult, however, to find persons 
in some of these categories who would be able to devote the 
Arthur Young & Company
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substantial amounts of time (fifty percent or more) that would be 
required and whose understanding of financial and accounting matters 
would be deep enough so that they could contribute to the solution 
of the wide range of problems coming before the body.
Another and perhaps more useful way would be to include 
persons in other disciplines as members of subcommittees assigned 
to study specified subjects and draft Opinions. In some instances 
the project advisory committee that assists in the preparation of 
a research study might appropriately continue to serve until the 
principles body had issued a formal statement.
A related question is the length of members’ terms. We 
believe that the present arrangement, whereby members usually serve 
two three-year terms, is satisfactory in that it adequately accom­
modates the benefits of accumulated, detailed familiarity with the 
work of the body and the benefits of reasonable rotation.
In searching for ways to accelerate output, it is natural 
to wonder whether a smaller group could do better. In this vein it 
has been suggested that the principles body ought to be a smaller 
group, composed of perhaps five or six members who would serve full 
time. Although such a group might reach answers faster, we do not 
believe the answers would be correspondingly better. Further, we 
think it would be most difficult to find qualified people who 
would be willing to serve as members of such a body. Moreover, 
however well qualified, the people selected would quickly lose 
touch with the business world, so that their pronouncements would 
be decreasingly realistic and hence decreasingly accepted. Further, 
as suggested earlier we think it unlikely that the accounting firms 
would uniformly and effectively support statements of a body on 
which they were not represented. It may be relevant that in the 
political arena the bodies to which legislative functions are en­
trusted are almost always larger than those to which other major 
functions are entrusted.
Appeals
In the eyes of some, the structure of the Accounting 
Principles Board is defective because there is no formal procedure 
for appealing its decisions. We think this objection evidences a 
misunderstanding of the function of the principle-setting body. 
To see this it may be useful to use again the analogy between 
the function of that body and the function of the most nearly cor­
responding type of government body. The appropriate analogy is 
with the legislative function, rather than with the judicial. For 
the most part, courts hear appeals from decisions of other courts, 
not from the actions of legislatures. A legislative action is 
subject to court review, but only on the basis that the legislators 
have exceeded their authority, as by violating a constitution. In 
the case of an accounting principles body, there is no rationale 
for a formal appeal procedure. In any event, the SEC’s power to 
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make accounting rules is an effective restraint, probably more ef­
fective than the constitutionality restraint on legislation. If 
there were a procedure to appeal the setting of principles, the 
body hearing the appeals might easily become the principle-setting 
body, and in that event the group below would lose its signifi­
cance .
Operating procedures
A complaint frequently heard is that the Opinions of the 
APB have been too detailed. Many believe that the principles body 
should limit its statements to broad expressions of philosophy and 
intent. We do not believe a general answer can be laid down for 
this issue. Rather, we think it should be left to the principles 
body to decide how it can best meet the dual objective of (a) mak­
ing its statements understandable and enforceable and (b) avoiding 
the inclusion of unnecessarily detailed rules.
A serious problem the APB has faced is how to increase 
the volume of its output. Ways should be sought to shorten the 
time span between the initial consideration of a subject and the 
issuance of an Opinion. Ways must also be found to enable the 
principles body to better anticipate problems and to deal with 
them in an orderly way before they become fires that must be ex­
tinguished. In the long run, the work of the Accounting Objectives 
Study Group should be useful in this latter regard. In the short 
run, changes in the APB's operating procedures can be effective by 
making more time available.
We believe that a significant advance can be made by in­
creasing the extent of quality staff assistance. This has been 
obvious to all concerned for some time. If, before discussing an 
issue, the members of the principles body were able to study well- 
prepared staff papers analyzing the alternatives and the varying 
consequences of adopting them, the body ought to be able to reach 
conclusions more rapidly than the APB has done in the past. And 
surely the members of the body should not be called upon, as APB 
members are at present, to perform research and to draft statements. 
If the task of expressing the body’s conclusions could be assigned 
to able, responsible staff people, the members would be free to 
move more quickly in applying their experience and expertise to 
the solution of additional issues.
The present requirement for a two-thirds vote of the mem­
bership of the Board in order to adopt an Opinion should be con­
tinued. This is a suitable safeguard against the issuance of state­
ments to which too great a segment of informed opinion is opposed.
For the most part, the Opinions of the APB have become 
effective shortly after they were issued. It would be reasonable, 
in many instances, to postpone the effectiveness of statements for 
a relatively long period of time, such as one or two years. This 
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would give companies an opportunity to adjust to the new principles 
but would not seriously undermine the advantage of the change.
Interpretations
The practice of issuing interpretations is useful and 
should be continued and expanded. We are not, however, in accord 
with all the uses to which the process has been applied or with 
the language of the recently adopted preamble to interpretations.
There has been a growing tendency to use the interpreta­
tion process as a vehicle for the APB to make pronouncements which 
for one reason or another it chooses not to put into the form of an 
Opinion. The APB should not substantively alter an Opinion except 
by means of another Opinion. On July 30, 1971 the APB approved a 
change in the standard language accompanying interpretations which 
give interpretations an authority they did not previously have. 
We do not believe that the Board should issue two classes of au­
thoritative pronouncements, one called Opinions and one called 
interpretations and attributed to other authorship.
We believe it would be useful in connection with some 
Opinions to issue discussions (whether called interpretations or 
something else) which would develop various applications of the 
Opinion and sometimes include illustrative applications. We do 
not believe, however, that any such documents should carry the 
July 30 language: "However, members should be aware that they may 
be called upon to justify departures from the interpretations.”
We also deplore the language "unless otherwise stated 
the interpretations are not intended to be retroactive." If they 
are only interpretations, they should simply explain what the 
Opinion has always meant and the question of retroactivity should 
not arise.
Financing
The cost of the process of determining accounting prin­
ciples, including the cost of the related research effort, has 
been substantial and will continue to be so. We believe that this 
cost should be underwritten by different groups in different ways. 
CPAs in public practice should continue to bear the preponderance 
of the cost, partly by making available the time of APB members 
and others and partly by means of direct contributions. We be­
lieve that the APB should look increasingly to other interested 
organizations for assistance, both in developing and presenting 
reasoned position papers and in doing research. We do not believe, 
however, that the accounting profession should look to other orga­
nizations for direct financial support of the principles body or 
of the research effort.
Arthur Young & Company




We believe that the effectiveness of the AICPA’s research 
efforts can be improved in a number of ways. For one matter, we 
would like the research studies to be more balanced in their pre­
sentation of the arguments for and against the various conclusions 
that might be reached. One way to achieve this would be to omit 
recommendations of the authors, so that the studies would be neutral 
in character. To make this workable, the studies would need to pre­
sent alternative conclusions, worked out in relatively complete and 
coordinated form, so that the significance of the choices would be 
fully understandable.
We believe that studies should go more deeply into the 
likely effects of proposed accounting principle changes on finan­
cial statements, and hence on business operations. Such procedures 
would expose problems of implementation that the principles body 
might otherwise overlook.
We also believe that behavioral research, directed to 
finding out how readers use financial statements and how they are 
influenced by them, would be helpful.
In order to attain the highest possible volume of output 
consistent with maintaining the highest level of quality, the In­
stitute should make use of all available sources of research capa­
bility. Principal among these are the accounting firms, the uni­
versities and the Institute's own research staff. A researcher 
must approach his project with enthusiasm, must be able to commit 
the time necessary in the aggregate to accomplish it and must be 
able to give it sustained attention, with a minimum of interruption, 
for relatively long periods. University faculty members may be 
able to commit relatively large blocks of time, and consideration 
should be given to making better use of their abilities.
578Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles
Submitted by: Herbert K. Bell Jr.
1. I believe the board should establish fundamentals, whether we call them "accounting 
principles" or "financial accounting and reporting standards." Since Opinion No. 15, 
the Board has been issuing detailed, illogical, arbitrary, regulatory instructions, 
in most cases, it appears, to patch up or plug up some shady or undesirable accounting 
practice or method of financial statement presentation being practiced by some segment 
of the business world. They are trying to legislate honesty, integrity and high morals; 
and if we have to do that, then, in my opinion, we had better turn in our badges and 
let the SEC or some other governmental agency do the job.
2. I would hate to see the responsibility for establishing accounting standards or 
accounting principles reside in a governmental body. However, I sincerely believe 
that if we do not improve on the present method of operation - the APB — then the 
SEC will some day in the not too distant future step in and take over, which they 
now have the power to do.
3. I believe the present Board is ill-constituted, and will never be able to do an 
acceptable job. The reasons:
a. It is too large and unwieldy. I believe a Board of five or seven would be much 
more effective.
b.There are too many selfish interests being protected by the 18 members (or at 
least a large part of them). The independence in mental attitude that we talk 
about so much is certainly lacking here.
c. Closely akin to b, above, is the pressure from the business executives. The 
corporate president does not want to be held to an accounting principle or 
statement presentation requirement that will make him look bad, regardless of 
how bad the situation really is. Look at a few articles in the Wall Street 
Journal over the past couple of years and see how many companies have "really 
cleaned house” during the business downturn. Why weren't these unfavorable items 
handled in 1966 or 1967? Did everything suddenly go sour all at once? Of 
course not, and all of you know it.
4. I would suggest a Board constituted somewhat as follows:
a. Five or seven masters on a full-time, paid basis.
b. They should all be CPAs, preferably with experience in public accounting, 
industry, and teaching. This sort of varied background should gire knowledge 
and understanding of the problems of the practicing CPA and the business executive, 
as well as the needed academic touch.
c. Hare any Opinions (or whatever you might call their pronouncements) coordinated 
with and approved fay the SEC. Then, request the SEC to put the necessary "teeth" 
into the Opinions, the APB cannot new do.
d. I would suggest an appeal procedure.
CPA ASSOCIATES
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING • SUITE 5415 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10001
(212) 736-3617
SAMUEL P. GUNTHER 
Executive Director
October 15, 1971
Accounting Principles Study Group 
American institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 
666 Fifth Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10019
Attention: Michael A. Pinto
Gentlemen:
I am writing to you as a member of the Committee on Account­
ing and Auditing Procedure of the New York State Society of 
Certified Public Accountants. Because of the limitations of 
time, this letter has not been reviewed by our entire com­
mittee at this point. It will be circularized among the 
committee as a whole, and any conclusions which differ with 
the opinions expressed in this letter will be sent to you. 
The comments presented below are divided into four major 
categories: (I) Public Hearings,(II) Legislative Histories 
(III) Accounting Interpretations, and (IV) Technical Infor­
mation Service Interpretations.
I. PUBLIC HEARINGS
Accounting Principles Board Opinions constitute "Account­
ing Law." As such, they are developed in a manner quite simi­
lar to legislation. In fact, the business corporation laws 
of certain states contain language which permits reliance, 
for certain purposes, by officers and directors of corpora­
tions upon reports of certified public accountants. This is 
viewed by some as incorporating generally accepted account­
ing principles into those statutes. Because this is so, and 
because of the vast impact upon the public of promulgated 
principles of accounting, public hearings should be held prior 
to the issuance of every Accounting Principles Board Opinion, 
similar to those held for marketable securities. This will 
provide any interested person or organization with an oppor­
tunity to indicate his or its comments on any matter under 
consideration by the Board. It will also assist the Board 
in deriving reasonable positions and will be useful in main­





Based upon the results of public hearings and delibera­
tions of the Board, Accounting Principles Board Opinions are 
issued. It would be invaluable to practitioners to have 
available textual summaries of Board meetings containing 
descriptions and examples of the problems considered, alterna­
tive proposed solutions, the reasons for adopting or reject­
ing those solutions and the specific meanings of specific 
terms and phrases used in the Opinions, Such legislative 
histories would also indicate how new Opinions change prior 
practice or merely codify that which always had been deemed 
to be generally accepted.
Of equal if not greater importance, committee reports should 
focus on the substance of transactions dealt with and will 
indicate the spirit of the pronouncements. This will further 
guarantee that the “substance over form" language which fol­
lows each Opinion will have the effect intended.
At present, Accounting Principles Board Opinions con­
tain very brief introductory commentaries but the individual 
operative paragraphs of the Opinions provide little insight 
into the reasoning behind them. Moreover, frequently no 
definitions are set forth. For example, Paragraph 46a of 
Opinion 16 says “Each of the combining companies is autonomous 
and has not been a subsidiary or division of another corpora­
tion within two years before the plan is Initiated..." 
(Emphasis added). Does the word “and“ suggest that "autonomous" 
has a meaning independent of "not a subsidiary or division" 
or should the paragraph have simply read, “Neither of the 
combining companies has been a subsidiary or a division..." 
without using the word "autonomous" at all? The answer to 
this question is not apparent in the paragraph in point.
The suggested legislative histories could be made avail­
able in the AICPA library or for purchase at the AICPA. Such 
histories would be useful not only to practitioners but also 
to the AICPA staff and to subsequent appointees to the APB.
III. ACCOUNTING INTERPRETATIONS
The general interpretations of Board Opinions by the 
AICPA staff which administers the APB have been published 
in the Journal of Accountancy and in one instance, in book­
let form, (i.e. (concerning Opinion 15), Leonard Savoie, 
Executive Vice President of the AICPA, writing in the Septem­
ber, 1971 CPA, stated that in the future the word "unofficial" 
will be dropped in describing future interpretations of Board 
Opinions. Because of the mechanism through which the inter­
pretations are developed and released, and because of their 
source, we recommend that such interpretations specifically
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be designated as constituting "substantial authoritative 
support" for those paragraphs of Accounting Principles 
Board Opinions which are interpreted. In view of the fact 
that practitioners must justify departures from these in­
terpretations, conversely, they should be able to rely upon 
them without equivocation. The present warning that de­
partures from these interpretations requires justification 
implies such a conclusion. We feel that although the in­
terpretations may not be labeled "official" they are clearly 
"authoritative." Why not say so in the standard caveat 
that accompanies all of these interpretations?
IV. TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE INTERPRETATIONS
The Technical Information Service of the Institute has 
the responsibility of answering specific inquiries includ­
ing those relating to Board Opinions. The Institute should 
consider publishing for members those opinions of the Tech­
nical Information Service which deal with Board Opinions 
(without the use of actual names, of course). These inter­
pretations might be compiled annually in booklet or loose­
leaf form. They could also be incorporated into the loose­
leaf CCH service which presently contains material concern­
ing Accounting Principles Board Opinions.
The force and effect of Technical Information Service 
interpretations could be differentiated from the general 
interpretations set forth by the AICPA staff which admini­
sters the APB. The possibility of any conflict between the 
two interpretative sources would be small if the administra­
tive staff reviewed Technical Information Service opinions 
prior to their release to those making specific inquiries.
Very truly yours,
SPG:se Samuel P. Gunther
cc: Peter Lasusa, Chmn
Louis Sternbach & Company
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Offices
NEW YORK, N. Y.
WILTON, CONN.
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.
10 EAST 40TH STREET 
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016
(212) 889-4900
STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
1 - SCOPE OF THE TASK
We believe that the public interest will best be served if the body 
concerned with the "Establishment Of Accounting Principles" will concentrate 
its work on formulating financial accounting and reporting standards. Concern 
with "principles" is likely to go far afield into theoretical considerations 
as to accounting postulates, principles, procedures and methods and the respec­
tive areas encompassed by each, with the possible result of academic exercises 
diverting attention from the establishment of sound and fair standards to oper­
ate within the existing economic and social environment. Financial accounting 
and reporting standards should be based on sound theory; but within the param­
eters indicated it would appear that the main objective should be the develop­
ment of a coherent body of workable standards pointing to the most desirable 
practices in implementation.
The formulation of financial accounting and reporting standards 
should not be limited to fundamentals which can be made so broad in scope that 
"anything goes". On the other hand, we do not view the responsibility of 
formulating standards as an authority to promulgate detailed standards and 
regulations which are likely to become the limiting norms for compliance and 
cause a lowering of the status of the accounting profession to the position of 
artisans applying "cookbook" rules. We see the task at hand as that of develop­
ing guidelines in an orderly manner, pointing up recommended treatments when­
ever possible, and calling for explicit justification of departures from 
recommended treatments, to arrive at a unified stand for the accounting profes­
sion so as to make it a truly effective leader in its area of competence.
2 - PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERFORMING THE BASIC TASK
The formulation of financial accounting and reporting standards 
should remain the responsibility of a skilled body of professionals capable of 
seeing the work in its broadest social and economic context, preferably the 
Accounting Principles Board. A government agency or government-sponsored body 
is likely to have its deliberations affected by the political tendencies of the 
day, consciously or subconsciously - whereas the basic task, as we see it, is
that of providing a framework of guidelines for the future, with a view toward 
making the accounting and reporting standards truly responsive to the require­
ments of all users of financial statements.
The non-governmental body of skilled professionals, preferably the
Accounting Principles Board, should work in close contact with the AICPA. It 
would be preferable for a majority of the members to be drawn from the AICPA. 
The contemplated body should work in close contact with the SEC but not be 
subservient to it. We would favor a body that, by coming to grips with the 
"issues" of financial accounting and reporting standards, would demonstrate 
that the leadership in the field rests upon skill and understanding and would 
resist any attempt at arbitrary ad hoc rule - making. Enforcement of the 
guidelines promulgated by this body should continue as heretofore, by placing 
on the reporting entity the onus of justifying, in clear and understandable 
terms, any departures from the guidelines.
3 - COMPOSITION OF THE NON-COVERNMENTAL STANDARDS BOARD
Service on the board should be broadened somewhat beyond the present
composition in that one or two financial executives who are not CPA's should 
be invited to serve on the basis of demonstrated leadership on their part in 
working towards more adequate reporting. The board should be composed of CPA's, 
in practice, with a good combination of public practice, industrial and com­
mercial practice and non-profit organization practice; the majority of the board 
should be members of the AICPA. As to representatives from public practice, 
it would be important to include competent members of local and regional firms; 
to some extent, there is such representation now, but it should probably be 
increased so that the public interest is served. Recommendations from the various 
State Societies of CPA's should be solicited and evaluated. The size of the 
board could be increased to 25 members or so; but in order to expedite its func­
tioning there should be increased delegation of work to project subcommittees 
for review, discussion and acceptance or rejection by the full board.
We would like to see the present volunteer board system continue, in
the interest of having all members keep in continuing touch with the practical 
problems to which they are expected to address themselves. The spirit of public 
service to the profession and the community is just as lively in small and 
medium firms as it is in large firms. The distinctive honor of serving in a 
leadership capacity on the board should of itself be sufficient compensation.
Staff support, to the extent that existing support from the AICPA
requires rounding out, might be supplemented by the seconding to the Board, for 
a year at a time, of capable CPA's just below full Board stature, to serve the 
Board, possibly by an arrangement under which the seconding firm pays half of 
the salary and the AICPA the other half. In this manner, there would be created 
one possible avenue for bringing in replacement members to the Board as terms 
of office expire.
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Financing should, ideally, be by the entire profession; but as it is 
probably difficult to reach CPA’s who are not members of the AICPA or their 
applicable state societies, the preferred practical solution would be financing 
by a dues increase on the part of the AICPA, with the increase being clearly 
labeled as to its nature. It is not that we would want to discourage grants or 
gifts to the AICPA in support of the Board; we would, however, take a dim view 
of even the possibility of some substantial ’’angels” desiring to call the tune 
on the basis of contributions.
4 - METHODS OF OPERATION OF A NON-GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS BOARD
The newly applied procedure of public hearings appears adequate;
provided, however, that continuing control is kept over the time allotted to 
oral presentations, and that time continues to be made available, in moderation, 
to participants at hearings wishing to speak.
Since full consensus is impossible to attain, except in the most non-
controversial situations, the present rule requiring at least two-thirds of the 
members to assent before action should be retained. It may be possible to set 
up a post-review of opinions that are passed by a two-thirds vote, but did not 
command at least three-quarters of the vote, after the first two years of ex­
perience with such opinions, to determine the extent to which the objections or 
reservations of dissenting members have been borne out by experience.
We suggest that swift action on ’’developing problems” can be obtained
by resorting to unofficial interpretation of existing opinions, and, in areas 
not yet covered by formal opinions, by the increasing use of working subcom­
mittees of the Board with adequate staff assistance. To the extent both pro­
cedures are currently used, they appear to be working satisfactorily.
We do not think it desirable to develop an appeal procedure designed
to handle appeals from determinations of the Board. An accounting court, by 
whatever name called, would, in our opinion, make for rigidity and for going 
in the direction of rule-making rather than in that of developing parameters 
for action. Reconsideration of matters previously dealt with by the Board 
should come from two-way communication, to and from the Board and its individ­
ual members.
5 - ACCOUNTING RESEARCH SUPPORT FOR A NON-GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS BOARD
There should be a continuation of the present accounting research 
studies, under the auspices of the Board, with the help not only of those present­
ly engaged in them but also of suitable personnel to be secured to help the 
Board by cooperating firms. The studies should concentrate on the objective of 
usefulness and public interest and should be financed by increased AICPA dues.
Louis Sternbach & Company
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Sound theoretical justification must be adduced, but the concern with theory 
must be tempered with an understanding of what is feasible and wise. It should 
be remembered that accounting has a dual character, that of a science resting 
on working hypotheses considered valid until disproved, and that of an art, 
holding up a mirror to reality and thus, hopefully, getting nearer to the essence 
of reality.
Louis Sternbach & Company
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ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
by Edward P. Brunner
My statement has been prepared in line with the pertinent questions submitted with 
the notice of the establishment of the Committee on Accounting Principles and I 
will address myself to these questions in the order that they were presented.
1. ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
I feel the term ’’Accounting Principles” should be defined as the 
comprehensive and fundamental laws, rules and code of conduct for 
the fulfillment of the art of accounting. The body primarily re­
sponsible for formulating these laws should limit itself to fun­
damental concepts and should not develop specific detailed standards 
of operation. If an expert heart surgeon were bound by a detailed 
list of specific instructions of how and when to use his scapel, 
he would be much less effective in his profession — so it is with 
the accountant. I think Mr. Paton covered this point very well in 
a recent article in the Journal of Accountancy when he stated:
"All of us expect the doctor to base his decisions in the 
particular case on his own judgment, in the light of his 
training and experience. The same should be expected of 
the accountant, viewed as at least an aspirant to pro­
fessional competence and reputation. The business world 
in which he operates is almost infinitely complex and 
varying, and it is impossible as well as undesirable for 
any Board to hold him by the hand by means of an exhaus­
tive set of detailed directives."1
I am in complete sympathy with Mr. Paton’s point of view and I 
think his example of Opinion #15 is a valid one. The obscurity 
and unnecessary detail covered in this Opinion and the resulting 
publication of a 189 page unofficial interpretation of the Opinion 
is evidence, I feel, that the tendency appears to be toward a more 
detailed regulation which, I feel, will be detrimental to the pro­
fession.
2. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
I feel that the Accounting Principles Board should be a non­
governmental body and should be a legislative arm of the AICPA. 
It should work closely with all segments of the financial com­
munity and should be represented accordingly (see #3 below).
The nature of its authority, I feel, is self-evident in matters 
of accounting, and enforcement of its proclamations can be sup­
ported and enhanced by cooperation of regulatory authorities, 
security analysts and public practitioners through various means. 
The regulatory authorities would require compliance for areas 
under their jurisdiction; the security analysts would require 
compliance through their organizational representatives; and 
the public practitioners would require compliance through the 
code of ethics.
1 ’’Earmarks of a Profession — and the APB”, Journal of Accountancy, January 1971, 
p. 43.
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3. COMPOSITION OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
I feel that the breadth of view of the Board should be expanded 
and should proportionately represent the various segments of the 
financial community.
In the report of the special committee on Opinions of the 
Accounting Principles Board published in the spring of 1965, it 
was indicated that over 25% of the members of the Institute are 
from industry, education and government and I would assume at 
this time that this percentage is much higher. It may well be 
when you are referring to auditing standards that the prepon­
derance of public practitioners is mandate. However, when you 
are referring to accounting principles, I feel that all seg­
ments of the profession have men equally competent with the 
integrity and trustworthiness to participate in the establish­
ment of these principles. To say that an individual in industry 
would be serving special interests is no more justified than 
saying that a member of one of the "big eight" would be serving 
a special interest because of the relationship with a large 
national client. I feel that the criterion for serving on the 
Board should be an individual’s capability and expertise rather 
than his location in the business community.
In order to give the Board the broader scope recommended here, 
I feel that there should be equal representation of public 
practitioners and other areas of the business community. I 
feel that members of the Board should be members of the AICPA. 
I feel there should be representation of certain essential 
segments of the financial community such as: the SEC, the se­
curity analysts field and the academic community. These 
representatives along with additional representatives from 
industry, would broaden the input of the Board and hopefully 
would enhance the enforcement of the Board’s pronouncements.
I feel that the term of office should be flexible and possibly 
varying for certain members. Some members may hold office for 
three years in order to establish continuity, whereas other 
members may serve shorter terms, possibly one year, to enable 
that member to devote the necessary time required while serving 
on the Board. It may be that some members would not want to 
commit themselves for a three year period, if the meetings were 
to be held frequently. The chairman preferably, should be a 
paid full time member.
Since the Board would be all inclusive in its membership and 
the members would be members of the AICPA, I feel that out­
side financing would be justified.
4. METHODS OF OPERATION OF THE BOARD
I feel that the introduction of public hearings on subjects for 
proposed opinions has been very successful and should be con­
tinued and expanded. I feel that the two-thirds vote for adop­
tion of an opinion is satisfactory and should remain in effect.
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I feel that the Board should meet regularly, at least monthly, 
in order to cut down the required time for taking action on an 
issue. The use of subcommittees, meeting more frequently on 
given issues, may also speed up the process.
Although an appeal procedure would probably be extremely bene­
ficial in certain cases, the problems, expenses and maintenance 
of such a system makes it impractical.
The publication of unofficial interpretations of APB Opinions 
should be continued, however, the word unofficial should be 
eliminated and the interpretations should be promulgated after 
the Opinion has been in force for a given period of time, in 
order to clarify the questions that arise immediately after 
the issuance of an Opinion.
5. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
There should be a research committee established within the AICPA 
with representation similar to the Principles Board. It would be 
this committee’s responsibility to research various accounting 
standards and report their findings to the Accounting Principles 
Board.
The committee would not be a part of the Principles Board, but 
an independent entity established within the Institute. It 
would be a sounding Board for the financial community for pressing 
accounting problems.
Again, I feel that outside financing would be justified in the 
form of membership fees.
Very truly yours,
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INTRODUCTION
Substantial progress has been made in recent years in the development of 
accounting principles. But there has been increasing criticism, from both within and 
without the accounting profession, of the process by which accounting principles are 
established. This criticism has resulted in the formation of a special committee of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to study the process for 
establishing accounting principles. To aid the Committee in its study, we at Haskins & 
Sells submit in summary form our views on today’s and tomorrow’s needs of 
accounting and our proposal for a new structure to determine accounting principles 
and their applications—one fully capable of responding to these demanding needs.
General Acceptance
Accounting principles and their applications have meaning only in relation to the 
objectives of financial statements. Objectives, in turn, derive from needs for financial 
information. The needs are diverse because the interests of those concerned with 
financial statements are varied. The needs, therefore, must be evaluated and given the 
emphasis justified by their relative importance. This evaluation process may cause some 
whose needs are not emphasized to believe that their views and interests are unduly 
subordinated. The process, therefore, must be fair and, of equal importance, both users 
and issuers of financial statements must believe it to be fair. Otherwise, general 
acceptance will not be attained.
To date, pronouncements of the Accounting Principles Board have gained general 
acceptance, if not general approval, in that they are being followed. The objectivity of 
the Board’s decisions is not seriously questioned. The growing concern over the 
determination of accounting principles appears to be aimed more at the process by 
which principles are established than at the particular conclusions reached by the 
Board. We believe, therefore, that the process should be changed in order to enhance 
confidence in it and thus ensure the general acceptance of its results.
The Blur Between Principles and Applications
The basic distinction between meaning and usage of principles on the one hand 
and applications of principles on the other needs to be emphasized and observed in the 
establishment of principles. The blur of meaning between these terms has slowed 
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progress. Principles or fundamentals of accounting are broad concepts that cut across 
industries and companies. Applications are concerned with making the fundamentals 
operative, both where the circumstances are alike and where they are not. 
Fundamentals or principles underlie; applications represent the method. Attention to 
fundamentals has lagged with resulting inconsistencies and obscurities of reason.
The time and effort expended by members of the Accounting Principles Board 
have been very significant. Even so, financial reporting problems requiring Board 
attention have been occurring at an increasing rate. Time limitations have caused the 
Board to concentrate on pressing problems, whose solutions generally include 
enunciation of new applications rather than of principles. A way must be found to give 
continuing parallel attention to principles and to their applications.
As needs for financial information change and evolve, accounting objectives 
change and, therefore, so do accounting principles. Thus, consideration of accounting 
principles must be a continuing process. At the present time the task is magnified by 
the backlog of matters requiring attention.
HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR PROPOSAL
To ensure that consideration of accounting principles and their applications is 
coordinated, that pronouncements are responsive and timely, and that they receive 
general acceptance, we recommend a structure comprising the following elements.
A Foundation for Advancement of Accounting and
Its Board of Trustees
A non-profit foundation should be formed for the specific purpose of developing 
accounting principles. The Foundation would be governed by a Board of Trustees, 
whose members would be distinguished representatives of all the interests concerned 
with and affected by developments in financial statements, including issuers, users, 
and auditors.
An Accounting Principles Commission
A full-time, paid commission would be appointed by the Board of Trustees of the 
Foundation to issue pronouncements on accounting principles after extensive research, 
hearings, interviews, exposure, and deliberations. Each Commissioner would be a 
recognized expert in the field, who would possess a broad understanding of the 
purposes, uses, and limitations of financial statements.
The success of the structure recommended by this proposal depends upon the 




capability can be found and will accept appointments to the Commission.
Research-A Vital Function of the Commission
Extensive research, both analytical and empirical, will not only continue to be 
required but, at least initially, will need to exceed the research efforts presently 
devoted to the development of accounting principles. This research capability should 
be in the Foundation in order that the Commission may direct the research needed to 
perform its function. Some of it may be contracted; some of it would be performed by 
a full-time staff; but all of it should be supervised by a director of research responsible 
to the Commission.
A Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles
A part-time, non-paid committee should be established within the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants to issue pronouncements on applications and 
interpretations of accounting principles. Its membership would be quite similar to that 
of the present Accounting Principles Board. Issuance of a pronouncement by the 
Committee would be subject to approval by the Accounting Principles Commission.
A Task Force on Accounting Objectives
From time to time, perhaps as frequently as every five years, the Trustees of the 
Foundation should appoint a task force to study the then existing needs for financial 
information and their effects on the objectives of financial statements.
Petitions for Interpretation or Reconsideration
A procedure should be created to provide interested parties with the opportunity 
to petition the Accounting Principles Commission for interpretation or reconsideration 
of pronouncements on accounting principles or applications thereof.
*****
We at Haskins & Sells believe that the organizational structure outlined above 
would represent a substantially more effective process for the determination of 
accounting principles and their applications and that it would be responsive to the 
needs of accounting both for today and for the future.
4
OUR PROPOSAL IN FURTHER DETAIL
Background
Financial reporting has been advanced significantly by the Accounting Principles 
Board. The Board has dealt with some difficult problems and has gained general 
adherence to its pronouncements. Of course there has been controversy. Unanimity in 
any field is rare when complex and sensitive issues are being resolved.
In 1958 when the AICPA Special Committee on Research Program recommended 
formation of the Accounting Principles Board, it also recommended that the 
“immediate projects of the accounting research staff should be a study of the basic 
postulates of accounting underlying accounting principles generally, and a study of the 
broad principles of accounting.” It was envisaged that these postulates and principles 
would form the basis for the Board’s pronouncements. Although the Special 
Committee recognized that postulates and principles could become outmoded, there 
appeared to be an underlying assumption that, once the postulates and principles had 
been identified, promulgation of guides for applying principles could move ahead 
quickly. Concerted efforts were made to identify these postulates and underlying 
principles; however, the results did not receive general acceptance and were laid aside. 
Perhaps they were ahead of their time; perhaps the transition was too difficult. 
Whatever the reasons, they seem to have had little impact on accounting developments. 
Since then the Board has approached the development of accounting principles in an 
evolutionary way. We agree that the process should be one of evolution, rather than 
abrupt transformation; however, the process can and should be speeded up and made 
more effective.
Today’s and Tomorrow’s Needs
Assurance of General Acceptance. General acceptance is essential—both of the 
decisions made in establishing specific accounting principles and their applications and 
of the process by which these decisions are made. General acceptance of the process 
requires recognition by both issuer and user of financial statements that the process is 
fair and effective. Objectivity and independence are the keys to acknowledged fairness.
General belief that the process itself safeguards objectivity and independence and 
responds quickly to changing needs will minimize controversy. A minimum of 
controversy is necessary to assure a maximum of reason and reflection in establishing 
accounting principles.
The relatively placid accounting world of earlier times is gone. For years 
accounting was not subject to extensive public scrutiny, and the process of developing
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accounting principles was slower-paced and comparatively non-controversial. Today 
there is broader awareness of accounting and greater interest in its results. This 
awareness has lead to increased criticism from (1) those desiring more rapid progress, 
(2) those concerned about the process by which accounting principles are determined, 
and (3) those disagreeing with specific decisions of the Accounting Principles Board 
(including some who believe their reported financial results will be adversely affected 
by changes in accounting principles). As for the last group, new promulgations of 
principles must stand on their own merits, and some disagreement must be expected.
The recent practice of conducting public hearings and seminars before 
determining positions on principles should be followed in establishing accounting 
principles and their related applications. Accounting principles cannot be derived by 
attempting to achieve a consensus of the parties concerned (often because their 
individual interests are in conflict); nonetheless, once accounting principles are 
determined, general acceptance by all concerned parties should be sought. It will be 
substantially obtained if the process is objective, reasoned, and responsive to the needs 
for financial information.
The criticism from those desiring more rapid progress reflects today’s need for a 
substantial increase in the total capability for establishing accounting principles and 
related applications. This need results from changing accounting objectives, a backlog 
of fundamental matters requiring attention, and the accelerating rate of change in 
today’s world. Accounting “crises” will inevitably arise in a rapidly changing business 
environment unless the time and resources to anticipate change and accommodate to it 
are provided in the structure for advancing accounting principles.
Distinguishing Between Principles and Applications. There is a pressing need to 
distinguish between (a) broad accounting principles and (b) applications of those 
principles. Accounting practice has tended to blur, at times virtually to erase, this 
distinction. The results sometimes have been (1) to elevate applications to the status of 
principles or (2) to ignore the need for considering (sometimes establishing) principles 
when establishing applications. Accounting principles represent the conceptual logic of 
accounting in relation to the objectives of financial statements. They prevent 
accounting from becoming a patchwork of unstructured rules. Why have principles and 
rules become confused? Muddled terminology, the necessity of reacting to crises, and 
the inherent difficulties in establishing principles-all of these have contributed to this 
confusion.
Principles, concepts, objectives, standards, conventions, methods, procedures, 
practices, and rules have been a part of accounting’s muddled terminology. The phrase 
“generally accepted accounting principles” in reports of auditors is generally 
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recognized as including not only accounting principles and practices but also the 
methods of applying them. Although this single phrase has been useful in referring to 
the criteria upon which financial statements are prepared, its usage should not be 
permitted to obscure the fact that principles or fundamentals are of a different order 
from applications or methods.
In the structure we recommend, accounting pronouncements would deal 
separately with:
Accounting Principles—Fundamental, pervasive concepts that are established in 
relation to the objectives of financial statements.
Applications of Accounting Principles—Procedures, methods, and rules that are 
observed in applying accounting principles.
Accounting principles and applications of accounting principles can be defined so 
as to appear mutually exclusive; but in fact the elements of “generally accepted 
accounting principles” span a continuum ranging from those representing the most 
fundamental principles to those representing applications based solely on consensus, or 
even in some instances a majority view. Although some elements have the attributes of 
both principles and applications, the two can be determined separately. The operations 
of the United States Government provide a precedent for this approach; Congress 
enacts laws, while the agencies of the Executive Branch adopt enabling regulations. As 
a result of the proposed separate determination of principles and applications, there 
should evolve an appreciation for the functional differences between the two that 
should facilitate the resolution of future accounting problems.
The emphasis placed on accounting methods and guidelines, without 
corresponding attention to unifying fundamental concepts, has resulted largely from a 
continually growing need to deal with “short-range crises.” Specific problems tend to 
beget specific, application-oriented solutions. Time limitations often necessitate 
adoption of stop-gap measures rather than solutions related to unifying fundamental 
concepts, particularly where the pertinent concepts lack clarity of definition.
Accounting principles are more pervasive than applications of accounting 
principles—and more difficult to develop. One principle may seem more applicable to 
the needs of one financial statement user; an opposing principle may appear more 
applicable to another’s needs. The adopted principle must be equitable to both. Often 
there are difficult trade-offs.
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A Responsive Organizational Structure
The Foundation and Its Board of Trustees. We recommend formation of a 
foundation for advancement of accounting. The interests of those concerned with the 
development of accounting principles are widespread and diverse and are by no means 
limited to accounting practitioners. We believe a foundation would be an effective 
means for also involving the issuers and users of financial information in the 
development of accounting.
Members of the Board of Trustees should be leaders in their fields. Collectively, 
they would be representative of those in the financial community who are concerned 
with and affected by developments in financial statements. These would include, 
among others, accounting practitioners, accounting educators, corporate executives, 
investors, investment advisors, lawyers, lenders and other creditors, and government 
officials.
Once established, the Board of Trustees should appoint succeeding Trustees. We 
believe that organizations representing broad groups concerned with financial reporting 
should be asked to recommend candidates for Trustees.
The most important function of the Trustees would be to appoint Commissioners. 
Through their power of appointment and because of their individual prestige, the 
Trustees would be a significant influence on the process of establishing accounting 
principles and would enhance the general acceptability of the results. The Board of 
Trustees would also be a logical forum for considering public criticism. They would 
have the power to act. They also could become an important buffer for the Accounting 
Principles Commission in responding to public criticism. In addition, the Trustees 
would hire other key employees for the Foundation and would administer the 
Foundation’s overall finances.
The Accounting Principles Commission. The Commission would issue statements 
on accounting principles. Its conclusions would be based on intensive research, public 
hearings, interviews with interested parties, comments on exposure drafts, and its own 
deliberations. The Commission’s statements ordinarily should be released sufficiently 
ahead of their effective date to allow for the concurrent development of any necessary 
related pronouncements by the Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles 
(whose functions are described subsequently). The Commission would review exposure 
drafts and pronouncements of the Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles 
to make sure that they are not in conflict with established accounting principles. 
Statements on accounting principles, approved by a majority of the Commissioners, 





Individuals named as Commissioners should be those recognized for their broad 
perspective and judgment. A majority should be accounting practitioners at the time of 
their appointment. This would provide a broad base of experience in accounting 
practice and training in accounting theory. The remainder should be chosen for their 
backgrounds in accounting education or in the preparation or use of financial 
statements. All Commissioners should have a thorough understanding of financial 
statements—their uses, purposes, and limitations. Each Commissioner would be 
required to sever his prior employment affiliation, and compensation would be 
sufficient to obtain persons with the highest qualifications. A Commission of seven 
members with staggered seven-year terms of appointment seems appropriate.
Research—A Vital Function of the Commission. While outstanding qualifications 
of Commissioners can be thought of as the keystone to success, the underlying 
cornerstone must necessarily be extensive research, both empirical and analytical. 
Considering the circumstances of the times and the nature of the fundamentals 
requiring resolution, the initial research efforts directed toward the development of 
accounting principles should be greater than past undertakings. One portion of the 
program should be concerned with developing fundamentals that fulfill the objectives 
of financial statements in the current environment. Another portion should be 
concerned with analysis of problems, including extensive testing of proposed principles 
and applications. This analysis would thus ensure anticipation and understanding of the 
effects of proposed principles on the financial statements of diverse entities.
The Commission would need research capability within the Foundation to 
support its activities. Diversity of research skill and experience would be required. 
Whether the research is contracted or performed by a full-time staff, it should be 
supervised by a director of research in the Foundation who would report to the 
Commission. Much of the drafting of the Commission’s pronouncements should be 
performed by writers on the staff.
The Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles. The Committee’s 
function is to issue pronouncements on applications and interpretations of accounting 
principles. Because accounting applications are so closely related to wide-ranging 
current accounting matters, we believe a majority of its members should be accounting 
practitioners. A large committee (of perhaps 18 to 21 members) is desirable, in order 
to bring a diversity of experience to bear on specific issues. The Committee should be 
formed within the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and should 
consist of part-time, non-paid members.
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The operating procedures of the Committee should be similar to those of the 
Commission; accordingly, its conclusions would be based on research by the staff and 
others, public hearings, interviews, committee deliberations, and comments on 
exposure drafts. Its pronouncements, approved by a majority of the Committee, 
should have the same basis of authority as statements of the Commission.
The Task Force on Accounting Objectives. From time to time (possibly as 
frequently as every five years) the Board of Trustees of the Foundation should appoint 
a task force on accounting objectives. This Task Force would prepare or update a 
statement on the objectives of accounting and financial statements in the light of 
changing needs for financial information.
Since accounting deals with the circumstances of the times, objectives are subject 
to gradual change. Objectives, therefore, must be periodically re-examined.
The Task Force on Accounting Objectives should include representatives of public 
accounting, industry, accounting education, and users of financial statements. 
Accounting practitioners should probably be in the minority, since the wide-ranging 
insight of users and issuers of financial statements is necessary to identify and rank the 
needs for financial information. The Task Force’s conclusions would serve to guide the 
Accounting Principles Commission in its deliberations.
Petitions for Interpretation or Reconsideration. There should be an opportunity 
for representatives of industry, accounting practitioners, and others to petition the 
Accounting Principles Commission on matters relating to accounting principles and 
their applications. A procedure to petition for interpretation or reconsideration is 
essential. Circumstances vary among entities, and therefore pronouncements cannot 
be sufficiently comprehensive to cover all possible situations. Moreover, changes in 
business practices and the accounting environment necessitate continuing 
re-examination of accounting principles and their application.
Transition and Financing
Carrying Out the Proposal. We think the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, representing the accounting profession, is the organization that should 
act on this proposal. If adopted, it should establish the Foundation and seek 
recommendations for and then name the initial Board of Trustees. The Trustees would 
then name the members of the Accounting Principles Commission.
It would be intolerable if a protracted period of inactivity resulted from a 
changeover to a new or different structure for establishing accounting principles. 
Therefore, the Accounting Principles Board should continue its operations 
uninterrupted and undiminished until the Accounting Principles Commission is 
prepared to issue statements on accounting principles. Our proposal preserves the 
characteristics of the present Accounting Principles Board in the proposed Committee 
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on Applications of Accounting Principles. In fact, the Board could very well become 
the Committee with little or no modification.
If for any reason the Accounting Principles Commission proved to be ineffective, 
there would still be a continuing body in the form of the Committee on Applications 
of Accounting Principles to prevent a disruptive break in the development of 
accounting principles.
Financing. Our proposal calls for a substantially expanded -effort to advance 
accounting principles. We estimate the additional expenditures required-over and 
above current expenditures for the Accounting Principles Board and its research 
program—at $2,000,000 to $3,000,000 annually. In order to attract highly qualified 
personnel as Commissioners and staff, the ability of the Foundation to operate with 
assured financing must not be left in doubt. Accordingly, we recommend that the 
financial requirements of the Foundation be guaranteed by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, which in all probability would be the major source of 
financing. Since an objective of the Foundation would be to broaden participation in 
the advancement of accounting, financial contributions from other sources should be 
encouraged.
Conclusion
The Accounting Principles Board has achieved much in its twelve years of 
operation. The needs of accounting today, however, show every likelihood of 
intensifying in the years ahead. For this reason, it could only be a matter of time 
before the organization and operation of the Board would require revision. The 
constructive approach is to move ahead now to create a plan capable of meeting the 
challenge of changing times. We believe the steps we propose will do just that.
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The Central National Insurance Group of Omaha
STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
1. Establishing accounting principles - scope of task.
The question was asked, "What is meant by the term 'accounting principles'?”. 
If the question and the suggested answer, which referred to "financial account­
ing and reporting standards" refers to an all encompassing approach, then we 
feel that this is impossible. However, if the term "financial accounting and 
reporting standards" refers to an industry-by-industry approach, then we feel 
it is feasible and would surely be more accurate and useful.
Relating to the same subject, it is our opinion that an industry principles 
board should be responsible for not only fundamentals but for detailed standards 
as well. We are adding "detailed standards" because in the past opinions have 
been interpreted differently within the A. I. C. P. A. membership.
2. Should the primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards 
reside in a governmental body or a non-governmental body? 
It is our opinion that the governmental body of the A.I. C. P. A. should remain 
independent from the S. E. C. or any other governmental body. We believe that 
the A.I. C. P. A. should act independently and should not be governed by requests 
from government organizations which it appears to have done in the past. In 
our opinion, an industry non-governmental body's relationship to the A. I. C. P. A. 
should be their reports and/or recommendations for the industry they are repre­
senting made to the governing board. This relationship is further explained 
below. As to the S. E. C. , we reemphasize that the only relationship should be 
of a cooperative nature and the non-governmental bodies should not be governed 
by S. E. C. standards. In our opinion, any pronouncements having a majority 
approval of the A. I. C. P. A. membership should be enforced as they are today 
by disallowing further membership in the A. I. C. P. A. if a member does not 
follow the wishes of the majority. It could possibly be further enforced by 
getting state-by-state backing to loss of that individual's certificate.
3. Composition of a non-governmental standards board.
We would recommend the formation of several non-governmental standards 
boards. Each board would be made up of nine members of the A. I. C. P. A. 
whose backgrounds are substantial for the industry board they will represent. 
In other words, we are suggesting that each industry have its' own standards 
board which would be responsible for fundamentals, as well as developing de­
tailed standards for that particular industry reporting to the governing board 
of the A. I. C. P. A. The governing board should then poll the membership for 
their approval or disapproval with majority rule. The possibility has existed 
in the past wherein many members of the A.I. C. P.A. have disagreed with 
opinions of the principles board as it is now constituted, while being compelled 
to act in accordance with its' findings.
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4. Method of operation of non-governmental standards boards.
In our opinion, the present procedures where the board holds public hearings 
on subjects for proposed opinions are satisfactory. There should be a two- 
thirds vote requirement for each non-governmental standards board with de­
scenting opinions contained within their reports. If the boards' procedures 
and public hearings are broad enough, no developing problems should exist 
that have not already been considered in that you are dealing with specialists 
within each industry. We believe that there should be an appeal procedure 
by segments of the industry for which the opinion is being rendered. This 
appeal should be set up so that it is an ar bitration-agreement type procedure, 
wherein the governmental body of the A. I. C. P. A. would appoint one arbitrator 
and the industry appealing appointing a second arbitrator, with the third ar­
bitrator being a disinterested party, such as a United States District Court 
Judge.
5. Accounting research support for a non-governmental standards board.
We have touched on the subject in the foregoing answers, however, we believe 
that a permanent salaried employee who is a member of the A. I. C. P. A. is 
necessary, who would have a staff adequate enough to formulate and clear all 
documents from the various industry boards reporting to the governing board 
and who would instigate their requests for opinions for the particular industry 
to the proper non-governmental standards board. This office and its' employees, 
in our opinion, should be financed by the A.I.C. P. A. through dues of the mem­
bers. We believe it is also possible to obtain membership fees from the various 
companies representing a particular industry if it is known that industry boards 
will be established.
Earl G. Watters
Vice President and Comptroller
HURDMAN AND 
CRANSTOUN, PENNEY & CO.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS • 140 BROADWAY • NEW YORK. N.Y. 10005
October 22, 1971
Mr Michael A Pinto
American Institute of C P A’s 
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Sir:
Re The Wheat Committee
It occurs to the writer that if the Wheat Committee were to decide 
that the APB should not concern itself with the "fundamentals," it should ask 
itself what body is to do that job. By appointing the Trueolood Committee, the 
AICPA is on record as having concluded that important matters have been left 
undone and presumably many will be in that state even after the Trueblood Com­
mittee reports. The Wheat Committee is at somewhat of a disadvantage in this 
regard because it probably will have been discharged before the Trueolood Com­
mittee issues its final report.
The writer believes that the APB, however constituted, should continue 
to work in the same stratum as heretofore, viz, promulgating rules or standards 
rather than fundamentals . The reason is that some group, made up primarily of 
active practitioners, must develop and. monitor the loophole closing function. 
In the absence of such a body, the "clever" businessmen and professionals soon 
would conjure up and attribute so many different meanings to the broad funda­
mentals, from whatever source derived, that they would be reduced to impotency.
Accordingly, if the Wheat Committee decides that fundamentals are not 
the province of the APB, it should retain the matter on its agenda and ultimately 
satisfy itself that some group has as its preoccupation the abstract and the 
conceptual while the APB or its successor focuses on the rule making or standard 
setting process.
Although this letter is confined to but one part of one of the Perti­
nent Questions, it is directed at a basic factor which merits full deference from 
the Committee.
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TO: Mr. Francis M. Wheat, Chairman
Mr. John C. Biegler
Mr. Arnold I. Levine
Mr. Wallace E. Olson
Mr. Thomas C. Pryor
Mr. Roger B. Smith
Professor David Solomons
The Study Group on Establishment
Of Accounting Principles
We welcome this opportunity to present our views on 
the matters under consideration by your Study Group.
Investors and other users of financial statements in the 
United States have a right to expect more progress than 
they have been getting in the establishment of sound 
accounting principles, and they are entitled to a work­
able procedure whereby changes can be made on a more 
timely and effective basis. The legitimate public interest 
in financial statements in this country is enormous, and 
little consolation should be taken in the claim, even if true, 
that American investors are “the best informed in the 
world."
We believe that the accounting profession, through 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), is best qualified to provide the leadership in 
establishing accounting principles. However, the experience 
in recent years indicates an urgent need to improve the 
process by which accounting principles are determined by 
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the AICPA and to reevaluate the approaches that have 
been taken in the light of current developments.
Neither managements nor independent auditors can 
function effectively in the area of financial reporting unless 
they have sound accounting principles based on defined 
objectives to use in discharging their responsibilities. The 
importance to our free-enterprise system of an appropriate 
solution to this problem cannot be overemphasized.
The solution must be sought in terms of what is best for 
investors and all segments of the public and must not be 
prejudiced by the special interests of managements, ac­
countants or commissioners trying to maintain their rela­
tive prerogatives as they exist today.
A letter dated November 16, 1970, from the Chairman 
and Chief Executive of our firm to the President of the 
AICPA commenting on the need for a thorough review of 
the manner in which accounting principles are established 
is included herein as Appendix A.
Respectfully submitted,
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THE GENERAL PROBLEM
OF ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
Need for Reevaluation
The need to improve financial reporting to investors 
and others through the establishment of sound accounting 
principles has become increasingly evident. One of the 
important problems facing the accounting profession and 
the business community in carrying out their responsi­
bilities to the public is that of determining the best means 
of accomplishing such improvement.
The problem is this: Where and how in our society can 
decisions best be made to establish accounting principles 
that will communicate in the most useful manner infor­
mation as to the economic circumstances and performance 
of business enterprises. The approach selected must com­
mand the respect and support of all segments of our society 
if it is to be effective.
The most important consideration in establishing account­
ing principles is that of fairness—fairness to all segments 
of our society, including stockholders, management, labor, 
creditors, customers and government. Fairness should be 
determined in the light of the economic and legal environ­
ment and the modes of thought of all such segments in 
relation to each other. Accounting principles that are 
based upon this criterion of fairness should produce finan­
cial information that reflects in an impartial manner the 
lawfully established, but often conflicting, economic rights 
and interests of everyone in society.
Common law evolves through a court structure and de­
cisions by judges who, upon becoming judges, have dis­
continued the practice of law and previous business and 




in practice. Also, they disqualify themselves from hearing 
cases involving their former clients and associates. A 
structure with the same type of independence is needed for 
the establishment of accounting principles. To depend, as 
some accountants have suggested, on long-range evolution 
with no formal independent structure in an environment of 
undefined goals is unrealistic.
Accounting is a means of communication, and thus es­
sentially utilitarian in nature. Any utilitarian discipline 
is ultimately dependent upon a broad consensus for its 
effectiveness, but no authority, even a statutory one, can 
for long sustain a utilitarian function that is not sufficiently 
useful to the public. However, the complex and competitive 
nature of business and the conflicting interests of the 
various segments of our society would require an orderly, 
fair and efficient system for achieving consensus and for 
enforcing that consensus. No such comprehensive system 
currently exists, and in the absence of such a system no 
consistency or coordination would be likely between 
business enterprises in a particular industry or among 
business enterprises generally.
In making our suggestions for restructuring the proce­
dures to establish accounting principles, we are cognizant 
of the improvements achieved from actions taken by such 
organizations as the AICPA, the SEC and the New York 
Stock Exchange. However, the establishment of accounting 
principles in the United States has most often occurred only 
after a crisis and after the public has become disillusioned 
because of misleading representations about business 
activity. When the public has lost confidence in certain 
aspects of accounting, changes have been demanded of 
someone in authority. Both the accounting profession and 
governmental agencies have tended to react after problems 
have become acute and the public has been damaged rather
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than dealing with problems promptly as they emerge. This 
tendency to react to crisis rather than to act from a posture 
of leadership has resulted from two factors. First, and 
most important, the lack of definition of objectives of 
financial statements has made it virtually impossible to 
lead and act on problems before they arise and become 
critical. Second, the structure whereby the accounting 
profession has attempted to deal with accounting principles 
has been inadequate.
Where Are the Responsibilities 
and Authorities for Establishing 
Accounting Principles?
An analysis of the present situation reveals a state of 
confusion as to where the responsibility and authority for 
establishing objective standards and sound accounting 
principles lie. In our view, such confusion is most unde­
sirable for investors and other users of financial state­
ments, for the accounting profession, for the business com­
munity and for the public in general. The problem can be 
illustrated by considering the responsibility and authority 
of some of the groups and organizations involved.
Managements of business entities. The management of a 
business entity has a significant legal responsibility under 
the Federal Securities Acts and other statutes for the 
financial statements of that entity. Some agreement seems 
to exist that management has the primary responsibility 
for the financial statements, but who establishes the 
principles? Does management have effective authority to 
select accounting principles? The AICPA, independent 
auditors, governmental agencies and stock exchanges are 
all simultaneously prescribing or enforcing accounting 
principles and a wide variety of related rules and regula­
tions that management may not always believe result in the 
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best presentation of financial information concerning that 
particular enterprise. While each management may have 
its own concepts of what it is trying to reflect and communi­
cate and therefore not agree with the prescribed proce­
dures, does it have a viable choice?
Independent auditors. The primary responsibility of the 
independent auditors is to the users of financial statements 
other than management. The professional responsibility to 
stockholders and external parties who rely on the financial 
statements upon which the auditor has expressed an opinion 
is very significant. Independent auditors have a personal 
responsibility—both legally and professionally. Their 
individual reports are their specific responsibility and not 
that of the AICPA or a governmental agency.
An opinion written in 1947 by Mr. Scott W. Lucas, who 
subsequently was Majority Leader of the United States 
Senate from the State of Illinois, stated in part as follows 
with respect to registration statements filed under the 
Securities Act of 1933:
“While the form and content of the financial state­
ments are subject to the rules and regulations of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission the opinions 
expressed in the certificate by the accountant are his 
alone and he is the person who will be held responsible 
therefor. The accountant is also responsible for the 
examination and review of those financial statements, 
used in the registration statement, as to which he 
undertakes to express his expert opinion, and his 
responsibility relates not only to the propriety of what 
is set forth in the financial statements, but also to the 
inclusion of such additional information as is neces­
sary to make such statements not misleading. ...”
Although the AICPA may encourage the observance of 
APB Opinions by AICPA members who are in public prac­
tice, compliance to date has been on a voluntary basis.
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Can the Opinions be effectively enforced when in the 
judgment of an individual auditor compliance with an 
Opinion is not proper in a particular case? Who represents 
the public in resolving such a dispute? Compliance may be 
indirectly imposed by the intervention of governmental 
agencies with statutory powers, but the views of those 
agencies may reflect a bias without any effective public 
judicial review.
What position are the auditors in when they follow 
accounting principles prescribed by a professional associa­
tion or a governmental agency that in their view do not 
properly present the facts or attain the proper public 
accountability in a particular case?
Governmental agencies. The SEC has wide statutory 
powers to see that investors are adequately informed. As a 
result, the rules, regulations and policies of the SEC prob­
ably have a wider influence on accounting principles fol­
lowed by business entities than those of any other govern­
mental agency. However, many other Federal and state 
regulatory agencies have extensive powers to regulate the 
accounting and financial reporting of large industries, such 
as public utilities, transportation and communication com­
panies, banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance 
companies. “Protection” of the public by these agencies 
may sometimes be based on political and economic theory 
biases that do not result in the most meaningful informa­
tion for all users of financial statements.
These agencies may sometimes prescribe accounting with 
which the management or the independent auditors, or both, 
do not agree. Under these circumstances, where is the ulti­
mate responsibility? The power to enforce can easily be 
abused if the agencies are not required to document and 
support their conclusions as being the fairest to all seg­
ments of society.
6
While the SEC has generally supported and enforced the 
Opinions of the APB, it has made no formal commitment of 
any kind to do so. And in the case of Opinion No. 2, the 
SEC did not enforce that Opinion. The SEC has not dele­
gated, directly or indirectly, any of its statutory power to 
the APB. Neither has it gone through formal procedures to 
adopt any APB Opinions as its own rules and regulations.
Various Federal and state agencies support or ignore 
the viewpoints of the accounting profession, including APB 
Opinions, as they see fit. In some areas, they select from 
alternative practices; in other areas, they accept alter­
native practices. They have both published and unpublished 
accounting policies and rules. They are sovereign in their 
own fields with very little effective appeal from their deci­
sions in accounting matters available to enterprises under 
their jurisdiction. Of critical significance is the fact that no 
overall harmonizing or coordinating authority exists re­
garding the accounting principles prescribed by these agen­
cies. (See Appendix B for a further discussion of certain 
Federal governmental agencies.)
Stock exchanges. The stock exchanges have certain 
requirements for listing purposes and can exercise con­
siderable control over listed companies. The exchanges have 
occasionally prescribed accounting or reporting rules, but 
in general they have followed the lead of the accounting 
profession and the SEC in these matters and thus have 
contributed very little independent thought to the establish­
ment of accounting principles.
Accounting profession. A professional association, such 
as the AICPA, cannot require anyone other than its mem­




The Council of the AICPA in its 1964 resolution stated 
that its members should follow APB Opinions, as repre­
senting “generally accepted accounting principles,’’ and no 
departure from such Opinions is permissible unless “sub­
stantial authoritative support’’ can be found for another 
approach. Departures from positions established in APB 
Opinions must then be disclosed in the auditor’s report or 
in the footnotes to the financial statements. The burden of 
proof is placed upon the auditor who departs from an APB 
Opinion to support the alternative used. A recent attempt 
to incorporate this requirement in the Code of Professional 
Ethics failed to obtain the necessary affirmative vote. (How­
ever, this matter is presently being reconsidered.) In the 
absence of governmental agency enforcement, the support 
of the APB Opinions has been dependent upon the volun­
tary cooperation of the accounting firms and the members 
of the Institute. This support has, in general, existed during 
recent years, but there is no assurance that such support 
will continue indefinitely.
In few, if any, cases has a member of the AICPA relied 
upon “substantial authoritative support” to defend a 
direct and significant departure from an APB Opinion. 
Auditors have been qualifying their reports for such depar­
tures. However, the alternative of relying on “substantial 
authoritative support” is available and is a potential weak­
ness in establishing effective standards. This alternative 
was established by the Council as a compromise during the 
controversy in 1964 as to whether AICPA members should 
be required to follow APB Opinions as representing the 
only acceptable accounting principles. (See Appendix C 
for further discussion of the past efforts of the AICPA to 
establish accounting principles.)
Relationship of responsibilities. The interrelationship of 
the various parties involved with the issuance of financial 
615
statements can be summarized briefly. A committee in a 
professional association can bind only the action of its 
members, and this may be done by threat of expulsion from 
membership. Voluntary cooperation is effective only so long 
as the cooperation continues. Such cooperation, however, is 
tenuous and subject to breakdown at any time. In fact, if 
a group of AICPA members refused to follow an APB 
Opinion, the whole structure might fall apart unless the 
SEC enforced the Opinion.
Managements cannot be required by auditors to follow 
the pronouncements of professional committees, except 
indirectly if the auditors threaten to qualify their reports. 
A governmental agency, such as the SEC, can refuse to 
accept a qualified auditor’s report and can require com­
panies subject to its jurisdiction to follow the professional 
pronouncements. Managements are claiming that the SEC 
is using the APB as an unofficial regulatory arm, and is 
enforcing APB Opinions as though they were SEC regula­
tions, but without going through the rule-making proce­
dures as required by law. Some of this enforcement 
might be considered to be undesirable coercion because 
many of the rules are arbitrary and not supported by 
objectives that can be understood.
Managements and independent auditors have serious 
responsibilities to the users of financial statements, but 
other organizations and agencies are telling them what 
methods of accounting should be followed without taking 
responsibility for what the objectives are, or should be, and 
whether they are, or are not, being achieved. Those organi­
zations and agencies at present do not assume any direct 






Determination of sound accounting principles must be 
free of bias toward the particular interests of any groups 
within our society. Yet, each group is entitled to a forum 
(1) where a hearing may be had on its views, and (2) where 
the full record and the basis for the decision are public 
information. No adequate forum of this kind, which is so 
necessary because of the vast public interest, exists today 
with respect to accounting principles in any business, pro­
fessional or governmental organization.
Questions are sometimes raised as to whether any private 
organization, such as a professional association, can suc­
cessfully establish and enforce standards which have such a 
huge impact upon the business community and the public 
generally. Is the public interest involved so great that direct 
statutory authority is necessary to avoid difficult legal 
problems? Some authorities have suggested that the AICPA 
cannot successfully accomplish its self-appointed mission in 
this area, and that it is naive to try to do so.
Regardless of who makes authoritative decisions involv­
ing accounting principles, consideration must be given to 
effective appeal procedures. In a democracy, the citizens 
should have a right to appeal to some appropriate and 
effective appeal point the decisions imposed by a body with 
enforcement powers (either assumed or statutory). This 
problem needs attention in the field of accounting prin­
ciples, where prescribed requirements may have significant 
effects on many business and investment decisions, on busi­
ness transactions of all kinds, including mergers, and even 
on the success or failure of a business enterprise.
We believe that the solution proposed in this brief rep­
resents the best balance between the responsibilities and 
authorities of the various groups and organizations on the 
one hand and the public interest on the other hand.
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ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS 
OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
Many aspects of the operations of the APB could be 
analyzed and commented upon in this brief. However, some 
of those matters relate merely to the management of the 
APB and will not be covered herein. The following com­
ments are limited to an analysis of the basic organizational 
structure, the overall basis of operations, and significant 
deficiencies in accomplishing its mission.
General Effectiveness
The time and cost of the APB members and their asso­
ciates, probably one of the hardest working groups who 
ever participated in a volunteer program of this type in 
any field, and the administrative and research staff at the 
AICPA are tremendous. However, the results have not 
been commensurate with the effort.
Increasing concern has been expressed that the APB as 
presently constituted is no longer capable of meeting the 
need for timely development of accounting principles that 
are fair to all interests.
One question relates to the slowness of the APB to act. 
Many examples can be cited of extensive delays in dealing 
with problems. Five major questions were left open in 
Opinion No. 11 in 1967, and they are still open. Corrections 
of deficiencies in Opinions No. 5 and No. 7 have been pend­
ing for several years. Accounting for research and develop­
ment costs, which is one of the most urgent problems in 
today’s technologically oriented society, has been under 
study for about eight years and the study is not yet com­




critical problem areas, including accounting for business 
combinations, were identified for immediate research and 
eventual conclusions in the form of Opinions. Eleven years 
later, in 1970, Opinions were issued on accounting for busi­
ness combinations and intangible assets. In the intervening 
eleven years accounting practice in these areas deteriorated 
steadily to the detriment of many investors and the increas­
ing embarrassment of the accounting profession. Two other 
problem areas were selected for research about ten years 
ago—accounting for intercompany investments and for 
foreign operations—and are still in the research stage. This 
situation requires some corrective action.
A related concern is that the APB has not anticipated 
problems well enough and that it has spent most of its time 
putting out fires to prevent emerging problems from becom­
ing of crisis proportions. A review of the Board’s accom­
plishments indicates that nearly all of its Opinions have 
dealt with problems that the profession has faced for many 
years. While some argue that the AICPA is able to act 
quickly and point to accounting for franchise fees as an 
example, the facts are that the action taken was informal 
and outside the Board structure. Further, the timeliness of 
the action could certainly be questioned. Pressing problems 
have been identified more recently in the areas of computer 
leasing and land development. Some of the basic issues in 
these areas remain unresolved, however, even though many 
months have passed since the Board agreed that these 
problems needed prompt resolution.
The need to act quickly has been accentuated by the 
accelerating rate of change in our society—changes in 
methods, products, consumer tastes, laws, etc. These rapid
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changes challenge concepts of stability and permanence 
that permeate accounting, and demand a continuous change 
in accounting to reflect changes in the goals of business 
enterprises and in social and economic conditions.
The APB has not been efficient in its operating proce­
dures, and the degree of inefficiency has been accelerating. 
The vast number of problems on the Board’s agenda often 
prevents the Board from focusing on a given problem for a 
sufficient time to reach definitive positions. As a result, 
problems remain on the agenda for many months (even for 
many years, e.g., the reconciliation of lease accounting for 
lessees and lessors). Each time a problem reappears on the 
agenda for discussion much of the allotted time is devoted 
to a review or rediscussion of points covered in preceding 
meetings. Too often little new light is shed on the issue. The 
allotted time is used, and the problem reappears on 
numerous subsequent agendas. The inefficiency of these pro­
cedures is obvious.
The AICPA has been publishing interpretations of APB 
Opinions either in booklet form or in The Journal of 
Accountancy. This is a desirable practice that should be 
continued and expanded. However, interpretations should 
not be used to attempt to amend Opinions. Also, inter­
pretations should not be used to overcome delays, to meet 
crises that have arisen during the delays, and to deal with 
important problems that should be handled by Opinions. 
If the exposure process and many of the procedures that 
have proved to be desirable in the development or amend­
ment of Opinions are improperly bypassed, affected parties 
would have a legitimate cause for complaint. For example, 
questions have been raised as to whether the interpretation 
of Opinion No. 7 recently approved by the APB does not 
have the effect of amending that Opinion. This inter­
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pretation includes a definition of financing leases and 
guidelines for profit recognition by manufacturers who sell 
leases on their products to third-party financial institu­
tions. The APB has had this important subject under con­
sideration for several years and could have had a new 
Opinion prepared on this subject well before the final crisis 
arose. This interpretation, which has a very significant 
effect on many companies, was never exposed for comment 
and was distributed by passing out typed copies on an 
informal basis. The SEC presumably is enforcing this 
interpretation, but it probably will not be furnished to 
AICPA members or printed in The Journal of Accountancy 
for two or three months after its approval by the APB.
A major cause of inefficiency in Board operations is the 
other interests and responsibilities of Board members. 
Each Board member carries heavy responsibility within 
his own firm or organization, a responsibility that assumes 
primacy between Board meetings and even competes with 
Board matters for attention during Board meetings. Too 
often these competing demands appear to result in less 
than adequate preparation between Board meetings for 
those matters scheduled for discussion at the next meeting. 
Thus, Board members often are unable to prepare for 
APB meetings in a manner that would enable the Board 
to function reasonably effectively. The matter is not one 
of lack of interest or dedication, but simply one of lack of 
time in the face of the heavy responsibilities that each 
Board member bears. As a result, even after a given 
problem has been on the agenda for several meetings there 
is wide variance among Board members and Board com­
mittees in the depth of their understanding of the issues 
involved. This difficulty is compounded when the decision­




The activities and deliberations of the APB have been 
well publicized. The impact of the Opinions on the business 
community has become increasingly evident to everyone 
concerned. The APB is in fact a quasi-public body, whose 
actions have great significance to investors and many other 
persons and organizations. The desire of some for the 
APB to have a “low profile’’ reflected a failure to under­
stand the essential public nature of the APB’s responsi­
bilities. Those APB members who wanted the APB to 
operate more as a public body, with public hearings and a 
public record, were clearly in the minority, and their sug­
gestions in this regard received little consideration. Grad­
ually, the APB has been moving in that direction, and its 
first public hearing was held in May 1971.
Objectives
The major problem encountered by the APB has been 
the absence of an authoritative statement of the objectives 
of financial statements that would provide a standard 
against which to judge and measure the propriety of solu­
tions to accounting problems. As a result, individual APB 
Opinions reflect no overall philosophy or theoretical frame­
work. The Opinions consist of elaborate and arbitrary 
detailed procedural rules, and the conclusions are a diverse 
collection of ad hoc regulations to deal with alleged abuses. 
Extensive disclosure requirements are established to shore 
up the rules, and such disclosures place an undue burden 
on the readers who try to interpret them. The Opinions 
seldom contain adequate reasons or demonstrations why the 
conclusions produce useful results for investors and other 
readers of financial statements. Several Opinions are dia­
metrically opposed to the conclusions of extensive research 
studies, with little explanation in support of the departures.
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As originally conceived, the Accounting Principles Board 
was to develop a statement of basic objectives and con­
cepts of financial statements. This statement would then 
provide the premises or base points of support for later 
Opinions on individual problems. While some research 
was undertaken along these lines in its early years, the 
APB was unable at that time to agree on any particular 
objectives and concepts. Statement No. 4 issued by the 
APB in 1970 provides no real guidelines for progress, and 
eleven years during a most critical time were lost.
No organization, whether it be a professional association 
or a governmental agency or any other one, can establish 
sound principles that will serve the public and command 
genuine support, unless objectives and criteria are estab­
lished to serve as standards against which conclusions can 
be evaluated and judged. The fact that the APB has not 
accomplished this phase of its mission, is the greatest 
single deficiency in the operations of the APB. In our view, 
this omission could be fatal.
Regulatory Attitude
As a result of the failure to agree upon objectives, the 
APB has gradually deteriorated over the years into an 
organization that issues more and more arbitrary and in­
consistent rules rather than broadly based and logical stand­
ards or principles that are consistent with a set of guiding 
objectives. Each Opinion has been approached in an ad hoc 
manner, seeking to accommodate conflicting views with no 
clear expression of the goals to be achieved. Compromise 
has replaced principle, and rules have replaced reason.
Flowing from this effort has been a proliferation of 
detailed methods, procedures, and disclosures and an at­
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tempt to fit these into an ever-expanding web of regulations. 
As a result, the accounting profession and its service to the 
public are being damaged by rules; and, in the case of some 
Opinions, hundreds of pages of explanations will be re­
quired to make the Opinions operational in our firm.
Methods and procedures get confused with objectives and 
then are sanctified, as evidenced by our long forbearance 
with historical cost and the matching process. The result of 
all this has been that accountants have turned their backs 
on common sense.
Some accountants frequently argue that while a certain 
concept or principle is theoretically proper it is vulnerable 
to abuse. In order to foreclose the potential abuse, various 
arbitrary rules are prescribed. This approach is undesir­
able because (1) from a theoretical standpoint it assures 
the wrong answers, and (2) from a practical standpoint it 
invites abuse and circumvention. Accounting and financial 
reporting should communicate economic facts and circum­
stances in the most meaningful manner and in accordance 
with the objectives. Accounting rules should not be used as 
a club to police the judgments or performance of manage­
ment.
The APB has become obsessed with its self-appointed role 
of plugging up loopholes and stopping alleged abuses. But 
as arbitrary rules are written, additional loopholes are 
created, since the more precise a rule, the more questions 
as to its scope and applicability. The constant increase of 
detailed, arbitrary requirements has also had the effect of 
encouraging craftiness in financial reporting. An atmos­
phere of “gamesmanship” is created to try to “beat the 
rules” since the rules do not command the respect and 
support that would flow from principles based on logical 




Unless objectives are agreed upon and serve as a basis 
for decision making, each segment of the public affected 
has no way of knowing the reasons why a particular deci­
sion is made and why it is necessary and warranted.
Independence
Concern has been expressed about the degree of inde­
pendence under the present APB structure. The accounting 
profession faces serious challenges to its independence, and 
questions as to the independence of the APB are one facet 
of this broader issue. Insofar as the APB is concerned, 
doubts as to independence have increased as its Opinions 
have involved wider public interest. A body such as the 
APB, which deals with such significant matters involving 
the public interest, cannot afford to have any doubts persist 
as to its independence. Fairness and equity are critical for 
public acceptance of conclusions reached by the APB, and 
extensive doubts that Opinions issued are free from preju­
dice can eventually lead to public rejection of the APB as 
an authority on accounting matters.
In our view, the independence of the APB (both in fact 
and in appearance) is of overriding importance, and failure 
to deal adequately with this phase of the problem now 
could have serious repercussions later. This matter cannot 
successfully be deferred until some indefinite future date.
Research
The various Directors of Accounting Research and their 
staffs have performed some effective work since the incep­
tion of the APB in 1959. However, the research program 
has not been sufficiently responsive to the needs of the APB, 
either in the nature of the research performed or in the 
timeliness of its performance. Therefore, the entire ap­
proach to the research program needs to be reconsidered.
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Very few formal research studies have been completed 
in recent years. Of the eleven research studies published, 
only two have been in the last five years. Also, the APB 
has not made very effective use of the studies that have 
been published.
The research program has also suffered from a lack of a 
common set of objectives and criteria with the result that 
the conclusions of the researchers were controlled and lim­
ited by each individual’s experiences and background. Thus, 
not only did each APB member have his own premises and 
base points, but each researcher did likewise. No common 
objectives existed.
While the deficiencies in the operations of the APB can­
not be traced particularly to the inadequacies of the re­
search program, the fact remains that the proper type of 
research performed on a timely basis could greatly facili­




We believe that the proposed solution set forth below 
represents the best overall plan at the present time.
While the name “Accounting Principles Board” could be 
changed, it is used herein for the proposed new organi­
zation.
Summary of Recommendations
Our basic recommendations, which are discussed more 
fully in this section, are summarized as follows:
1. The objectives of financial statements and the 
necessary criteria for establishing accounting prin­
ciples must be determined so that the research, the 
views of interested parties, and the decision-making 
process of the APB all can be related to one set of 
sound premises and thus properly serve the public 
interest. This is the most crucial need facing the pro­
fession and no restructuring of the APB will be effec­
tive unless this need is met. (Since the AICPA pres­
ently has another study group working on this project, 
no further comments in this regard are included in 
this brief.)
2. An APB of five to seven full-time, paid members 
should be established within the AICPA.
3. The legal basis for the operations of the APB 
should be considered so that its authority and limita­
tions are known.
4. Operating procedures of the APB should be 
designed to make the maximum use of the experience 
and viewpoints of AICPA members and all other 
interested parties.
5. The research program should be revised to make
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it more effective and to coordinate it more closely with 
the needs of the APB.
6. The present procedures relating to interpretation 
of APB Opinions should be improved.
7. Appeal procedures should be carefully studied.
A question frequently arises as to whether the APB is, or 
should be, legislative or judicial in nature. We believe that 
this function has both legislative and judicial elements, but 
it is most important that the function be conducted in a 
judicial manner. Therefore, it is our view that the judicial 
characteristics should be predominant.
In an earlier section of this brief, the authority and 
responsibility of managements of business entities, inde­
pendent auditors, governmental agencies, stock exchanges 
and the accounting profession were discussed. In balancing 
these as well as the authority and responsibility of others, 
the primary test should be—what is in the public interest? 
If the performance of the APB is of sufficiently high 
quality and conducted in a truly professional manner, if all 
interested parties are given a comprehensive hearing, and 
if the APB earns the respect of the public, the chance that 
the APB will be successful in carrying out its mission is 
relatively high.
Background Considerations
Suggestions have been made to change the present APB 
merely by increasing or decreasing the number of its mem­
bers or by having a full-time, permanent chairman. We 
believe that such changes would be superficial and would 
not solve the basic problem.
Suggestions have also been made for an APB outside the 
AICPA made up of representatives from various business
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organizations and other segments of our society, such as 
corporate executives, lawyers, bankers, economists, finan­
cial analysts and accountants. However, a group so con­
stituted would not be responsible to any organization or 
entity, and we believe that an approach of that type would 
not be effective.
During the past forty years the accounting profession 
has borne a significant responsibility in the development 
of accounting principles. We believe that the basic respon­
sibility for developing accounting principles should con­
tinue to rest within the accounting profession as repre­
sented by the AICPA. The AICPA has no inherent institu­
tional defects that would prevent attainment of a much 
higher level of accomplishment. The AICPA, more than 
any other nongovernmental organization or group, pos­
sesses the personnel, the resources and the freedom from 
inherent biases favoring any segment of society to achieve 
the necessary progress in this area. Between a restructur­
ing of the APB to eliminate the defects in its operations 
that have emerged over the past twelve years and a 
resignation from the basic responsibility and consequent 
reassignment of such responsibility to a governmental 
agency or organization outside the jurisdiction of the 
accounting profession, we strongly favor a restructuring 
of an independent APB within the purview of the account­
ing profession.
The structure, organization and operating procedures of 
an APB within the AICPA must (1) assure the establish­
ment of sound accounting principles, consistent with the 
defined objectives of financial statements documented to 
meet the needs of users, representing fairness to all seg­
ments of society; (2) reduce the present inefficiencies in 




ing with emerging problems; and (4) operate in an environ­
ment free from conflicting and self-serving interests and 
questions as to independence.
In addition, all parties who may be affected by the devel­
opment of accounting principles should have ample oppor­
tunity to present their views. Whenever a small group in 
the private sector of our society assumes the responsibility 
for reaching decisions that may have a broad public impact, 
it is essential that those who are affected have an oppor­
tunity to contribute to the decision-making process. This is 
particularly important in the area of accounting principles, 
since public trust in financial reports is fundamental to the 
functioning of the free-enterprise system.
The APB should deal primarily with matters of prin­
ciple that achieve the defined objectives. Detailed pro­
cedures can and should vary and should be left largely to 
judgment. Managements and the independent auditors 
should bear the responsibility of carrying out the prin­
ciples and satisfying the objectives in the fairest manner.
Proposed APB Structure and Organization
Small permanent board. We believe that the APB should 
consist of full-time members, with a relatively small num­
ber of members, such as five or seven. Each member of 
the APB should separate himself from his prior firm or 
company affiliation and should be expected to devote his 
full time to the activities of the APB. He should meet 
tests of independence (insofar as investments and other 
matters are concerned) as would be expected of a Commis­
sioner of the SEC. APB members should be compensated 
by the AICPA at a level commensurate with their responsi­
bilities, including appropriate retirement benefits. The 
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term of appointment should be relatively long—for example, 
a period of five years with a possible renewal term of five 
years. Each member should be selected on the basis that 
he will represent the entire public and no particular 
constituency.
The members of the APB should be nominated by a 
continuing committee (of perhaps 15 members of which 
at least a majority should be AICPA members). That 
committee should be carefully selected by the President 
and approved by the Board of Directors of the AICPA. 
Those persons nominated for the APB should be elected 
by the Council of the AICPA. Such a selection process 
should help assure that the pronouncements of the APB 
will have maximum acceptance within the accounting pro­
fession.
Individuals selected for the APB should be knowledge­
able in the areas covered by APB Opinions, but they do 
not necessarily need to be members of the AICPA and 
need not be practicing certified public accountants. How­
ever, a majority of the APB at any time should have had 
extensive experience in financial and accounting matters. 
The objective should be to obtain the best qualified persons 
rather than representatives of any particular group.
A frequent assertion is that the AICPA will find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the type of individuals 
for a restructured APB that would be necessary for it to 
be successful. The presumption is that individuals with 
the experience, maturity and ability to fill such a respon­
sible position will be unlikely to leave their existing firm 
or affiliation for a position that might involve lower com­
pensation and an uncertain future. However, individuals 
of top quality in other professions have been successfully 
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attracted to positions of professional and public service and 
so have members of the accounting profession. Attorneys 
and businessmen regularly accept judicial appointments 
and high governmental positions, roles that frequently re­
sult in significantly reduced compensation. Surely the ac­
counting profession has the kind of people who would 
welcome this opportunity for important service with a 
major public interest. However, the compensation must be 
comparable to other positions of such responsibility.
Another point sometimes made is that a full-time APB 
would not be as professional as a part-time APB; and, 
also, that since a full-time APB has more of an appearance 
of a governmental agency, greater difficulty would ensue 
in trying to keep this function in the private sector. We 
do not accept this viewpoint. A full-time APB operating in 
an effective manner could be more professional and more 
successful in bringing the talents and resources of the entire 
profession to bear in accomplishing its mission. In the 
end, success or failure will depend on the quality and time­
liness of the pronouncements, and the principal question is 
how to obtain the highest quality.
Efficiency in operation. The overall costs associated with 
the operation of the present APB are significant in relation 
to the number and quality of the Opinions produced. In 
addition to the annual cost of several hundred thousand 
dollars to the AICPA for research and administration, 
the AICPA bears considerable additional costs directly 
and indirectly associated with APB activities. Individual 
firms and companies absorb annually a large amount, 
perhaps in excess of two million dollars, in terms of the 
time and expenses of APB members, their advisers and 
others involved in APB projects. A full-time APB should 
be able to operate, with research and staff support, on a
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budget of this general magnitude, and possibly less. The 
AICPA should be able to find the necessary financing, 
whatever the cost would be.
Of more importance, however, is the increase in pro­
ductive efficiency which a smaller, full-time APB could 
achieve. The ability to concentrate on a problem until it 
is resolved and the opportunity to direct research activities 
in the most productive channels would be definite ad­
vantages of such an APB. Whether in terms of cost or 
productivity, a full-time APB is likely to improve signi­
ficantly on the value received from the efforts expended 
than is presently the case.
Dealing with new problems. A full-time APB would have 
a significant advantage in dealing effectively with newly 
emerging problems. Rather than meeting only eight or nine 
times a year, the restructured APB could be virtually in 
continuous session. Procedures could be established for 
timely consideration of new problems and for expression 
of tentative conclusions for guidance of the profession until 
a definitive position could be developed.
An early warning system combined with issuance of 
tentative positions to guide practice away from foreseeable 
pitfalls is necessary. The complexity of business and gov­
ernment is increasing and new problems are constantly 
arising. The accounting profession needs a framework that 
can be responsive quickly to new developments, so that the 
business community and the users of financial statements 
can have a clear understanding of any accounting conse­
quences of such developments.
The frustrating delays experienced by the APB because 
of its periodic meetings, and other organizational con­
straints, could be eliminated. The result would be a more
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timely response to the needs of the profession and the 
public than has been possible.
Independence. A full-time APB whose members are dis­
sociated from conflicting entanglements and undesirable 
types of pressures would tend to remove the questions or 
cloud relating to independence. The enhancement in public 
confidence that could result would be of great benefit to the 
profession. Continuing loss in public confidence because 
of doubts as to independence under the existing structure, 
whether warranted or unwarranted, could be disastrous to 
the profession.
An important part of the function of the APB would be 
the establishment of appropriate procedures for the filing 
and presentation of views. In this regard, the APB and its 
staff should not have private meetings with affected persons 
or groups without having these meetings reflected in the 
public record.
Acceptability of pronouncements. There are those who 
argue that pronouncements by a full-time APB would not 
gain sufficient acceptance by the profession and that some 
AICPA members might not follow the Opinions. Apparent­
ly those who so argue believe the present level of acceptance 
of APB Opinions is related to the membership on the APB 
of partners from each of several accounting firms. We 
believe that acceptance results more from the quality of 
the pronouncements than from who are the members of 
the APB. No accounting firms should have permanent 
representation on the APB.
The key to acceptance of the pronouncements rests on 
the quality of the research and the documentation and 
reasoning supporting the conclusions and on their relation­




Proximity to current problems. Some contend that a full­
time APB would be inappropriate because the members 
would be too far removed from day-to-day experiences, and 
that the current organization benefits greatly from the fact 
that most current APB members are on the “firing line.’’ 
The wide range of problems they would face in their work 
on the APB would hardly result in a loss of touch with 
reality. The situation can be likened to that of a judge. 
Appointment to the bench doos not mean that a former 
attorney becomes impractical. Quite the contrary, the range 
of practical matters coming to his attention on the bench is 
likely to become greater than in practice. Similarly, the 
members of the proposed APB would likely expand rather 
than contract their range of exposure to practical issues of 
the day.
The information presented to the APB by means of hear­
ings, briefs and committee reports would bring to the APB 
the views of many parties who have had wide experience. 
Likewise, an opportunity to question those who make pres­
entations would enable APB members to keep in touch 
with the practical aspects of issues under consideration.
Other considerations. While views may differ regarding 
the merits of public criticisms of the APB, no one can deny 
that such criticisms tend to impair public confidence in and 
respect for the Opinions issued. Many in the accounting 
profession as well as in the business and financial com­
munity expect the profession to change the present struc­
ture of the APB to eliminate, to the extent possible, the 
bases for the recent criticisms. Any change made must be 
substantive, without creating undue discontinuity, and 
achieve the maximum improvement.
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The restructure that we have recommended represents a 
significant change from the current mechanism, yet it pro­
vides continuity with the past. The new APB could embrace 
the current agenda of the APB as well as initiate new proj­
ects as problems are identified. The new, full-time APB 
would be a logical step in achieving a formalized process 
for articulating accounting principles. The new APB would 
remain an integral part of the accounting profession, yet 
its increased independence and ability to react quickly to 
emerging problems would make it more responsive to public 
needs. It would permit more effective reaction to the de­
mands that increasing complexities have created in the 
development of accounting principles.
The future of the accounting profession depends impor­
tantly on its ability to meet the demands that the public, 
government and business community place upon it. A full- 
time APB would improve the ability of the profession to 
meet more promptly and effectively the rapid changes 
occurring in business and society at large and would help 
restore public confidence in financial presentations of 
American business.
Operating Procedures
Organizational relationship in AICPA. The Chairman of 
the APB could be responsible to the President of the 
AICPA only for general administrative purposes, such as 
the use of office space and other facilities and services of 
the AICPA. However, the governing and administrative 
structure of the AICPA should have no influence or control 
over the work or conclusions of the APB.
The heads of the research and supporting staffs of the 
APB should report to the Chairman of the APB. The APB
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should have a separate budget. It would be the responsi­
bility of the Board of Directors of the AICPA to obtain 
the necessary funds.
Task forces. In order to bring the maximum abilities 
and experience to bear on each particular problem, a task 
force of specially qualified individuals should be appointed 
to study the problem. These persons would be selected for 
their knowledge and background and would include those 
from various fields of experience, depending upon the sub­
ject matter. The task force would represent a significant 
source of information for the APB and would act in an 
advisory capacity to the APB. In this way, not only the 
vast experience of the accounting profession but also the 
experience from many other fields would be made available.
Briefs and position papers. The APB should give wide 
public exposure to matters it has under consideration. Upon 
announcement of an intention to issue a pronouncement in 
a given area, all interested parties should be invited to file 
their views with the APB. These views, or briefs, should be 
reasoned presentations and should provide the APB with 
material for its deliberations in addition to any research 
commissioned by the APB under its own research organi­
zation or special task force. All contacts with the APB with 
respect to subjects under consideration should be a part of 
the public record, and the conclusions should relate to the 
public record.
Public hearings. The APB should establish procedures 
for public hearings on all significant matters under con­
sideration and state the controlling criteria to be met in 
making the decisions. Interested parties, including govern­
mental agencies, should be notified of the hearings and 




any brief or position paper filed. The hearings should be 
conducted in a judicial manner, and a transcript of the 
proceedings should be published and sold on a subscription 
basis. Through the public hearing process the APB would 
have an opportunity to question in depth those who express 
differing views on matters under consideration. The APB 
would thereby be better able to consider the impact of 
proposed pronouncements on the various interested parties.
Exposure period. A question could exist whether, the 
draft of an Opinion or other pronouncement of the APB 
should be publicly exposed for reaction and comment. If 
the research, public hearing and other steps taken by the 
APB to review and consider a subject have been properly 
undertaken, it may be unlikely that much new information 
would result from the exposure process. Also, exposure 
could perhaps be construed as an indication of some degree 
of indecisiveness. However, it is difficult to record the rea­
soning and conclusions on complicated and controversial 
subjects in a clear and comprehensive manner. Also, the 
complexity, the diversity and the wide scope of business 
activities make it difficult to anticipate all of the problems 
of application. Therefore, public exposure of drafts of pro­
nouncements would be a desirable step in some cases in 
assuring the best possible results. However, this exposure 
would not be necessary in all instances.
Conclusions in Opinions supported by reasoning. The 
conclusions in Opinions should be supported in a more com­
prehensive and effective manner. These explanations would 
involve not only the establishment of a proper relationship 
to the defined objectives, but also the reasoning why the 




Approval and dissents. Approval by a majority of the 
APB would be required for its conclusions to become effec­
tive. A two-thirds vote requirement not only has the danger 
of an impasse but also results in excessive compromising. 
Each dissenting APB member would have an opportunity 
to express his disagreement with the majority position and 
his reasons therefor. The increasingly widespread interest 
in APB Opinions requires full disclosure and makes it very 
important that dissenting views not be submerged and that 
they be published together with the majority position 
reached.
Effective dates for Opinions. If the work of the APB 
could be done on a more timely basis, a greater opportunity 
would be available to lengthen the period of time from the 
publication of an Opinion to the effective date. This 
would give business enterprises more time to adjust to 
the new principles and methods and would undoubtedly 
reduce some of the opposition to changes. The APB in 
the past has tended to operate on a “crash basis” with 
only relatively short periods for those affected to adapt to 
the new bases.
Legal Basis
We do not propose in this brief to discuss the legal 
aspects of the operations of the APB, including its authori­
ties and limitations. These should be reviewed with lawyers 
who are knowledgeable in this area. Since various legal 
questions do arise periodically in this regard, and since 
the threat of possible legal action against the APB has 
been made occasionally, it is essential that full considera­
tion be given to this subject in connection with the present 





The entire research program and the role and respon­
sibilities of the Director of Accounting Research and his 
staff need to be thoroughly reviewed and our comments 
in this regard are brief. The research program of the past 
12 years has been successful in some respects. The research 
studies published have generally been of good quality. The 
research staff has also provided significant assistance on 
APB projects not involving or resulting in publication of 
a research study. However, an overall assessment of the 
research program indicates the results have not been com­
mensurate with the time and cost that have gone into it.
The research program should be coordinated much more 
closely with the needs of the APB. The permanent re­
search staff should not be expected to interrupt a signifi­
cant research assignment to deal with short-term projects 
or housekeeping chores. The capabilities of research per­
sonnel need careful evaluation so that research projects 
are assigned in a manner that will maximize the probabil­
ities of productive efforts.
Substantial portions of supportive research for the APB 
could be undertaken by various organizations and academic 
groups. The result of “outside” research could be pre­
sented to the APB in briefs or position papers, or it could 
be independently published.
The research as well as the conclusion of the APB 
should be related to predetermined and defined objectives 
if any common purpose is to be achieved.
The experience in our firm has indicated that successful 
and effective accounting research is generally not achieved 
by groups, teams or committees. Research involving con-
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ceptual matters, while it may require the accumulation of 
relevant data, is based primarily upon the thought and 
analysis of individuals. The best accounting literature has 
been written by individuals. Therefore, emphasis should 
be placed on research by individuals.
Interpretations
The preparation and publication of interpretations of 
Opinions should be expanded and improved. If this pro­
cedure were carried out properly and effectively, it would 
eliminate the alleged need for so many detailed rules in 
Opinions. Thus, Opinions could be limited more to prin­
ciples, and the implementation and application of the 
principles could be handled by interpretation and the use 
of judgment.
Enforcement
One of the long-range problems with respect to the APB 
is enforcement of its Opinions. This subject is closely re­
lated to acceptability of APB pronouncements as discussed 
in an earlier section of this brief.
Members of the AICPA. Members of the AICPA have 
generally complied with APB Opinions since the fiasco over 
the conclusion stated in Opinion No. 2 with respect to the 
investment credit. However, that episode involving certain 
AICPA members and the SEC illustrates what could hap­
pen again. The entire question of enforcement of APB 
Opinions other than with the assistance of the SEC (and 
certain other governmental agencies) has not yet been faced 
squarely and dealt with in a realistic manner.
The real question is whether AICPA members as a con­
dition of their membership should be required to follow
642
34
APB Opinions. So long as mere disclosure of departures 
from APB Opinions and reliance on “substantial authori­
tative support’’ is a permissible alternative, enforcement 
is purely voluntary and cannot be effective for a very long 
period. The AICPA should reach a definite decision to 
place a requirement upon its members to follow and sup­
port APB Opinions regardless of “substantial authorita­
tive support’’ for other alternatives. However, the AICPA 
should not attempt to force a member to take any action 
that would be unlawful.
While a certain degree of acceptance among AICPA 
members is necessary for any enforcement procedures to 
be effective, such procedures are a necessary part of the 
overall plan for the APB. Such procedures place an even 
greater burden upon the APB to perform its function in a 
proper manner.
We recommend that:
1. The new plan for the APB be adopted by a vote 
of the entire AICPA membership.
2. Procedures be established for requiring AICPA 
members to follow APB Opinions if an appropriate 
legal basis to do so exists.
Governmental agencies. The SEC has supported APB 
Opinions other than No. 2. However, it has no obligation 
of any kind to do so. Other governmental agencies also 
have considerable authority and power and their own 
enforcement objectives. What will be the ultimate effect 
when a Federal governmental agency with strong statu­
tory power orders a company under its jurisdiction to 
follow accounting contrary to an APB Opinion? The SEC 
will ordinarily not countermand such an order from another 
regulatory agency. The independent auditor can qualify
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his report, but no one can predict the ultimate outcome of 
such a conflict. Without some vehicle to resolve conflicts 
that might arise in this connection, how is the public to 
be served?
The Opinions published by any group within the AICPA 
must be based on their authority as a pronouncement of a 
professional organization operating for the benefit of the 
public. If the Federal Power Commission, for example, 
decides not to follow an APB Opinion in its rules and regu­
lations under existing conditions, no organization other 
than a Federal court could require it to do so and then only 
under a proceeding initiated by a party having the neces­
sary standing before the FPC. Past experience indicates 
that success in such a court action is only a remote pos­
sibility.
The SEC could adopt APB Opinions, as its own regula­
tions, or the Federal Securities Acts might be amended 
to give some sort of statutory authority to APB Opinions. 
However, neither action would necessarily be feasible, nor 
would such action necessarily influence the many other 
Federal and state regulatory agencies.
Congress could pass a law giving some legal authority to 
APB Opinions for purposes of all Federal regulatory 
agencies. However, it is not likely that Congress would 
give this authority to a private organization.
In view of the vast authority of the Federal and state 
regulatory agencies, it could be contended that the account­
ing profession might as well abdicate in its efforts to estab­
lish accounting principles and let this responsibility fall to 





If the APB is a strong and effective professional or­
ganization and does an outstanding job in carrying out 
its mission in behalf of the public, and if it receives the 
support of the business community and the accounting 
profession, it has an excellent chance of having its views 
prevail. Even though governmental agencies would have 
the power to depart from APB Opinions, they would have 
the responsibility to justify such departures.
Therefore, we believe that a strong and effective APB 
within the framework of the AICPA is the best means for 
the accounting profession to carry out its responsibility. 
The final decision as to who should carry the responsibility 
for the establishment of accounting principles may be made 
some day by the Congress, but the best way to keep this 
responsibility in the private sector is to have an APB that 
will do a truly outstanding job and place upon others (in­
cluding governmental agencies) the responsibility of justi­
fying departures.
We believe that a strong accounting profession, which 
retains on a merit basis the right to develop accounting 
principles in a professional manner, is desirable for the 
welfare of our free-enterprise system. There is a reason­
able chance for the accounting profession to retain this 
right, in behalf of the public, and the accounting profession 
should do everything in its power to earn this right by 
performance.
Appeal Procedures
APB Opinions have significant effects upon numerous 
decisions and actions in the business community and by the 
public. Such Opinions, in a free-enterprise system such as 
exists in the United States, cannot be imposed upon the 
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business community over a long period of time without any 
effective right of appeal. Fair appeal procedures are critical 
because they provide a safety valve that could help resolve 
potentially explosive situations. Until the first public hear­
ing was held by the AICPA in May 1971, company manage­
ments or other interested parties were not given an oppor­
tunity to be heard by the APB in person and on the record 
(committees of the APB had met previously with certain 
groups). Neither has the SEC served in a very effective 
appeal capacity for APB Opinions.
Certain appeal procedures are presently available to 
company managements and anyone else who can show that 
they are so affected as to have an appealable action. These 
procedures would involve appeals to appropriate govern­
mental agencies and to the courts. Everyone has certain 
constitutional rights that cannot be taken away.
Business managements resort to what may be considered 
to be aggressive persuasion when they consider their exer­
cise of this right to be the only appeal really available to 
them without undertaking court actions that may be lengthy 
and costly and with possible questionable results.
More effective appeal procedures beyond the AICPA may 
eventually be necessary to protect the legitimate rights of 
investors and other parties involved. Such rights may need 
to be further protected and, if they are not, the APB and the 
AICPA could be casualties in the process. In addition, the 
existence of reasonable appeal procedures may lead to a 
better job being done in the first place.
Our firm in 1965 published a booklet entitled, “Establish­
ing Accounting Principles—A Crisis in Decision Making.” 
This booklet discussed in some detail the possibility of a 
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United States Court of Accounting Appeals that could be 
established in the Executive Branch of the Federal Govern­
ment.
We recognize the problems involved in trying to estab­
lish appeal procedures beyond the AICPA that are any 
more prescribed or legal than those that may exist at the 
present time. However, consideration of the general subject 
under review by the study group would be incomplete with­
out consideration being given to appeal procedures and 





Arthur Andersen & Co.
69 West Washington Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60602
November 16, 1970
Mr. Marshall Armstrong, President
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Armstrong:
The Accounting Principles Board, in our view, has not 
successfully carried out its mission nor does it currently 
give promise of doing so. While the APB has made prog­
ress in some areas, the total result has not been sufficiently 
responsive to past or present needs. Many of the problems 
covered by pronouncements have been considered within a 
framework of concepts and principles which is out of date 
and which led to the problems in the first place. Most of 
the pronouncements represent little more than detailed, 
arbitrary rules, which set forth almost no reasoning as to 
how and why they meet the needs of investors and other 
users of financial statements. Also, too much emphasis has 
been placed on what is deemed to be best for the auditors.
The inability of the APB to succeed in its mission is evi­
denced today by the dissatisfaction and criticism, both 
inside and outside the profession, which are far greater 
than in 1959 when the APB was established. Many events 
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and developments in recent years have focused increased 
attention on the work of the APB. The public interest in 
business has been greatly expanded, and the number of 
shareholders in publicly held companies has increased 
dramatically. Also, business transactions have become more 
complex, and many new and difficult accounting problems 
have arisen, which underscore the urgency of achieving 
substantial improvements in financial accounting and re­
porting.
The Committee on Accounting Procedure was replaced 
because it was not properly organized to accomplish what 
was needed and because it had not established the neces­
sary objectives on which to base its conclusions. The effec­
tiveness of the APB has been seriously handicapped for 
similar reasons. The APB has been organized in much the 
same manner as the CAP, even as to size. Both groups 
have been involved primarily in what has been referred to 
as “putting out fires,” rather than taking a coordinated 
and planned approach to the problems in total. The total 
direct cost of the APB to the profession has probably been 
about twenty times as much as for the CAP. Yet, the im­
provement in results has not been at all commensurate with 
this increased cost.
With the APB or the CAP-type of organization, the 
necessary results cannot be achieved merely by increasing 
the expenditures of money and effort, by holding longer 
and more frequent meetings, and by having more people on 
the AICPA payroll. The time spent in debate and dis­
cussion expands to fill the time available, and the amount 
of expenses increases to use up the funds budgeted. There 
is little evidence that the research has had any significant 
effect on the views of individual APB members.
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While many reasons exist for delays in resolving 
problems, the fact is that numerous and undesirable delays 
have occurred. This fact could be documented in detail 
by a long list, but only two cases are mentioned here as 
illustrations. In order to avoid three dissents to Opinion 
No. 7 in 1966, the Board as a whole assured three Board 
members that a prompt review of Opinion No. 5 in relation 
to Opinion No. 7 would be made and appropriate action 
taken by the Board; but such review is still in process and 
no action has been taken. When Opinion No. 11 was issued 
in 1967, it was agreed that prompt attention would be 
given to each of the five special areas excluded from the 
Opinion; but any significant consideration or discussion of 
these items has been postponed several times, and no 
action appears to be imminent on any of them.
In our view, there are two primary reasons for the dif­
ficulties which the APB has had in carrying out its mission. 
The first reason is a lack of a definition of the objectives 
of financial statements. Under the original plan for the 
APB, these objectives were to be established as the first 
order of business. This omission has resulted in inef­
ficiencies in the APB’s operation and disastrous results 
in its resolution of problems. The tremendous amount of 
time which has been spent by APB members, the AICPA 
research staff and others on Statement No. 4 has delayed 
action in the establishment of meaningful objectives and 
concepts for five years and has produced nothing more 
than an elaborate defense for the status quo. Thus, after 
eleven years of effort, and with only Statement No. 4 as 
a product indicated to fill the need for basic objectives, 
this continued void (which is of increasing seriousness) 
will become more difficult to eliminate. Subjects such as 
business combinations, goodwill, changes in methods, equity 
basis, and marketable securities are examples of problems
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where objectives of financial statements must be established 
before it is possible for effective solutions to be determined. 
Unfortunately, the appearance of indecision and pro­
crastination on the part of the APB, resulting from a lack 
of objectives, creates an impression of a lack of independ­
ence and a doubt as to its leadership role and capabilities.
The second major reason for the difficulties of the APB 
involves its general organization and the manner in which 
it approaches problems. The APB has operated essentially 
as a compromising, rule-making body trying to achieve on 
each issue, by means of arbitrary rules, an ad hoc accom­
modation of the various views of eighteen members. While 
the APB is carrying out a quasi-public, legislative function, 
it has not operated in a manner which adequately recog­
nizes the public interest. There have been no public hear­
ings, no public record, and no appeal procedures, even 
though many millions of people are affected by its deci­
sions. Regardless of the personal integrity of individual 
APB members, questions involving conflicts of interest 
have arisen. An appraisal of the record indicates that a 
new approach is needed in formulating sound accounting 
principles.
We much prefer to have accounting principles estab­
lished by the accounting profession. Although we have 
questioned various decisions of the APB, we have up to the 
present time followed all of the Opinions issued. However, 
as we have noted, the situation is rapidly deteriorating, 
and it may no longer be desirable for the AICPA as a 
whole to continue to rely upon the APB as it is presently 
constituted. Likewise, it may no longer be reasonable to 
expect AICPA members to do so.
Compliance with APB Opinions by AICPA members is
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essentially a voluntary matter. Considerable responsibility 
is placed upon the SEC for enforcement. Yet, there are 
questions whether the SEC has the legal right to enforce 
such rules without going through the prescribed rule­
making procedures. Also, CPAs may not have an effec­
tive, legal defense under the Securities Acts for relying in 
good faith upon mere SEC enforcement of APB Opinions.
The AICPA can no longer take the position that the APB 
is only a committee of a private association establishing 
standards for its members. The pronouncements of the 
APB have a major impact on all segments of our society— 
not only investors, creditors and other users of financial 
statements, but also employees and their families. The APB 
is carrying a tremendously important public responsi­
bility.
The AICPA will not be able to retain this function unless 
it demonstrates that it deserves the confidence of the public. 
When an activity with such a significant public interest 
involved is undertaken by a private organization, such 
organization must satisfactorily meet the tests required by 
the public. Otherwise, it is inevitable that the activity will 
eventually be performed by some other organization, which 
would probably be a governmental agency.
We respectfully petition that prompt action be taken by 
the AICPA to make the necessary changes in the organi­
zation and operations of the AICPA as they relate to the 
establishment of accounting principles. We also suggest 
that the need for these changes is so urgent that a new 
plan should be submitted to Council for approval in May 
1971 and put into effect as soon as possible.
In our view, the following matters should be considered 
if the accounting profession is to retain significant respon-
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sibilities for the determination of accounting principles:
1. A major organizational change is necessary in 
order to achieve better results on a prompt and timely 
basis.
2. The objectives of financial statements should be 
defined.
3. Each pronouncement should explain why the con­
clusions are in the best interests of investors and 
other users of financial statements.
4. All aspects of the legal basis for the pronounce­
ments should be reviewed further and consideration 
given to ways and means of clarifying this situation.
5. Features which are characteristic of a body 
responsible to the public should be adopted, such as 
the following:
a. Maximum independence and freedom from con­
flicts of interest.
b. Primary attention to the needs of investors and 
to public interest generally.
c. Public hearings with a complete record of the 
proceedings to be published.
d. Clear reasoning in support of conclusions, with 
comprehensive concurring and dissenting opinions.
e. A procedure for appeal of decisions.
6. Research should be more timely and better 
oriented to meet the necessary requirements. Also, more 
research could be done by those outside groups repre­
senting different viewpoints.
7. Improved methods should be established for de­
termining and isolating current problems, obtaining 




8. The relationship of the AICPA to the SEC and 
other Federal and State regulatory agencies, as well 
as the responsibilities of CPAs in giving reports under 
the Securities Acts, should be clarified. The AICPA 
should not be an unofficial or informal arm of any regu­
latory agency. A better understanding of the responsi­
bilities of the various parties is necessary.
9. Procedures for interpreting pronouncements and 
answering questions should be improved.
While we are not committed to any particular solution 
to this problem at the present time, we do favor a plan 
whereby the new body would consist of five to seven full- 
time members and would incorporate such matters as those 
set forth in the listing above. Many of the details could be 
worked out satisfactorily, and we are prepared to give more 
specific suggestions which would be intended to make the 
entire organization more effective than it is at the present 
time. The staff of the AICPA which supports the present 
APB should be strengthened and its activities reorga­
nized and streamlined. More of the research now under­
taken by the AICPA could be performed by those com­
panies, firms and organizations which have a significant 
interest in the proceedings.
A new program probably would involve increased costs. 
We believe that sufficient funds could be obtained for the 
right kind of a new program. We also believe that it will 
become increasingly difficult to obtain funds for the present 
program.
Our firm will continue to devote its manpower and re­
sources to the establishment of sound accounting principles, 
and these must be channeled in a manner which will assure 
their most effective utilization.
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We are available at your convenience to discuss this sub­
ject with you further, if you would like to do so.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr.





FIVE OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES WITH 
INFLUENCE ON ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING OF
PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES
General
Various Federal and state agencies have the authority, 
individually and separately, to prescribe accounting to be 
followed by companies under their jurisdiction. They have 
not been coordinated or consistent with one another in their 
approach to accounting practices. They may or may not 
follow the Opinions of the APB. This situation represents a 
serious obstacle to improvement in financial accounting and 
reporting.
Each of these agencies was created by law for specific 
purposes; as a result, each has a special viewpoint, which 
may and frequently does constitute bias in its approach to 
accounting decisions. They have not been required to har­
monize their decisions with “generally accepted accounting 
principles” or even with one another. Within its own 
sphere, each of these agencies is sovereign, subject only to 
very broad limitations.1
1. This same general problem was discussed in 1938 by A. A. Berle, Jr. 
(a lawyer and then Undersecretary of State) in an article “Accounting 
and the Law” (The Accounting Review, March, 1938, pages 13-14) as 
follows:
“Where a government body has power to make an effective rule in 
any particular case, we have come to expect at least two, and possibly 
three, safeguards which are also development mechanisms. These are, 
in order: (1) The opportunity for full argument afforded both sides; 
(2) The requirement for a publicly announced, reasoned decision; 
(3) Review upon appeal to a higher tribunal. It may be granted at 
once that a conscious attempt has been made, in recent years, by certain 
influences in the law to eliminate some, if not all, of these safeguards, 
and to deify the administrative process in and of Itself. But this school 
of thought, is so obviously an extreme as applied to American conditions 
that it cannot be taken as a permanent guide in building the intellectual 
framework of the newest branch of law, which accounting really is. .. .”
*****
“It should be within the realm of possibility to create a Board of 
Accounting Appeals to which accounting questions could be referred, 
and which, by training, personnel, and equipment was capable of 
rendering swift decision on such problems. . . .”
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Five of the most significant of these agencies—the ones 
whose practices perhaps have the greatest influence on the 
accounting and reporting of publicly held companies—are:





Rule-Making and Appeal Procedures
The extent of jurisdiction that these five agencies exer­
cise over the accounting of companies varies greatly. Fur­
ther, the agencies vary significantly in how they administer 
the accounting authority they do exercise.
In the case of one of these agencies, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), little use has been made of 
formal rule-making procedures for accounting matters. 
There is no requirement to issue written rules on account­
ing principles and practices. Those formal pronouncements 
that have been made in this area either (1) have dealt 
with matters of form and disclosure, as in Regulation S-X, 
or (2) have been directed toward occasional specific mat­
ters as in some of the Accounting Series Releases. In fact, 
only a small fraction of the policies of the SEC relating to 
accounting principles and practices are in writing and 
available to the public.
Informal, but nonetheless binding, determination of im­
portant policies and rules as a result of decisions reached 
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in cases involving individual companies generally has been 
substituted by the SEC for formal rule making in account­
ing. As a result, far-reaching decisions are made and prece­
dents are created without a record and without an oppor­
tunity for participation by other parties who may have an 
interest, including public investors whom the SEC was 
established to serve.
In the case of the other four agencies, rule-making pro­
cedures for accounting matters are followed to some extent. 
However, public hearings generally are not held.
Appeal to the judicial courts from rule making by an 
agency is generally limited to those parties that are 
directly and adversely affected. However, an agency is 
presumed by the judicial courts to have expertise in areas 
of its jurisdiction, and its latitude in exercising powers 
granted by Congress is quite broad. Even where a party is 
directly and adversely affected and has adequate standing 
to appeal, judicial courts have usually refused to disturb 
accounting rules adopted by an agency unless they are so 
arbitrary and so flagrantly wrong as to amount to pure 
whimsy2 or violate “due process” standards. Yet, the courts 
hold public accountants to a high level of accountability and 2
2. In refusing to interfere with a uniform system of accounts prescribed 
by the Federal Communications Commission, Justice Cardoza of the United 
States Supreme Court in American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 
U. S. 232, stated at pages 236-37 of the opinion of the Court:
. . it is not enough that the prescribed system of accounts shall 
appear to be unwise or burdensome or inferior to another. Error or 
unwisdom is not equivalent to abuse. What has been ordered must 
appear to be ‘so entirely at odds with fundamental principles of 
correct accounting’ (Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 231 U. S. 423, 
444) as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of 
judgment. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 287 U. S. 134, 141; Kansas 
City So. Ry. Co. v. U. S., supra, p. 456. . . .”
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do not grant an immunity to them of a type that is available 
to the regulatory agencies.3
3. The legal counsel of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants as a result of the Continental Vending case, stated:
“The defendants had asked . . . for instructions that would have 
required the jury to acquit if it found that the balance sheet was in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The trial 
court instead gave instructions which said that the ‘critical test’ was 
whether the balance sheet fairly presented the financial position with­
out reference to generally accepted accounting principles.
“The trial court also said in its instructions that evidence of com­
pliance with generally accepted accounting principles would be very 
persuasive, but not conclusive. It also gave other instructions which 
the jury might have taken as an invitation to test the fairness of 
presentation, not against generally accepted accounting principles, but 
against their idea of what an investor or other layman might want to 
know.” (The Journal of Accountancy, August 1970.)
Inconsistent Rules Among Agencies
No means are available today to ensure consistency in 
accounting practices prescribed by the various agencies. 
Each is sovereign in its own jurisdiction with almost un­
limited powers to prescribe accounting as it, and it alone, 
sees fit. Also, the agencies have not established overall 
objectives and criteria to serve as guidelines, and their 
policies are frequently established without criteria or with­
out the underlying reasoning as to what is best for investors 
and other interested parties.
While the SEC has generally supported the Opinions of 
the APB, there have been increasing indications that other 
Federal regulatory agencies are giving more recognition to 
the Opinions of the APB. For example, after the issuance 
of Opinion No. 9, the FPC, FCC and ICC each instituted 
rule-making proceedings and subsequently issued orders 
changing the prescribed uniform system of accounts to re­
flect in general the revised form of the statement of income 
set forth in Opinion No. 9. However, these three commis­
sions adopted somewhat different rules with respect to the 




Some companies come under the jurisdiction of more than 
one of the agencies. Interagency conflicts and inconsisten­
cies could possibly be resolved by cooperation and consid­
eration for one another’s requirements, but there is now no 
effective method of achieving consistency in objectives or 
approach among all these agencies.
The principal problem results from the confusion to 
investors and others when they are furnished with financial 
statements of various companies that may not be—and 
frequently are not—prepared on a uniform basis or in 
accordance with consistent accounting principles and prac­
tices. With the overriding authority of these agencies over 
the accounting followed by companies representing such a 
significant portion of our economy, and with the autono­
mous power of each to make rules, efforts by the accounting 
profession to establish objectives and narrow alternative 
practices will not necessarily be successful.
While all of these regulatory agencies have a statutory 
responsibility to the public, there are indications that cer­
tain of them, by the very nature of their regulatory activi­
ties and statutory responsibilities, may from time to time 
tend to favor certain segments of society in establishing 
accounting rules. This potential for bias, accentuated by the 
lack of overall criteria concerning what constitutes the 
fairest presentation for all segments of the public that are 
affected, may not produce results that are in the best 
interests of all segments of the public. The one agency 
specifically concerned with the interests of investors, the 
SEC, seldom can or does challenge the accounting rules of 
the other agencies.
The general approach each of these five agencies has 




panies subject to its jurisdiction and the expansion of the 
use of such authority are discussed below.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
The agency with the broadest impact on publicly held 
companies is the SEC. It administers several statutes and 
has duties under certain others.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 give the SEC extensive 
control over the accounting followed by certain companies, 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes accounting 
requirements on brokers and dealers. By far the greatest 
number of companies, however, are affected by the registra­
tion, reporting and proxy-solicitation provisions of the Se­
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. These provisions apply to several thousand com­
panies with securities issued to or traded by the public.
Under these Acts, the SEC has certain authority over 
financial statements issued by most of the nation’s larger 
companies. As a result of the Securities Acts Amendments 
of 1964, most companies with 500 or more stockholders and 
over $1,000,000 of total assets now come under its account­
ing requirements. These requirements relate not only to 
financial statements filed with the SEC but also affect 
published reports to stockholders. Proxy Rule 14a-3, as 
revised in 1964, includes the following provision:
“. . . Any differences, reflected in the financial state­
ments included in the report to security holders, from 
the principles of consolidation or other accounting 
principles or practices, or methods of applying ac­
counting principles or practices, applicable to the finan-
661
53
cial statements of the issuer filed or proposed to be 
filed with the Commission, which have a material effect 
on the financial position or results of operations of the 
issuer, shall be noted and the effect thereof reconciled 
or explained in such report. ...”
The SEC’s powers to prescribe accounting rules are 
specific and sweeping. These powers are expressed in the 
Securities Act as follows:
“The Commission shall have authority from time 
to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the pro­
visions of this title, including rules and regulations 
governing registration statements and prospectuses 
for various classes of securities and issuers, and de­
fining accounting, technical and trade terms used in 
this title. Among other things, the Commission shall 
have authority, for the purposes of this title, to pre­
scribe the form or forms in which required informa­
tion shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown 
in the balance sheet and earnings statement, and the 
methods to be followed in the preparation of accounts, 
in the appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities, 
in the determination of depreciation and depletion, in 
the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring in­
come, in the differentiation of investment and operating 
income, and in the preparation, where the Commission 
deems it necessary or desirable, of consolidated balance 
sheets or income accounts of any person directly or in­
directly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any 
person under direct or indirect common control with 
the issuer; but in so far as they relate to any common 
carrier subject to the provisions of section 20 of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, the rules and 
regulations of the Commission with respect to accounts 
shall not be inconsistent with the requirements imposed 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission under author­
ity of such section 20. . . .” (Section 19a)
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Similar authority is contained in the Securities Exchange 
Act, except that the SEC shall not require reports that 
are inconsistent with accounting methods prescribed by 
any other agency under Federal law. Both Acts, in giving 
discretionary authority to the SEC, relate such authority 
to what is necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
or for the protection of investors. These Acts do not in­
clude any meaningful criteria to serve as guidelines for 
deciding when financial statements and the underlying 
accounting are on a sound basis.
In testimony before a subcommittee of the House of 
Representatives concerning the Securities Acts Amend­
ments of 1964, then-chairman William L. Cary of the SEC 
emphasized the importance of the SEC’s accounting 
authority as follows:
“Most importantly, investors in over-the-counter 
securities are entitled to be assured that corporate 
reporting meets all the tests of timeliness, sound ac­
counting, reliability, responsibility, and consistency. 
This can be achieved only by the imposition of legal 
obligations which would shape the development of 
appropriate accounting and other disclosure prac­
tices.”4
4. Hearing held before Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, Com­
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, on 
November 19, 1963.
5. Ibid.
Mr. Cary also stated:
“The purpose of disclosure is to place the investor 
in a position to make an informed judgment on the 
merits of a security, and to provide a basis for com­
paring that security with others issued by companies 
in the same or different industries. Essentially this 
purpose is achieved through the furnishing of financial 
information which provides a uniform pattern of 





With due respect to Mr. Cary, his viewpoint as expressed 
in the last sentence above has not always been followed 
by the Commissioners or the staff.
During the three decades since passage of the Securities 
Act and the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC has pub­
lished relatively few rules on matters involving accounting 
principles and practices. However, the SEC is in no better 
position than the accounting profession to determine ob­
jective standards until it establishes criteria to serve as a 
basis for decision making.
Regulation S-X governs the form and content of financial 
statements filed with the SEC; but this regulation is con­
cerned primarily with method of presentation and extent 
of disclosure, not with accounting principles and practices. 
The SEC has also issued Accounting Series Releases but 
only a relatively few of those issued to date have dealt 
with important accounting problems, and those few have 
dealt with rules rather than basic criteria, concepts and 
principles. In general, such releases as do relate to ac­
counting principles and practices have been directed toward 
specific problems (not necessarily the most important ones 
nor ones with the widest applicability) or have dealt with 
questions arising out of a few cases in which action was 
taken because financial statements filed were considered 
deficient.
Even when formal statements of policy are issued, there 
is no assurance that interested parties will be afforded an 
opportunity to present their views or that the SEC will 
consider the record, if any, in reaching its decision. In con­
nection with the issuance of some statements, the SEC does 
“expose” an advance draft to the public, requesting that 
any views or comments be submitted by a specified date.
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This practice is followed with respect to revisions of Regu­
lation S-X. In some cases, however, policy statements are 
issued without prior notice. For example, on January 10, 
1963, one month after the APB issued its Opinion No. 2 
with respect to the investment tax credit, the SEC issued 
its Accounting Series Release No. 96 on the same subject. 
This release, dealing with a matter of intense interest to 
business, the accounting profession and the public, was 
issued without advance notice or a hearing; it did not sup­
port the APB’s Opinion; and it gave no acceptable reason 
other than “the substantial diversity of opinion which 
exists among responsible persons” for its requirements, 
which differed in essential respects from the Opinion of 
the APB. No explanation has ever been given as to the 
identification of the “responsible persons” or as to why the 
action of the SEC was in the public interest.
Instead of exercising official authority directly and auton­
omously, the SEC generally has chosen to accomplish its 
objectives in two ways: (1) through working “behind the 
scenes” with the AICPA and (2) through its day-to-day 
processing of registration statements and reports filed by 
the many companies subject to its jurisdiction.
The SEC has generally preferred to go along with the 
customary practices of business and the alternatives con­
sidered acceptable by the accounting profession, although 
there have been occasions where the SEC has been placed 
in an untenable position and has decided to act on its own 
initiative. The SEC has usually followed the lead of the 
AICPA in this area. The preference of the SEC for work­
ing with the accounting profession rather than assuming 
direct responsibility for prescribing accounting principles 
and practices represents a deliberate position expressed 




was reiterated in Accounting Series Release No. 96, as 
follows:
“In Accounting Series Release No. 1, published 
April 1, 1937, the Commission announced a program 
for the purpose of contributing to the development of 
uniform standards and practice in major accounting 
questions. Accounting Series Release No. 4 recognizes 
that there may be sincere differences of opinion be­
tween the Commission and the registrant as to the 
proper principles of accounting to be followed in a 
given situation and indicates that, as a matter of 
policy, disclosure in the accountant’s certificate and 
footnotes will be accepted in lieu of conformance to the 
Commission’s views only if such disclosure is adequate 
and the points involved are such that there is substan­
tial authoritative support for the practice followed by 
the registrant, and then only if the position of the 
Commission has not been expressed previously in rules, 
regulations, or other official releases of the Commis­
sion, including the published opinions of its Chief 
Accountant. This policy is intended to support the 
development of accounting principles and methods of 
presentation by the profession but to leave the Com­
mission free to obtain the information and disclosure 
contemplated by the securities laws and conformance 
with accounting principles which have gained general 
acceptance. ’ ’
The SEC has been criticized, and perhaps properly so, 
for not pressing the AICPA more for prompt and effective 
action. Instances have occurred where the APB has acted 
rapidly at the insistence of the SEC.
In Congressional testimony, which followed that quoted 
earlier, Mr. Cary answered Questions by Congressman 
Harley 0. Staggers as follows:
“Mr. Staggers. . . . Who has the primary responsi­
bility for the determination of appropriate accounting 
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principles to be followed in the preparation of finan­
cial statements?
“Mr. Cary. I would say Mr. Barr is our long-time 
senior chief accountant, and I think I can say quite 
truly that we have cooperated with the accounting pro­
fession very carefully on this subject over a period of 
years. I would take it as a joint responsibility.
“Mr. Barr has been working with them, I know, on 
an almost day-to-day basis over a period of years, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
“One of my colleagues says the ultimate responsi­
bility is ours, but I think in many areas we have 
encouraged them to move ahead and we have stood 
behind them. Sometimes we have differed but in gen­
eral we have been going along with them in many areas 
and we have pushed them. ’’6
The chairman of the SEC in 1964, Manuel F. Cohen, 
expressed it this way:
“No one can dispute the assertion that the Commis­
sion has the power to decree ‘acceptable’ accounting 
principles and practices. I think it is common knowl­
edge that we have, at various times, been urged to do 
just that. However, from its inception, the Commission 
has preferred cooperation with the profession to gov­
ernmental action, and has actively encouraged account­
ants to take the initiative in regulating their practices 
and in setting standards of conduct. In response, the 
profession, although not the recipient of delegated 
power (as are the NASD and the stock exchanges), 
has performed an important service as a self-regula­
tory institution. ”7 
6. Hearing held before Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, Com­
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, on 
February 19, 1964.
7. From an address before the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American 
Accounting Association, September 1, 1964.
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The above comments do not imply that the SEC’s posi­
tion with respect to accounting principles has been purely 
passive, waiting for the profession to take action. Through 
meetings, correspondence and speeches, individual com­
missioners and members of the staff have encouraged im­
provement in specific areas where it has felt particular 
concern. The Chief Accountant of the SEC has frequently 
submitted his personal views (which do not purport to be 
those of the SEC) to appropriate AICPA committees. The 
SEC has not indicated, at least publicly, any general dis­
satisfaction with the overall performance of the accounting 
profession in establishing accounting principles. However, 
the SEC’s tolerance in this regard, particularly as it re­
lates to objectives, may not have always been in the public 
interest.
The SEC’s greatest influence over accounting practices— 
and one that is sometimes overlooked—results from its 
regular and continuous review of financial statements 
included in registration statements and reports filed with 
it pursuant to the Acts which it administers. In deciding in 
each case whether to accept the financial statements as filed 
(and, usually, as covered by an opinion of independent 
public accountants) or to request that they be revised, the 
SEC exercises a great influence over accounting practices. 
The decisions reached in these individual cases, together 
with matters covered in conferences and correspondence, 
have cumulatively built up a vast body of informal, unpub­
lished “file-cabinet case law” with respect to the SEC’s 
position on accounting principles and practices.
The influence exercised in this way is discernible to the 
general public (and even to many companies and their 
accountants) only in those isolated instances where major 
differences of opinion between the SEC and a registrant 
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become public or in speeches by the SEC members and 
staff, but it is nonetheless real and powerful. Through this 
means the SEC, quietly and without public discussion, 
molds and directs the development of accepted practices in 
those areas in which it chooses to do so. However, this 
procedure does not cover all areas, and many second-rate 
alternative practices continue.
Whether the SEC has exercised too much or too little 
influence over accounting practices or whether the influence 
it has chosen to exercise has been sound are really not 
as important as the considerations that (1) the SEC has 
broad authority over accounting; (2) its influence is 
mainly exercised through day-to-day decisions reached pri­
vately between registrants and the staff with no public 
record; (3) there are no effective means for compelling the 
initiation of accounting rule making or for review on 
appeal where differences of opinion among companies, 
accountants and the SEC may exist; and (4) the statutes 
that give authority and responsibility to the SEC do not 
establish criteria or require that such criteria be estab­
lished for the determination of accounting principles that 
will result in “fairness” to all segments of our society 
affected by the decisions of the SEC.
Federal Power Commission (FPC)
The Federal Power Act of 1935 gives the FPC regula­
tory jurisdiction over sale of electric energy at wholesale 
in interstate commerce. Similar authority over companies 
engaged in the interstate transmission and sales-for-resale 
of natural gas is conferred on the FPC by the Natural Gas 
Act of 1938; this has been held by the United States 




Under the authority of statutes that it administers, the 
FPC has issued uniform systems of accounts for natural 
gas companies (other than independent producers) and 
electric companies. In addition, its chief accountant has 
adopted the practice of issuing Accounting Releases setting 
forth interpretations of the uniform systems of accounts.
In the Appalachian Power Company case,8 the United 
States Supreme Court refused to review a decision of the 
Appeals Court that, under the Federal Power Act, upheld 
the FPC’s authority to require that a utility’s report to its 
stockholders conform to its prescribed uniform systems of 
accounts. Since the wording in the Natural Gas Act is 
similar to that in the Federal Power Act, the FPC may have 
the same authority over reports to stockholders of natural 
gas companies.
8. Appalachian Power Co. v. F. P. C., 328 F. 2d 237 CA 4, Cert. denied 
(1964 ) 85 S. Ct. 59; 379 U. S. 829.
Mr. Arthur Litke, Chief Accountant of the FPC, in an 
address in 1965 made the following comment with respect 
to the above court decision:
. The Appeals Court held that the Federal Power 
Commission’s systems of accounts are to be regarded 
as the basic accounts in cases where there may be 
conflict with those prescribed by state commissions. In 
addition, the Appeals Court affirmed the Commission’s 
authority to insist that utility stockholder reports con­
form to Federal Power Commission accounting pro­
cedures. The decision is another in a series of cases in 
which the Commission has been sustained on fundamen­
tal questions concerning the force and effect of its 
prescribed systems of accounts. By refusing to review 
the case, the Supreme Court has left, in effect, the sug­
gestion of the Appeals Court that the Federal Power 
Commission take full advantage of the authority given 
to it by the Federal Power Act. Obviously, the decision 




important. Looking beyond the statutory command, 
there is an obvious challenge to the Commission to 
impose accounting standards which are balanced with 
the general needs and interests of government, man­
agement and investors.
“The Appalachian decision affirms the Commission’s 
responsibility to review the financial statements of 
jurisdictional companies in their reports to stock­
holders and to the public. As yet, however, the Com­
mission has not formulated any definite procedures for 
carrying out this responsibility. The accounting pro­
fession is of great influence in improving financial 
statements to the end that accounting nonconformities 
are eliminated or reduced in number. In this respect 
cooperation of the profession will assuredly be sought 
by the Commission.”9
9. From an address before the Federal Government Accountants Associa­
tion Symposium, June 17, 1965.
The FPC’s uniform systems of accounts for electric com­
panies and for natural gas companies vary from the 
alternatives available under generally accepted accounting 
principles primarily in the area of accounting for plant 
costs.
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
The ICC regulates the interstate transportation by com­
mon carriers of passengers or property by railroads, motor 
carriers (trucks and bus lines), inland water carriers, and 
pipelines (except those transporting natural gas or water). 
The Interstate Commerce Act authorizes the ICC to pre­
scribe uniform systems of accounts for railroads and pipe­
lines, motor carriers, carriers by water and freight for­
warders. The uniform systems of accounts so prescribed 
vary in several respects from the alternatives available 
under generally accepted accounting principles. A partic-
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ularly significant difference is the failure to provide for 
deferred taxes arising from the use of liberalized deprecia­
tion and amortization under certificates of necessity.
Another difference relates to the accounting for certain 
types of properties and the related depreciation. The usual 
type of depreciation accounting is followed by railroads for 
such assets as freight and passenger-train cars, locomotives, 
bridges, buildings, communication systems, shop machinery, 
etc. Replacement, sometimes called “betterment,” account­
ing is followed for grading, ties, rails, other track material, 
ballast, and track laying and surfacing costs. Under re­
placement accounting, costs are charged to the property 
accounts when such items are originally constructed. To 
the extent that these items are replaced in kind, the cost 
of the replacement is charged to expense and no entries 
are made to the property accounts, which retain the amounts 
capitalized at the time of original construction. To the 
extent that these items are replaced with heavier or im­
proved material, the cost of the heavier or improved ma­
terial in excess of the cost of replacement in kind is also 
capitalized. The so-called “betterment” capitalized is 
limited to the “betterment” in material; labor is charged 
to operating expense, both when materials are replaced in 
kind and when replaced with improved or heavier material.
A committee of the AICPA in 1957 took the position that 
this replacement accounting for railroads was not in accord 
with practices generally followed by other industries but 
that “no substantial useful purpose would be served by 
a change to depreciation accounting techniques.” On Sep­
tember 17, 1963, the AICPA was requested by our Firm 
to reconsider this view (since it could not be supported on 
any logical basis), and a committee was appointed to do so. 
That committee submitted its report to the Accounting
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Principles Board on April 20, 1966, but the APB has taken 
no action on the report.
In 1960, the ICC issued a proposed rule that would 
prohibit carriers subject to its accounting regulation from 
including financial statements in their annual reports to 
stockholders (or otherwise released to the public) that are 
inconsistent with the corporate books of accounts main­
tained in conformity with the applicable uniform systems 
of accounts. However, on January 25, 1962, the ICG 
adopted Order No. 33581 which stated that:
“Carriers desiring to do so may prepare and pub­
lish financial statements in reports to stockholders and 
others, except in reports to this Commission, based on 
generally accepted accounting principles for which 
there is authoritative support, provided that any 
variance from this Commission’s prescribed account­
ing rules contained in such statement is clearly dis­
closed in foot-notes to the statements;.. .”
A few railroads and a number of other carriers subject 
to the ICC’s jurisdiction have adopted the practice per­
mitted by this rule, primarily as related to deferred in­
come taxes. Many railroads continue to report to their 
stockholders in accordance with the accounting require­
ments of the ICC; and, as a result, the independent public 
accountants (in cases where audits are made and opinions 
are issued) generally take exception in their opinions 
to the lack of a provision for deferred taxes in cases where 
such taxes should be provided, but they take no exception 
to replacement accounting.
In our opinion, the deficiencies in the accounting of the 
railroads as reflected in their published financial state­
ments, which accounting does not respond fairly to the
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objectives of investors, have had a far-reaching effect on 
the public and have influenced many business decisions 
such as the declaration of dividends and the management 
of cash.
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
The CAB regulates the routes and rates of air carriers. 
As authorized by law, it has prescribed a uniform system 
of accounts for such companies. Generally the system of 
accounts does not vary from the alternatives available 
under generally accepted accounting principles.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that:
‘‘The Board is empowered to require annual, monthly, 
periodical, and special reports from any air carrier; 
to prescribe the manner and form in which such reports 
shall be made; and to require from any air carrier 
specific answers to all questions upon which the Board 
may deem information to be necessary. ...” (Section 
407a)
The CAB has not attempted to exercise authority over or 
to prescribe the form and content of financial statements 
furnished to stockholders and other parties. The pre­
scribed annual report to the CAB includes a schedule for 
reconciling such report to the statements on which the 
independent public accountants have given their opinion. 
This appears to be a recognition that differences could 
exist between the requirements of the CAB and generally 
accepted accounting principles.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
The FCC has authority over licensing and allocation of 
wire and radio communication rights, and has jurisdiction 
over interstate telephone and telegraph rates.
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In accordance with statutory authorization, the FCC has 
prescribed uniform systems of accounts. These systems of 
accounts vary from the alternatives available under gen­
erally accepted accounting principles primarily in the area 
of accounting for plant costs.
The FCC has not attempted to exercise authority over 
or to prescribe the form and content of financial statements 
furnished to stockholders or other parties. However, this 
matter has not come to issue and the FCC’s powers in this 





BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AICPA WITH RESPECT 
TO ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
Of the numerous organizations and associations of 
accountants, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) has assumed the greatest respon­
sibility for the establishment of accounting principles. This 
Appendix represents a brief discussion of the activities of 
the AICPA in this area.
Prior to 1939
Prior to the early 1930’s, there was relatively little 
interest in development of accounting principles on a 
profession-wide basis. The accounting profession was small 
and was loosely structured, and its activities were on a 
“personalized” basis. Neither the interest in financial re­
porting nor the resources of the AICPA were significant 
enough to provide the impetus for a broad review of 
accounting principles. Very little consideration was given 
to the real objectives of financial statements.
In the early 1930’s, interest in accounting principles 
became much more evident, because of the damage to the 
public from inadequate financial reporting. The inad­
equacies of financial reporting and accounting were high­
lighted during this depression period. A special committee 
of the AICPA on cooperation with stock exchanges made 
specific recommendations in 1932 to a companion committee 
of the New York Stock Exchange. One key suggestion 
was that a small group, including accountants, lawyers 
and corporate officials, should prepare an authorita-
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tive statement of the broad accounting principles or 
standards to be adopted by listed corporations. This state­
ment was intended to be brief and to provide only a broad 
framework within which companies would be free to choose 
individual detailed accounting methods and procedures 
considered to be best suited to their own needs. This state­
ment stressed consistency of application and disclosure 
of the accounting methods employed, rather than what the 
objectives and principles should be.
While all aspects of the recommendations were not im­
plemented, the pattern was established for significant 
freedom of choice by companies among alternative ac­
counting methods with certain boundaries on those methods 
to be circumscribed by agreement among a small group of 
informed individuals commissioned for such a task. The 
accounting profession was to take the lead in the articula­
tion of the necessary broad principles. However, such broad 
principles and the related objectives were never estab­
lished.
During this same period Congressional hearings and 
discussions were held which led to the passage of the 
Securities Acts and to the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in 1934. While the Commission was 
granted broad powers over matters of financial reporting 
and accounting principles, in practice the Commission has 
only rarely chosen to exercise its powers to prescribe 
specific accounting rules. In effect, the Commission urged 
the accounting profession to meet the challenges of the time 
in regard to matters of accounting principles, but the test 
was whether the results were “misleading”, rather than any 
broad principles or objectives. The basic policy of the Com­
mission has been to let the accounting profession take the 
lead, with the Commission providing support and occasion-
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al prodding. However, neither the accounting profession 
nor the SEC had established any criteria, objectives or 
guidelines as to what constituted “fairness” in financial 
reporting to all segments of our society.
Committee on Accounting Procedure (1939-1959)
By 1939 the AICPA had formalized its structure for 
expressing statements of accounting principles by estab­
lishing a “senior committee,” the Committee on Account­
ing Procedure. This committee consisted principally of 
practicing certified public accountants, and it issued 51 
Accounting Research Bulletins during the period up to 
1959. These bulletins considered specific topics and identi­
fied one or more alternative procedures as being superior. 
The conclusions expressed were advisory to auditors in 
their resolution of day-to-day practical problems, and ad­
herence to the bulletins was voluntary, although most 
bulletins received fairly widespread acceptance. The main 
thrust of the committee was to use persuasion rather than 
compulsion to gain acceptance of positions taken. Thus, 
companies exercising the strongest opposition generally 
received the least compulsion. Auditors who did not agree 
with a bulletin were not bound to follow the recommended 
practice, provided they accepted and supported the desired 
alternative as being generally accepted or as having sub­
stantial authoritative support.
Dissatisfaction developed during the 20-year existence 
of the Committee on Accounting Procedure both as to the 
quality of the bulletins issued and as to the ability of the 
committee to deal effectively with difficult problems. The 
degree of usefulness of these bulletins has varied, but an 
overall evaluation of them indicates that:
1. No criteria were ever established that could be 




solutions to a problem represented the fairest result 
for investors and other users of financial statements.
2. The bulletins were not supported by any signi­
ficant amount of research by the AICPA. The AICPA 
staff was unable to give the committee very much 
assistance insofar as research was concerned, since 
the limited personnel available were busy with the 
administrative aspects of the operations of this and 
other committees.
3. The bulletins represented a compromise of the 
committee members’ personal points of view because 
no basic objectives or concepts were ever agreed upon. 
The bulletins usually included little reasoning or ex­
planation of the bases from which the conclusions were 
drawn.
4. The bulletins frequently sponsored alternative 
practices or were equivocal in dealing with the subject 
matter. Compromises on conclusions and wording to 
receive the necessary two-thirds vote of the committee 
members frequently resulted in “watering down” the 
conclusions so that the bulletins were only partially 
effective. Thus, the decision-making process was 
really one of arbitration among the committee members 
rather than a determination of what principles would 
best achieve predetermined objectives.
5. The bulletins reflected a lack of real authority 
by carrying the following statement, . Except in 
cases in which formal adoption by the Institute 
membership has been asked and secured, the authority 
of the bulletins rests upon the general acceptability 
of opinions so reached. ... It is recognized also that 
any general rules may be subject to exception; it is 
felt, however, that the burden of justifying departure 
from accepted procedures must be assumed by those 
who adopt other treatment. ...”
6. Bulletins were never issued on many con­
troversial subjects, which were avoided.
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Accounting Principles Board (1959-Present)
In an effort to assume more effective leadership in the 
determination of accounting principles, the AICPA estab­
lished a Special Committee on Research Program and its 
report was submitted to the AICPA Council in September, 
1958. The establishment of the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB) along with a much expanded research pro­
gram was recommended. The committee report stated:
“The general purpose of the Institute in the field of 
financial accounting should be to advance the written 
expression of what constitutes generally accepted ac­
counting principles, for the guidance of its members 
and of others. This means something more than a 
survey of existing practice. It means continuing effort 
to determine appropriate practice and to narrow the 
areas of difference and inconsistency in practice. In 
accomplishing this, reliance should be placed on per­
suasion rather than on compulsion. The Institute, how­
ever, can, and it should, take definite steps to lead in 
the thinking on unsettled and controversial issues.”
The APB was established by the AICPA Council and 
superseded the Committee on Accounting Procedure on 
September 1, 1959. The APB, supported by a much ex­
panded research program, was first to consider and reach 
some conclusions on the basic concepts, postulates and 
principles of accounting (including the objectives of 
financial statements), and then to proceed to study, analyze 
and consider the more important current problem areas 
involving accounting practices and financial reporting. The 
overall objective, as indicated above, was “to narrow the 
areas of difference and inconsistency in practice” in as 
expeditious a manner as practicable, but on the basis of 




Research. The responsibility for research studies was 
assigned to the AICPA’s Director of Accounting Research 
and those who are associated with him in research proj­
ects. The conclusions and recommendations are not ap­
proved, disapproved or otherwise acted upon by the APB, 
the only agency of the AICPA having authority to make 
or approve public pronouncements on accounting principles.
Opinions and Statements. The APB has issued twenty- 
one Opinions and four Statements. Fifteen of these 
Opinions and three Statements have been issued since 
1965, and most of these have been on more significant sub­
jects than those issued during the first six years of the 
APB’s existence.
Despite the fact that the APB has dealt with some 
difficult and controversial subjects in recent years—cost 
of pension plans in 1966; the form of income statements in 
1966; income taxes in 1967; earnings per share in 1969; 
business combinations and intangible assets in 1970; the 
equity method in 1971; and accounting changes in 1971— 
many difficult problems still remain on the agenda.
The inability of the APB to hold its position on Opinion 
No. 2 on accounting for the investment credit and the re­
sulting damage to its standing as an independent and 
authoritative body in the business community led to a 
controversy within the AICPA and to the appointment of 
the Special Committee on Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board. Action taken by the AICPA Council on 
one of the committee’s recommendations was reported to 
the AICPA membership by its President as follows:
‘‘The Council of the Institute, at its meeting October 
2, 1964, unanimously adopted recommendations that 
members should see to it that departures from Opinions
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of the Accounting Principles Board (as well as effec­
tive Accounting Research Bulletins issued by the 
former Committee on Accounting Procedure) are dis­
closed, either in footnotes to financial statements or 
in the audit reports of members in their capacity as 
independent auditors.” (Special Bulletin, October 
1964)
The question of whether AICPA members should be 
required (under the By-Laws and Code of Professional 
Ethics) to follow the above Council action was deferred. 
The same Special Committee also prepared a compre­
hensive report dated April 1965 in which many recom­
mendations were made for improvement in operations of 
the APB. One recommendation was that Council in 1968 
should approve, and propose to the AICPA membership, 
an amendment to the Code of Professional Ethics to cover 
infractions of the requirement to disclose departures from 
APB Opinions. Such a proposal was made in 1969, but 
was defeated by the membership.
Since various aspects of the operations of the APB are 
covered in the principal part of this brief, no further dis­
cussion is necessary in this Appendix C.
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles
The standard used by the accounting profession for the 
past thirty-five years in judging whether financial state­
ments of a business entity fairly present its financial posi­
tion and results of operations has been “generally accepted 
accounting principles.” However, this term has no clear 





The Council of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) in 1964 adopted various recom­
mendations of a Special Committee on Opinions of the Ac­
counting Principles Board. These recommendations in­
cluded the following:
“1. ‘Generally accepted accounting principles’ are 
those principles which have substantial authoritative 
support.
“2. Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board 
constitute ‘substantial authoritative support.’
“3. ‘Substantial authoritative support’ can exist 
for accounting principles that differ from Opinions of 
the Accounting Principles Board.”
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1938 
stated in Accounting Series Release No. 4, which is still in 
effect, that when financial statements ‘‘are prepared in ac­
cordance with accounting principles for which there is no 
substantial authoritative support, such financial statements 
will be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate . . . .”
In 1963 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 96 
relating to accounting for the ‘‘investment credit.” Despite 
the publication of Opinion No. 2 of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board, which provided for deferment of the invest­
ment credit, the SEC in that release stated: “In recogni­
tion of the substantial diversity of opinion which exists 
among responsible persons in the matter of accounting for 
the investment credit, the Commission will accept” either 
the deferment method or the flow-through method. Thus, 
“diversity of opinion” was formally recognized as a basis 
for alternatives in accounting.
The accounting principles set forth in Statement No. 4, 
issued by the Accounting Principles Board in 1970, are 
stated in terms of what is “generally accepted.” It states
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in paragraph 137: “Generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples incorporate the consensus at a particular time . .
as to what the accounting should be. That 122-page docu­
ment gives no indication of how this consensus can be de­
termined or identified.
A research study published by the AICPA in 1965 states 
that the sources for determining whether an accounting 
practice has substantial authoritative support are:
“1. In the practices commonly found in business. 
This does not follow from the mere fact that a practice 
exists, but from the fact that experience of the business 
has demonstrated that the practice produces depend­
able results for the guidance of management and for 
the information of investors and others.
‘‘2. The requirements and views of stock exchanges 
as leaders in the financial community; similarly the 
views and opinions of commercial and investment bank­
ers would be entitled to weight.
“3. The regulatory commissions’ uniform systems 
of accounts and accounting ruling exercise a dominant 
influence on the accounting practices of the industries 
subject to their jurisdiction. The commissions some­
times depart from generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples and, in such cases, it may be necessary for the 
certified public accountant to make appropriate qualifi­
cations in his report.
“4. The regulations and accounting opinions of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission have the con­
trolling authority over reports filed with the Commis­
sion. The Commission and its chief accountants have 
demonstrated a high degree of objectivity, restraint 
and expertness in dealing with accounting matters. The 
regulations and opinions issued to date are entitled to 
acceptance by their merit as well as on the basis of the 
statutory authority of the Commission.
“5. The affirmative opinions of practicing and aca­
demic certified public accountants constitute authorita-
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tive support for accounting principles or practices. 
These may be found in oral or written opinions, expert 
testimony, textbooks and articles.
‘‘6. Published opinions by committees of the Amer­
ican Accounting Association and of the American In­
stitute of CPAs.”1
1. Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business 
Enterprises by Paul Grady, AICPA Accounting Research Study No. 7, 
March 1965, pp. 52-53.
Support for a wide variety of accounting practices, many 
of them inconsistent with each other, can be found in the 
sources listed above. The many alternative accounting 
practices which are followed for similar transactions under 
similar circumstances are therefore considered to be in ac­
cordance with “generally accepted accounting principles.” 
As a result, financial statements often are not prepared on 
a comparable basis as between industries or even among 
companies in the same industry. Variations in accounting 
principles followed by two companies obscure financial com­
parisons between them and may result in differences that 
do not reflect differences in the facts and circumstances.
As a result, it is only natural that some are questioning 
the whole concept of ‘‘general acceptance’’ as presently em­
ployed in the term “generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples.” Can this concept be continued as the basis for 
accounting principles unless it rests more on what truly 
serves the needs of users of financial statements than on 
what accounting procedures are merely customary?
These deficiencies cannot be overcome by footnotes to the 
financial statements disclosing the alternative practices 
that are followed. Such disclosures generally do not re­
veal the effect of a particular practice except perhaps to 
the highly sophisticated user of financial statements.
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MACHINERY and ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE
1200 EIGHTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 202-338-3430
October 25, 1971
Francis M. Wheat, Esq.
Chairman, Study on Establishment 
of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Wheat:
The Machinery and Allied Products Institute is a 
national organization of capital goods and allied industrial 
equipment manufacturers . Its member companies are deeply 
interested in the work of the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants (AICPA) and in the Study on Establishment of Account­
ing Principles which was formed to consider, in the words 
of the President of AICPA, ”... how the AICPA’s standards- 
setting role can be made more responsive to the needs of 
those who rely on financial statements.”
In this preliminary statement of our views, we 
have commented within the limits of our competence on the 
"Memorandum of Pertinent Questions” now under consideration 
by your distinguished Committee and have suggested certain 
other questions which we think deserve the Committee’s at­
tention. Our principal comments on the "Memorandum” relate 
to "Composition of a Non-Governmental Standards Board” and 
more specifically to our suggestion of October 12, 1970, to 
the Executive Vice President of AICPA that there be estab­
lished an Advisory Committee to APB, composed of chief 
corporate executives. A copy of that letter is attached. 
Our oral testimony, scheduled for 10:15 a.m. on Thursday, 
November 4, will elaborate on this issue and will consist 
in the main of testimony by two chief executives of lead­
ing American corporations.
Some General Questions
We commend AICPA for the initiation of this study 
and we appreciate the opportunity of offering our views on 
those matters comprehended by it. The study is a most timely 
one. The Accounting Principles Board has now been in exis­
tence for some twelve years, a period of time sufficient to 
justify a reexamination of its mission, its organization,
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its mode of operation, and, of course, its products. The study is made 
not only timely but urgent by exogenous factors bearing on the develop­
ment and refinement of accounting theory and practices. Such influences 
—and they are reciprocal, interacting influences—include greatly expanded 
stock ownership and a resulting enlargement of public interest in the prac­
tice and the product of financial accounting; the growing importance of 
security analysis—itself a product of enlarged shareholding; an increas­
ingly activist administration of the Federal Securities Acts with con­
tinually growing emphasis on disclosure and more disclosure of informa­
tion hitherto regarded as confidential in nature; and a growing public 
cynicism toward financial accounting and reporting that has found expres­
sion not only in professional and press criticism but in lawsuits against 
leading accounting firms . One item must be added to this too short list­
ing—the Opinions of the APB itself which have produced in many cases 
controversy and passionate debate.
With all this in mind, sketched in outline here because it
seems to us that our views can be fully appreciated only if considered 
against the backdrop of the larger problem as we see it, let us turn 
now to some questions which seem to us deserving of examination in the 
course of this very important study. They reflect generally, we believe, 
the views of capital goods manufacturers whom we represent. Those views 
have tended to become even more firmly held as the pace of APB activity 
has quickened in recent years.
What is the guiding philosophy of the Accounting Principles
Board? Does APB conceive its function as being a professional forum for 
the study, development, statement, and restatement of accounting princi­
ples as experience and changing circumstance may dictate? This seems to 
us its proper function. Or does APB regard its primary obligation that 
of asserting sole leadership in the pronouncement and enforcement of new 
and revised principles of accounting? This would seem of less doubtful 
propriety but it is in practical effect what has happened. In combining 
its professional obligation of offering expert opinion on accounting mat­
ters with the quasi-judicial function of enforcing—through the profes­
sional apparatus of AICPA—opinions thus rendered and with no provision 
for appellate review, APB mey have bitten off more than ary organization 
can or should be expected to chew.
Are the Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board leading to
more rigidity and less flexibility in accounting practice? We are in­
clined to think so. To be sure, pressures on the accounting profession 
have unquestionably necessitated a reduction in optional accounting 
practices but, if the present trend in APB Opinions were to continue, 
we think there mey well be a further and most undesirable erosion of 
management discretion. To cite an example, SEC has required the report­
ing by diversified companies of sales and earnings by line of business. 
APB seems headed in the same direction. Is this really wise? In an 
unsuccessful attempt to persuade the then Chairman of SEC to desist 
from such a requirement, MAPI said some years ago, "A real danger in 
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product line reporting—both to shareholders and in a larger sense, the 
economy itself—lies in the possibility of subjecting management to a new 
volume of criticism based on limited knowledge and a constricted view of 
management’s problems, plans and opportunities which can only tend to re­
duce management’s freedom of action. And we must not forget that this 
freedom of capable management to act in the corporation’s best overall 
interests may well be the corporation’s principal asset and the thing 
which gives to the investor’s share of ownership its greatest value.”
We continue to hold that view and we cite it here, in view of 
APB’s apparent move toward ’’product-line reporting," as a reminder that 
the continual reduction of management’s discretion by the introduction of 
greater rigidities into accounting and reporting requirements can have the 
most serious consequences for business and the economy as a whole. We 
believe that the Accounting Principles Board—or any successor standards- 
setting body—must broaden its horizons and enlarge its sources of infor­
mation if it is to avoid such unintended consequences. Let us consider 
this latter point briefly.
Is the Accounting Principles Board receiving all of the infor­
mation and counsel which it should have in preparing its Opinions? We 
credit APB with a thoroughly conscientious effort to obtain the views of 
interested parties in its standards-setting process. The solicitation 
of views on "exposure drafts" of APB Opinions and, in some cases, on 
matters under current study by the Board is both timely and extensive. 
It is to be noted, however, that comments are solicited and received 
almost wholly from professional accountants and financial executives. 
No doubt the bulk of comments should be received from these sources be­
cause of the technical character of matters under review. We think, 
however, that the review process followed by APB—or initiated by any 
successor body—should include an input from top business management. 
Without intending to demean in any way the indispensable contribution 
of the accountant and the financial executive, only the chief executive 
of the corporation sees the enterprise whole and from a vantage point 
which enables him to appraise fully the effects on it of major new de­
partures in accounting and reporting.
Obviously these questions are merely representative of the 
many larger questions that deserve ventilation in the course of this 
study. They will suffice, however, to suggest a line of inquiry which 
would seem to us to go beyond those very important matters referred to 
in your "Memorandum of Pertinent Questions” and to which, in our Judg­
ment, the Committee should give major attention.
Let us go now to some further comments on that Memorandum.
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"Pertinent Questions"
1. Established Accounting Principles — 
Scope of the Task
We think it might be preferable to substitute the phrase "finan­
cial accounting and reporting standards" for the more commonly used term 
"accounting principles." The word "principle" at once raises some con­
ceptual problems inasmuch as it means in common understanding, "a compre­
hensive and fundamental law, doctrine or assumption" (Webster's Seventh 
New Collegiate Dictionary). The reason for our tentative conclusion is 
well put by Paton and Littleton (An Introduction to Corporate Accounting 
Standards as quoted in the Fourth Edition of Accountant's Handbook): "The 
term 'standards’ is used advisedly. 'Principies' would generally suggest a 
universality and degree of permanence which cannot exist in a human-service 
institution such as accounting." In short, the development of accounting 
standards is an evolutionary process and accounting standards must change 
as the nature of business may change; they are not, and must not be regarded 
as, immutable laws that are fixed and unchanging.
The final question under this heading asks, "Should the body with 
primary responsibility for formulating such standards limit itself to fun­
damentals, should it develop detailed standards, or should it undertake to 
do both?"
It seems to us that there is no one right answer to this ques­
tion. There may well be circumstances in which the standards-setting 
body will find it necessary to develop and announce both fundamental and 
detailed standards. We believe, however, that such cases should be the 
exception and that the general rule should be this: The standards-setting 
body, by whatever name known, should be charged with developing fundamen­
tal financial accounting and reporting standards. This is true for at 
least two reasons. First, and as a purely pragmatic matter, the body 
confronts an immense task with limited resources; it should deploy those 
resources on the most critical part of its task—the statement and/or 
restatement of fundamental standards. Secondly, we doubt if the 
standards-setting body should undertake as a general practice to fix 
detailed standards—at least insofar as that term implies detailed and 
prescribed procedures—since, as pointed out above, the infinitely vary­
ing circumstances to which accounting applies would seem to demand flex­
ibility in accounting procedures designed to satisfy a particular ac­
counting standard.
2. Should the Primary Responsibility 
for Establishing Accounting Standards 
Reside in a Governmental Body or a 
Non-Governmental Body?
The responsibility for establishment of accounting standards 
should be vested in a non-governmental body. We believe that such a 
standards-setting group should be an agency of the American Institute 
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of Certified Public Accountants and that its relationship with the Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission should be one of independence as is the case 
today.
We doubt if we are competent to express an opinion on the nature 
of such a standards-setting body’s authority although it does seem to us 
that there must be somewhere a "court of last resort" on controversial 
accounting questions. As indicated previously, we believe that the ap­
pellate function should be separated from the standards-setting function. 
The enforcement of the standards-setting body’s decisions is, of course, 
more than simply a mechanical function and will depend, ultimately, upon 
the general acceptance by government, the accounting profession, business, 
etc., of the pronouncements handed down by any such standards-setting body. 
We believe that the general acceptance of such opinions would be enhanced 
if our suggestion for creation of an Advisory Committee composed of cor­
porate chief executives were adopted.
3. Composition of a Non-Governmental 
Standards Board
We shall not undertake to answer all of the detailed questions 
raised under this point. In general, we believe that any such standards - 
setting body should contain representation from the accounting profession, 
government, and financial executives from business. Inasmuch as such a 
body should be the fountainhead of professional accounting doctrine, it 
seems obvious that the membership should be composed of highly qualified 
professional accountants.
However, decisions or opinions of such a body will often involve 
questions of national and business policy which transcend the confines of 
accounting per se. Accordingly, we renew our earlier suggestion that there 
be created an Advisory Committee to—but not a part of—the Accounting 
Principles Board, or any successor standards-setting body, which should 
be composed of chief corporate executive officers. We believe that proj­
ects under study by the standards-setting body should be referred to the 
Advisory Committee at an early stage to permit time for its consideration 
of the matter under review and to give the standards-setting body the 
benefit of the view from the chief executive’s office.
Aside from those general observations made earlier, we offer no 
comments on Items 4 and 5 in the - "Memorandum of Pertinent Questions."
We look forward to the opportunity of appearing before your 






VICE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER
ARTHUR S. ARMSTRONG...............Chairman 
The Cleveland Twist Drill Co, Cleveland, Ohio
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 
CHARLES L DERR
MACHINERY and ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE
1200 EIGHTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 202-338-3430
ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
RICHARD R. MacNABB






WILLIAM J. HEALEY, JR. DONN R. MARSTON
ECONOMIST
A. B. von der VOORT
Mr. Leonard M. Savoie
Executive Vice President
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Len:
This will confirm our telephone conversation on 
Thursday, October 8,
You were very kind in giving me a full picture of 
the comprehensive and thorough manner in which the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and its Accounting 
Principles Board seek the advice and recommendations from out­
side individuals and interested groups on matters which may 
become the subject of official Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board.
I have been concerned for some time with the 
fact that Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, at 
least on certain subjects, have an impact on American in­
dustry which has vital top management implications as dis­
tinguished from accounting policy or detail which is of 
interest primarily to the financial departments of cor­
porations. This is not intended to demean in any way 
the enlarged role of the chief financial officer of cor­
porations .
The interest of the chief executive officer in 
the effect of certain Opinions of the Accounting Principles 
Board on his company’s operation and corporate strategy has 
been underlined in a number of the meetings of the MAPI ex­
ecutive Committee, For example, when you deal with the 
subject of product-line reporting, pooling of interests, 
accounting for the investment credit, etc., the chief ex­
ecutive of American companies is interested and concerned. 
I suggested in our telephone conversation, therefore, that 
since you acknowledged that your system of obtaining out­
side advice does seem to have one gap in terms of direct 
input of opinion from top management, this gap should be 
filled in a way that is appropriate both from the stand­
point of AICPA and American industry.
MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANIZATION, COUNCIL FOR 
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT, ARE ENGAGED IN RESEARCH IN THE ECONOMICS OF CAPITAL GOODS 
(THE FACILITIES OF PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION AND COMMERCE) 
IN ADVANCING THE TECHNOLOGY AND FURTHERING THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Leonard M. Savoie - 2 - October 12, 1970
Accordingly, I have suggested that your organization ask a small 
group of chief executive officers or chairmen of corporations to serve on 
a top management Advisory Committee to the Accounting Principles Board. 
I agree that this advisory committee should be relatively small in number 
although you might want to have a second group of men at the same executive 
level in a different group of companies who could be called on to partici­
pate in a particular exchange of ideas when the date for the meeting is 
inconvenient for a majority of your regular advisory group. We might call 
this second group the "taxi squad” to borrow from football jargon. You 
mentioned some reservation as to the possibility of the chief executive 
or chairman asking that his place be taken at a particular meeting by the 
chief financial officer of the company. Under those circumstances, you 
would be merely duplicating information obtained from financial officers 
through other means that you are already employing. My reaction to this, 
as I indicated by telephone, is very simple and direct: have a "no sub­
stitute rule" and enforce it. Industry, I am sure, would agree and un­
derstand any such rule and its strict enforcement.
Another element in the suggestion which I am respectfully of­
fering is that exchanges of ideas should take place between the Account­
ing Principles Board or its designated subcommittee and the advisory 
business group at a very early stage in the development of the Board’s 
thinking on a particular problem or project which is listed for action 
by AICPA. As is always the case in complex and controversial subjects, 
a position can be frozen fairly early and in order to achieve the maxi­
mum benefit from exchanges between AICPA and the advisory group, the 
time of the exchange would have to precede any determination of basic 
position or even before a strong direction of policy is established.
Finally, with respect to specifications for the individuals 
who might be called upon, I would like to make these preliminary sug­
gestions. I have already referred to the fact that he should be the 
chief executive officer or the chairman, provided the latter is a work­
ing chairman as distinguished from an honorary officer of the company. 
The group should have a fairly broad spread insofar as types of business 
are concerned. For example, the service industry should be represented 
as well as manufacturing, etc. You probably would find especially help­
ful the advice of a chief executive officer who has at some time in his 
career had financial responsibility. Such a person as Frank Forster, 
Chairman and President of Sperry Rand Corporation, Bill Blackie or Bill 
Franklin, Chairman and President, respectively, of Caterpillar, etc., 
would meet this test. At the same time, it might be desirable to have 
at least one person on the advisory group who does not have financial 
background but is a broad-gauged top executive.
I appreciate the open minded way in which you received my 
suggestion which is entirely consistent with your customary mode of 
operation. I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter 
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to Lou Kessler who is personally acquainted with my associate Charlie Derr. 
Although we have taken no formal vote nor have we passed any resolution, I 
can assure you that the views which I have expressed are in general entirely 
consistent with the attitude of the Executive Committee of MAPI to which I 
have referred above.
Cordially, 
/s/ Charles W. Stewart
President
CWS:jd 
cc: Mr. Louis M. Kessler
President
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
(Comments by W. L. Wearly before Study Group of A. I. C. P. A. 
on Establishment of Accounting Principles - November 4, 1971)
 *   *  * * *
My name is William L. Wearly and I am Chairman of Ingersoll- 
Rand Company, a diversified manufacturer of machinery and 
equipment. Our total sales approximate $800 million of which 
about $300 million are outside the United States, including $200 
million U. S. exports.
I am here this morning to discuss with you a possible opinion 
of the Accounting Principles Board having to do with product 
line accounting since this committee is studying the operations 
of the A. P. B.
The outline prepared by the A. P. B. states that the objective is 
"to identify, and to permit evaluation of, the separable segments 
of a company’s operations”. The APB Outline does not state 
why it is necessary or desirable to identify and evaluate separable 
segments of operations, although it does negative the purpose 
of comparing data of one company with another.
It is evident, however, that it does, in fact, permit comparing 
and evaluating one segment of a company with a somewhat similar 
segment in another company. This does cause disclosure of 
confidential information, information of extreme strategic 
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importance to the future well being of the company, not only to 
domestic competitors but particularly to worldwide competitors, 
who are not similarly required by their accountants to make 
such disclosures. This is not materially different in effect 
than requiring a company to disclose its product research and 
development programs as they are being formulated. I believe 
you will agree, if an individual employee or outsider were 
involved in the disclosure of a research program or of a marketing 
strategy program, he would be subject to discharge and to suit 
for damages. I will demonstrate that the proposed disclosures 
might become even more damaging and broader in scope.
Ingersoll-Rand’s business segments, product lines, or what 
have you -- are by intent designed to have certain relationships. 
Our so called segments involve some 27 product divisions and 
300 or 400 product lines. We charge our management with 
creating and putting together product lines into divisions and 
divisions into groups in such a way as to optimize customer service, 
marketing impact, engineering and technological proficiency, and 
deployment of fixed assets for the most efficient production 
utilization. This is managements stock in trade. If we succeed 
in this endeavor, we have highly profitable growth. Conversely, 
stagnation may indicate failure to develop proper product line 
relationships. Thus, we do not feel that our various business 
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units, or segments, can have the same vitality if operated as 
separate unrelated units -- for if they do, there is little purpose 
in putting them together. Clearly there should be no inference 
made that segments could or should perform the same if 
operated independently. Therefore what is the valid reason 
for an investor to have this information? He cannot invest in 
a segment. Is it to permit him to invest in a new business to 
compete with favorable segments?
We, as management of Ingersoll-Rand would like to know the 
following about our competitors, so as to optimize our own 
domestic and worldwide strategy. We spend a great deal of 
effort trying to get this data.
1. Unit production of various product lines.
2. Growth rate by product line over a period of years.
3. Profitability and production cost over a period of years.
4. Expenditures for product development.
5. Nature of development.
6. Which products are marginally profitable.
7. Which products are highly profitable. 
\
8. Capital expenditures and depreciation charges over 
a period of years.
9. Where are profitable lines subsidizing low profit lines.
10. Is market penetration being made in country ”A” 
at expense of country "B”.
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We believe the proposed APB reporting in effect would lead to this 
type disclosure much to the detriment of many United States 
companies.
Do you know what a cost experience curve is? Let me show you 
what a typical cost experience curve is. When plotted on log-log 
paper, it typically follows a straightline and has a slope between 
70% and 90%.
First, let me illustrate three typical price patterns represented by 
the following Chart A.
Price Pattern X indicates a steady reduction in price as more and 
more units are sold. Price Pattern Y shows little or no price decreas 
until competitive pressures force a reduction to a point where the 
vendor did not survive. Price Pattern Z indicates a variation of Y 
but in this instance the vendor was able to survive and adjust his price 
to meet competition and maintain a profit.
On Chart B we have added the cost curve to show the relation to Price 
Pattern Z. Note the cost experience curve follows the typical pattern 
with a slope of between 70 and 90 percent as previously mentioned. 
Chart C is an alternative pattern indicating a constant price through 
the introductory period followed by a reduction in price paralleling 
the cost curve as time goes on. In this instance, the vendor has re­
duced his selling price preserving a modest profit while at the same 
time increasing market share by discouraging competition.
Chart D is the experience curve for an Ingersoll Rand product.
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Note that the cost curve follows the expected straight line at an approxi­
mately 85 percent slope. Indicated on this curve is what we believe 
to be the relative positions of two competitors with less experience.
I am already in the position of being the volume leader and low cost 
producer. If I drop my price to the cost level of competitor "A", I will 
gradually force him to retrench or at least will curtail his desire for 
further investment in this product. The same reasoning can be extended 
to competitor "B". Furthermore, if I definitely knew their cost and 
was willing to sacrifice current profits, I could drop my price below 
the level of competitor "B" and project my volume out two or three 
years at which point I would again be profitable and would have effectively 
stopped competition.
Thus with sufficient knowledge of my competitor’s products you can 
judge the formidable tool I have to use against them. You are familiar 
with so called predatory pricing practices. If the APB rules force us - 
American Industry - to disclose this information to the Japanese or 
other foreign competitors they will pick off our products one by one 
with great ease.
It is obvious that a small amount of disclosure leads to the requirements 
for greater disclosure by way of explanation. Where will this stop? 
Won't this result in the disclosure of the complete game plan? If I had 
this data on my foreign competitors, my job would be infinitely easier 
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in planning how to capture an important share of their markets but I 
don't think they are going to reveal this kind of information. In fact, 
they reveal very little. But, under the APB disclosure suggestions, 
I will be revealing my data to them. Do I need say how much more 
effective this will make the Japanese invasion of the American machinery 
industry. Let me show you what has happened where the Japanese 
have already invaded some of our highly visible industries. Chart "E" 
shows monochrome television sets and Chart "F" shows basic steel.
In both cases unit production, selling price and cost data, and many 
of the answers to my 10 questions were readily available. I think you 
know the result.
You might reply that foreign competition is simply a matter of low 
labor rates vs. our high rates. This is only one of many important 
factors. There are still many areas in the machinery business where 
by superior productivity we can compete. But I don't want to tell our 
competitors where this is and by how much.
In my letter of July 22, 1971 to the APB I registered my opposition 
to the issuance of any opinion requiring presentation of financial in­
formation as to segments and certification thereof and I quote a part 
of that letter -
"We are strongly of the opinion that management is 
charged with protecting the interests of its stockholders 
and keeping information relative to segments confidential.
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It would appear that damaged stockholders would have 
grounds for legal action to recover losses suffered from 
your proposed disclosure of inside proprietary information. ”
I have requested our attorneys advice as to a possible remedy by 
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BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90210
PHONE: (213) 273-0440
of savings institutions
111 E. Wacker Drive, Chicago, III. 60601 644-3100
October 22, 1971
Mr. Michael A. Pinto
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the hearings 
being conducted by the Institute for the purpose of examining 
the AICPA's standards — setting role.
We believe that the recently evolved practice of holding 
public hearings on the subject prior to the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board or other committees reaching a position is a 
sound one. We encourage the Institute to develop broad lists 
of subjects having an impact on each issue being considered 
and to seek out testimony on all sides of each subject.
Participation on the various boards and committees should not 
be limited to practicing accountants only. While there are 
some business and educational members on the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board, it is my understanding that only members of 
accounting firms are on other committees. For example, there 
are no industry representatives on the Savings and Loan Audit 
Guide Committee. This Committee has worked hard and done a 
very professional job; but we believe that the addition of 
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As the organization which represents the financial officers 
of the bulk of the savings and loan associations in this 
country, the Society looks forward to participating with 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 








Savings Associations Financial Executives
9601 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 826 • BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90210 
PHONE: (213) 878-5670
October 22, 1971
Mr. Michael A. Pinto
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:
We welcome the opportunity to participate with the Insti­
tute in its effort to improve the procedures for establish­
ing accounting principles. Our members, who are the chief 
financial officers of nearly all the publicly held savings 
and loan associations and holding companies, have worked 
from time to time with the Accounting Principles Board 
and the Savings and Loan Audit Guide Committee. We believe 
these meetings have proved beneficial to both the profess­
ion and the savings and loan industry.
We believe that the recently evolved practice of holding 
public hearings on the subject prior to the Accounting 
Principles Board or other committees reaching a position 
is a sound one. We encourage the Institute to develop 
broad lists of subjects having an impact on each issue 
being considered and to seek out testimony on all sides 
of each subject.
Participation on the various boards and committees should 
not be limited to practicing accountants only. While there 
are some business and educational members on the Accounting 
Principles Board, it is my understanding that only members 
of accounting firms are on other committees. For example,
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there are no industry representatives on the Savings and 
Loan Audit Guide Committee. This Committee has worked 
hard and done a very professional job; but we believe 
that the addition of industry representatives would make 
it even more effective as a group.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in these 
hearings. The Savings Associations Financial Executives 
looks forward to participating with the Institute in its 
continuing efforts to establish accounting principles 








 National Association of Independent Insurers
Thirty West Monroe Street • Chicago, Illinois 60603 
312 • 263-6038
October 25, 1971
Mr. M. A. Pinto, CPA 
Administrative Secretary 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:
We appreciate the opportunity to submit a statement in reference to the AICPA 
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles.
In view of the fact that the AICPA has created another committee, the Accounting 
Objectives Study Group, to "refine the objectives of financial statements, " and as 
this group lists as one of their first considerations "Who needs financial state­
ments?" and "What information do they need?", we believe that this group should 
complete their studies prior to the study on establishment of accounting principles
There is widespread agreement that financial statements should be designed to 
meet the needs of the users. However, there is a real need to define who the 
users really are. Many of the Opinions and other pronouncements seem to be 
pointed towards the alleged needs of security analysts. We believe a definition 
of other users would include individual stockholders, creditors such as banks 
and vendors, customers, employees, political economists and, last but not 
least, regulators. With respect to regulators, there should be full consideration 
of regulatory requirements in developing accounting principles.
There has been a great deal of discussion about meeting users' needs and this 
is the alleged reason for standardization of accounting. In fact, many of the 
Opinions released by the Accounting Principles Board have been so complex 
that skilled technicians in CPA firms could not interpret them. In trying to 
reduce everything to rules to assist the user in analyzing financial statements, 
the statements are so complicated that anyone other than a financial analyst has 
great difficulty in understanding them. We believe that simplicity and consis­
tency should be the rule in accounting and financial statements and the Accounting 




It seems evident to us that not enough research in the specialized industries 
has been undertaken before the APB publishes exposure drafts. The rather 
extensive changes that have been made between exposure and finalization is, 
in our opinion, proof of insufficient research.
Consideration should be given to including representatives from the insurance 
industry on the Accounting Principles Board. We believe this is important as 
the industry has much at stake and much to contribute.
Very truly yours,
J. F. Gill
Vice President and Actuary
JFG:lg
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A Presentation to AICPA Study Group (Mr. Francis M. 
Wheat, Chairman) on the organization and operation of 
the Accounting Principles Board.
For public hearings November 3, 1971
A Mul tiassociation Board to Establish
Accounting Principles
Adapted from a speech given at the Annual Convention 
of the American Accounting Association, at the University 
of Kentucky, August 24, 1971.
by Robert I. Dickey, Ph.D., CPA
Professor of Accountancy
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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SUMMARY of
A Multiassociation Board to Establish
Accounting Principles 
by Robert I. Dickey
This presentation is directed to the following two "pertinent questions” of 
the five listed by the study group:
1."Should the primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards 
reside in governmental or nongovernmental body?”
2. "What should be the make-up of a nongovernmental standards board?”
It is believed that the wise policy followed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of allowing a nongovernmental Accounting Principles Board to issue 
Opinions should be continued. In spite of some shortcomings, this arrangement 
seems to be much better, in the eyes of many accountants and businessmen, than 
the detailed regulation of accounting in the railroad and public utility fields.
This writer believes that this nongovernmental accounting principles board 
should not be completely under the control of one organization, which is the 
situation we have today with the present APB operating as a committee of the 
AICPA. The Committee on Accounting Procedure of the AICPA, predecessor of today’s 
APB, was first in the field, with its first three Accounting Research Bulletins 
issued in September 1939. In the years since then the AICPA has rendered valuable 
service to the whole economy through the issuance of APBs and Opinions, first by 
its Committee on Accounting Procedure, and since 1962, by the APB. The fact that 
a committee completely controlled by the AICPA became predominant does not mean 
that it should continue this way for the next 50 or 100 years.
The control and support of the APB should be shared by AICPA with three other 
long-established national accounting societies, namely the American Accounting 
Association, the Financial Executives Institute, and the National Association of 
Accountants. Each of these three suggested organizations has conducted programs 
of research in important areas of accounting.
The composition of the APB should be changed. The present requirement that 
all members of the board must be CPA’s and members of the AICPA should be relaxed 
to permit appointment of some non-CPAs if one of the supporting accounting societies 
wishes to do so. The current restriction bars many highly qualified accountants 
who are not CPAs. Further, the overheavy dominance of the present APB by CPAs 
in public practice (14 out of 18 members) should be reduced. There should be more 
high-ranking accountants with a strong background in broad business management 
experience on the APB.
Current dissatisfaction with the present APB may lead other accounting organi­
zations to issue formal opinions of their own. This presumably would constitute 
"substantial authoritative support” for positions that might well be different 
from those taken by the APB, If this happens, the resulting decrease in unifor­
mity might cause the SEC to feel it necessary to take over the writing of the rules.
An accounting principles board sponsored and controlled by the four named 
national accounting associations presumably would have a greater likelihood of
raising the substantially increased amounts 
in accounting. A centralized research fund 
from its four supporting societies and from 
in general, than the research program of just one association.
of money needed for future research 
should be better able to obtain funds 
foundations, government, and business
714 2.
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1. Criticism of the AICPA's Accounting Principles Board
Many adverso criticisms have been made, particularly in the last few years, 
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of CPAs. These 
criticisms cover the composition of the APB, the methods it uses, and the 
contents of some specific Opinions. Some critics have gone so far as to say 
that there is a credibility gap in published financial reports as a result of 
the Board's actions or inaction.1 These criticisms have come from a broad range 
of persons -- financial executives and managers in industry, bankers, financial 
analysts, government officials, academics, and public accountants themselves. 
Obviously some of these criticisms are contradictory and some probably would 
have been made of most other agencies, public or private, had they been chosen 
to perform the functions of the APB.
In the midst of all this criticism, it should be recognized that the APB 
has made important contributions, not only to the accounting profession, but to 
the entire business community and the investing public. The American Accounting 
Association Committee on Establishment of An Accounting Commission says in its 
report, which was adopted unanimously by the committee members, "Whatever may 
be thought of the eleven years’ activity of the APB, it cannot be denied that
For example, H. C. Knortz, Senior Vice President and Comptroller of 
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, at the National Industrial 
Conference Board panel discussion on "The Prospects for Agreement on Accounting 
Principles" on Feb. 18, 1971 in New York, said of credibility in public reporting, 
"An avalanche of public dissent is trembling on the brink." At this same session, 
Frank E. Block, Senior Vice President of Girard Bank, Philadelphia, referred to 
accounting’s severe deterioration of credibility over the,past few years. Leonard 
Savoie, Executive Vice President of AICPA, referred twice to this so-called 
credibility gap, in Journal of Accountancy, January 1968, pp. 37 and 38.  
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progress has been made towards better reporting methods. Even its harshest 
critics give it some credit for having resolved a number of accounting prob­
  lems.2 The Institute has performed this service by a substantial expenditure 
of money and time by itself, its individual members, and member firms. It 
reports that for the 11 years ended August 31, 1971, the combined costs of
the administrative and research efforts supporting the APB come to approximately 
3a$2,940,000. This does not include, however, the imputed costs of time spent by
APB members themselves, and their advisors, and staff. Marshall Armstrong, 
1970-71 President of AICPA, says that many APB members spend from 50 to 75% 
of their time on work for the Board and are assisted in this work by one or 
more partners or staff on a full-time basis. He estimates that if a monetary 
value were put on all these hours worked for APB, it would amount to several 
  million dollars each year.3
The American Accounting Association committee came to the conclusion 
that the formulation of accounting principles in an optimal manner was import- 
ant enough, and the dissatisfaction with present methods strong enough, to 
recommend the appointment of a Commission of five, part-time members, with a 
supporting staff headed by a full-time director, to study the matter over a
2Report of the Committee, Accounting Review, July, 1971, p. 611.
3In "The APB and Corporate Accountability” in Financial Executive, 
August, 1971, p. 30.
3aFrom letter of August 10, 1971 to this writer from Michael Pinto of 
the AICPA staff.
period of 18 months at a cost of approximately $260,000. Action on this report 
has been deferred, pending the reports of the two study groups sponsored by 
the AICPA.
2. Should the Government take over the Establishment of Accounting Principles?
At the annual convention of the American Accounting Association in August, 
1969, Robert M. Trueblood, Past President of AICPA, concluded his important 
speech, "Ten Years of the APB: One Practitioner’s Appraisal" with these words:
"Our professional alternatives, as I see them, are these:
...Accounting practices can revert to the confusion and disorder of the 
 days when every company went pretty much its own merry way, as is the. 
case today in some nations.
...Or the Government, through the SEC and other regulatory agencies, can 
take over accounting rule-making in an authoritarian way.
...Or the profession can improve its present rule-making procedures and 
thus keep that function in the private sector.
What is to be our choice?"4
It is believed that very few responsible citizens would wish to follow the 
first alternative.
The second alternative, rule-making by the government, is a prospect that 
may materialize if dissatisfaction with self-regulation by the accounting profession 
reaches an intolerable level. The experience of many accountants and business 
men with closely regulated industries such as the railroads and public utilities 
tends to make them oppose an increase in governmental control over accounting.
4Speech given at American Accounting Association Annual Meeting at University 
of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, August 27, 1969, privately printed, pp. 14-15.
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In spite of present dissatisfaction with various aspects of the APB, this 
writer doubts if a majority of accountants and businessmen would at this 
time favor the SEC’s taking over the establishment of accounting principles 
and standards for business in general. The AAA report of the Committee on 
Establishment of An Accounting Commission referred to above described the 
possibility of a governmental agency such as the SEC taking over the job of 
the APB as "a move which most people, including the SEC itself, seem to want 
to avoid.
It should be recognized that if a governmental agency were to take over 
  
the work of the APB, it would face most of the difficulties of the present 
 
APB. It is sometimes said that members of the Institute’s APB have been 
handicapped in agreeing on standards in the public interest by pressure from 
important clients, and that a governmental bureau would not have these pressures.6 
Although a governmental agency might not have these particular pressures, many 
persons feel that it might well be subject to even greater pressures that would 
  
not be in the public interest. Further, although a governmental agency might 
be able to move more rapidly in issuing standards because of its authoritarian 
structure, this advantage might be more than offset by insufficient consideration
5Report of the Committee, Accounting Review, July, 1971, p. 611.
6Lawrence L. Vance, Changing Responsibilities of the Public Accountant, 
Stanford Lecture in Accounting, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 
June 5, 1970, privately printed, p. 13.
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given to certain valid viewpoints, thus resulting in ill-considered regulations.
Those individuals who are inclined to favor having the SEC take over the 
work of the Accounting Principles might also give careful consideration to certain 
current major reorganization proposals made by President Nixon's Advisory Council 
on Executive Reorganization, one of which would abolish the Commissioners at 
SEC and place that organization under a single head.7 There seems to have been 
very little discussion of this proposal so far in accounting circles. Careful 
thought should be given to how such a move, presumably towards a more authoritarian 
structure, would affect the capability of the SEC to perform the functions of 
an accounting principles board.
Consideration should also be given to the generalization that it is easier 
to give a specific power to a governmental agency than it is to take away such 
power, once it has been exercised.
The recent establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards Board by the 
federal government presumably will create additional pressures for a critical 
re-evaluation of all phases of the operations of the APB. Although the area 
assigned to the Cost Accounting Standards Board is a specialized one, it is 
difficult to see how it can avoid dealing with some of the areas covered by 
the present APB. Thus, it may have a substantial impact on the methods used 
to establish accounting principles for business in general.
 7Lyman Bryan, Washington Background, in Journal of Accountancy, April 1971, 
p. 22, and also News Report, in Journal of Accountancy, May 1971, p. 9.
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A number of writers, in discussing the accounting profession’s relationship 
with the SEC, have stressed the point that although the SEC has the authority to 
establish accounting standards and procedures, it has preferred to allow the 
accounting profession to develop them. They have said that in general the SEC 
has taken over the rule-making role only when it felt the profession was moving 
too slowly.8
A different viewpoint was expressed by Richard T. Baker in an address before 
the American Accounting Association Annual Convention in August 1971. He stressed 
the differences between the SEC and the APB, citing the well-known investment credit 
fiasco of 1962-1964 and the difficulties on business combinations of the last 
several years. He says, "As a result of having two separate groups involved in 
establishing accounting principles, [the APB and the SEC] a very confusing and
  chaotic situation resulted.”9
To remedy the present difficulties, Mr. Baker suggests that there by only 
one principle-making body and that it should be selected by the presidents of 
the American Institute of CPAs, the American Accounting Association, the New 
York Stock Exchange, the Federation of Financial Analysts, and the Financial
 8For example, Leonard M. Savoie, in The CPA, June 1968, p. 3; Robert M. 
Trueblood, op. cit., pp. 2-3; and SEC Commissioner Hugh F. Owens in "The S.E.C.   
and the Accounting Profession,” an address given to the Texas Society of CPAs, 
Houston, May 25, 1971, privately printed, p. 2.
9”Why Aren’t We Solving Our Problems?,” privately printed, p. 6.
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Executives Institute. Further, he proposes that this new APB should include 
"representatives whose backgrounds are other than strictly accounting, such as 
economists, financial analysts, and other financial experts." His explanation 
of how the SEC would give up its rule-making activity is as follows:
"Practicing professional accountants and their clients must accept 
and follow the principles that would be promulgated by this new 
principle-making body. It should then follow that statutory 
authorities, such as the SEC, should not attempt to establish 
accounting principles on a case-by-case basis, but should con­
centrate their activities on making sure that reporting companies 
and their independent accountants follow and disclose compliance 
with the prescribed principles."10
This writer believes that it is very unlikely that the SEC will voluntarily
give up, or be compelled to give up, its power to step into the picture when it
feels it is advisable to do so.
3. Keeping the APB in the Private Sector
Mr. Trueblood's third alternative was improvement of our "present rule­
making procedures and thus keep that function in the private sector." Mr. 
Trueblood personally chose this 3rd alternative and made some specific pro­
posals which have been publicly discussed.
This writer would like to propose 
an Accounting Principles Board within 
that an Accounting Principles Board be
a somewhat different procedure to keep 
the private sector. Briefly, it is proposed
established and supported by not only 
 10Opus cited, pp. 8 and 9.
8
the American Institute of CPAs, as at present, but also by three additional 
national accounting organizations so that it can be said more truly to represent 
the accounting profession in the broad sense of that term. The AICPA is the only 
national organization composed exclusively of CPAs and it speaks primarily for 
CPAs in public practice. Its current membership of over 80,000 makes it the 
largest organization of accountants in the world. It is suggested that the 
following three large national organizations of accountants also be included. 
They are, in alphabetical order:
(1) The American Accounting Association, which includes in its membership 
a high percentage of all the university teachers of accounting in the 
country, and which speaks primarily for university teachers, although 
apparently a substantial majority of its members are employed outside 
academia.
(2) The Financial Executives Institute, which is the one national organi­
zation composed exclusively of high ranking financial officers of a 
wide range of entities, primarily in business.
(3) The National Association of Accountants, which is the second largest 
organization of accountants in the world, with approximately 70,000 
members at present. Although it is primarily interested in industrial  
accounting it includes in its large membership not only accountants 
in industry and commerce but substantial numbers in public accounting,
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governmental accounting, and in university teaching, including 
a number of high-ranking individuals in each of these categories. 
Each one of these three suggested organizations, like the AICPA, has conducted 
programs of research in accounting for many years and each one currently has a 
committee, or committees, which give to the present APB comments and suggestions 
on drafts of proposed APB Opinions. Each association would determine for itself 
what requirements it would set for the individuals it appointed to the new APB. 
Presumably the new, broader-ba sed APB would be implemented through a new 
association formed specifically for that purpose by the four-named national 
accounting organizations. Perhaps the AICPA Accounting Research Association 
might be used as the vehicle.
4. Advantages of Proposed Plan
The writer believes his proposal has the following advantages.
(1) The rules of the present APB require that each member be a member of 
the American Institute of CPAs, and this means that he must be a CPA. 
Although there is much to be said for the CPA examination as a test 
of accounting knowledge, the writer thinks it is unfortunate that 
every member of the Board must have the CPA degree. There is a strong 
feeling on the part of many against the doctrine that only CPAs are 
well-qualified to legislate on accounting matters. The requirements 
for the CPA certificate have varied widely over the years and among
9
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the 54 jurisdictions in the United States. The public accounting 
profession is justly proud of the fact that for many years past 
all 54 jurisdictions have not only been using the AICPA’s Uniform 
CPA Examination but all have been having their candidates' papers 
graded by the AICPA's Advisory Grading Service. It is said that 
this gives the public accounting profession greater national 
uniformity than any other profession in the United States. Even 
today, however, in spite of a general movement among the states for 
many years to raise the educational requirements and reduce the 
experience requirements, there is still a substantial variation 
among the states on each of these requirements. The more years 
one goes back, the greater are the differences among the states. 
Further, there presumably are a large number of AICPA members 
today who passed a state CPA examination years ago which was 
neither made up nor graded by the AICPA. 
 
The present serious movement toward establishing requirements 
11 for continuing education for practicing CPAs is rather good evidence 
that passing the CPA examination ten or twenty years ago is no
11For example, see "Required Continuing Education" in Editor's Notebook, 
Journal of Accountancy, October 1971, pp. 39-40.
11
assurance that an individual is well qualified to legislate on 
new and controversial issues that the APB has to deal with today. 
None of the above is intended to be derogatory of CPAs.12 The 
point is simply that the possession of a CPA certificate does 
not provide as uniform a background as might superficially appear.
There presumably are a number of financial vice presidents and 
controllers of large and intermediate size corporations with successful 
experience over a wide range of accounting and related business 
activities who were barred by law from taking the CPA examination years 
ago because their state required one or two years of public accounting 
experience, with no substitute experience, accepted. Attention is 
called to the fact that the most recent edition (1970) of Profile 
of A Chief Financial Officer, published by the firm of Heidrick and 
Struggles, shows that a little less than one-third of the chief 
financial officers of the largest corporations in the country
  possess a CPA certificate.13 The long standing policy of the 
AICPA of appointing only CPAs to the APB unfortunately carries the 
implicit indictment that any individual who is not a CPA is incompetent
12The writer obtained his CPA certificate in 1942 and has been a fairly active 
member of the AICPA since 1948.  
  13Page 3 of the report. Heidrick and Struggles wrote to the chief financial 
officers of the 747 companies included in the Fortune compilation of leading 
companies (500 largest industrials, 50 leading merchandising companies, etc.). 
The figures in their report are based on the 441 who sent in the forms (59%).
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to be a member of the APB, regardless of his intelligence, education, 
long years of high-level experience in positions of responsibility, 
and demonstrated ability in accounting and financial matters. This 
is difficult to accept and is not calculated "to win friends and 
influence people." This writer's proposed APB would not have this 
artificial restriction which bars some highly competent accountants 
from serving on the board.
(2) Closely related to the above would be an increase in the number of 
accountants from industry on the Board. Even when the APB had 21 
members, the number of accountants from industry did not exceed 
three. At present the Board is composed of 18 members and only one is from 
industry (Mr. Oral L. Luper of Humble Oil Co.). In 1971, for the 
first time in the history of the APB, there is a professional security 
analyst on the Board, Mr. David Norr of the First Manhattan Corporation, 
who is a CPA and has been a member of AICPA since 1952. There are 
 
two university professors of accounting and the other 14 members are 
in public accounting practice. As usual, the "Big Eight" public 
accounting firms have one member each, with 6 from other public 
accounting firms.
 It has been said repeatedly that a company's published financial 
statements are representations of the company's management rather than of 
13
the independent public accountant. Tills being the case, it would 
seem logical that the accountants who are closest to the management, 
and in many cases are themselves part of the management of business 
enterprises, should have ¿1 stronger voice in the establishment of 
accounting principles than at present.
Mr. Leonard Savoie, Executive Vice President of AICPA, has 
said:
"Corporate financial management contains a vast pool of 
knowledge on accounting and financial reporting matters 
which must be made available to the Board if it is to 
establish principles wisely."
"Management must be involved in determining accounting 
principles, to provide assurance to all that the Board 
is not acting arbitrarily without regard to real practical 
problems.
This writer feels that the most logical way in which to 
accomplish this would be to increase the number of accountants 
from corporations on the APB.
In regard to the under-representation on the APB of persons 
with broad business experience (in contrasting to auditing experience), 
Herbert C. Knortz, Senior Vice President and Comptroller of International
14"Controversy Over Accounting Principles Board Opinions," Journal of 




Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and President of the Inter­
national Association of Financia] Executives, has written, "It 
is impossible for the general business community to accept legislation 
which is executed without the consent or the review of the governed."15 
(3) The issuance of an official pronouncement on an accounting subject 
by such well-known national accounting organizations as the American 
Accounting Association, the Financial Executives Institute, or the 
National Association of Accountants presumably would constitute 
"substantial authoritative support" within the meaning of the 
Special Bulletin of October, 1964 by the AICPA on "Disclosure of 
Departures from Opinions of Accounting Principles Board." If such 
a pronouncement were in conflict with some APB Opinion, this would 
tend to encourage the use of different accounting procedures in the 
same circumstances. It seems fairly ]ike]y that the issuance of 
just a few such Opinions would lower the status and usefulness of 
the present APB and push the SEC toward taking over the writing 
of the rules.
What is the likelihood of such Opinions being issued? This 
writer does not claim the gift of prophecy but thinks that the longer 
the present dissatisfaction continues, the greater is the likelihood
15From letter of August 5, 1971, to this author. 
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that such Opinions will be issued. Attention is directed to the 
Membership Questionnaire: Summary published by the American Accounting 
Association’s Executive Committee in The Accounting Review of July 
1967 (pp. 605-609). This shows that there was (and presumably still 
is) a strong preference on the part of a substantial majority of the 
more than l,400 AAA members who responded to the questionnaire, to 
have the AAA take and publish an "official position" on such matters 
as significant AAA publications in accounting concepts and principles, 
AAA research studies, AICPA Research Studies, AICPA APB Opinions, and 
pronouncements of regulatory agencies such as the SEC. Further, the 
procedure most favored by the AAA respondents to determine an "official 
position" by the Association was a "mail ballot of members." The 
National Association of Accountants’ Management Accounting Practices 
Committee was established in 1969 with the responsibility for issuing 
statements representing NAA's positions on accounting principles and 
practices. This MAP committee and its many subcommittees have been 
quite active studying various aspects of accounting, responding to 
exposure drafts of the APB, and working with the new Cost Accounting 
Standards Board of the federal government. The committee has not issued 
any statements of its own thus far. Recent published remarks of NAA’s
730
16
   Executive Director16 and the current year's President,17 however, 
indicate that at some future time NAA’s Management Accounting 
Practices Committee may issue opinions.
If one accounting organization makes public pronouncements 
on accounting matters, this may increase the likelihood that 
others will follow suit, in part to give the members of that 
organization "a voice that will be heard." It seems preferable to 
make an attempt, before it is too late, to have one accounting 
principles board supported by the four major national accounting 
organizations which can speak for the accounting profession as a whole.
16William M. Young, Jr., Executive Director of the National Association of 
Accountants in "A View from the Inside," in Management Accounting, February 1971, 
p. 55, wrote: "The MAP Committee through a number of well-structured subcommittees 
is now actively exploring those accounting problems which presently seem most 
important to a majority of NAA members. Research is going forward and eventually 
opinions will be offered either to be published as original positions of the 
Committee or presented to other bodies for discussion and coordination."
An article, "Julius Underwood: NAA’s New President," in Management 
Accounting, July 1971, p. 12, says of NAA's 1971—72 President: "The establish­
ment of the Management Accounting Practices Committee. (MAP) he regards with 
enthusiasm and says that the committee will eventually help to give industrial 
accountants 'a voice that will be heard' in the deliberations on accounting 
standards and principles. He suggests that as the MAP Committee gains experience 
it will adhere more closely to the thinking of management accountants, rather 




(4) One of the proposals macle by Mr. Trueblood in his speech at the AAA 
Annual Convention in 1969 (referred to above) was to increase the 
amount spent for research for the APB to at least $5 million a year. 
This is approximately 10 times the amount that was spent during the 
past fiscal year (ending August 31, 1971) which in turn was up from 
the $142,000 spent in APB’s first year of operations (fiscal 1961). 
Officials of the American Institute of CPAs have indicated that the 
expanded research needed in accounting will soon be too costly for
 the Institute itself even with the help of its Accounting Research 
Association established in 1967. They think that it may become necessary 
to go to the larger foundations or to the government for the large
19sums that will be needed in the years ahead. This writer believes 
that the chances for getting substantial sums from the above sources 
and from business concerns would be improved if most of the research 
in accounting were centered in one. Accounting Research Foundation 
which would be jointly sponsored by the four accounting associations 
named above and which would support the work of the proposed APB. It 
would be worthwhile to examine carefully the organization and operation 
of the Accountancy Research Foundation established in 1967 jointly by
18From letter of August 10, 1971 to this writer from Michael A. Pinto of 
the AICPA staff.
19Exposure Draft of AICPA Planning Committee Paper, Research, p. 2, January 2, 
1968.
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21to the opinions of the AICPA.
20From letter of August 9, 1971 to this writer from John M. MacLeod, Secretary- 
Treasurer of the Canadian Tax Foundation.
21News Report , Journal of Accountancy, June 1971, p. 24.
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and the 
Australian Society of Accountants, and also of the Canadian Tax 
Foundation, now in its 26th year of operation. The Canadian Tax 
Foundation is sponsored jointly by the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants and the Canadian Bar Association, but is not 
supported financially by these organizations, as such. Its revenue 
currently comes from about 4,700 individual members (accountants, 
lawyers, academics, businessmen, etc.) and from over 400 companies 
holding corporate memberships. The companies furnished $142,000 
(approximately 60%) of the total of $235,000 subscriptions revenue 
20 received in the year 1970.
It should also be noted that the Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee, established in 1970 by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales in association with the Scottish 
and Irish Institutes, has now (1971,) issued the first in its series 
of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice which will be similar
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5. Possible Disadvantage of Multiassociation Board
It is said that when Michael DiSalle was Governor of Ohio some years ago 
he had a sign on his desk which read, "I do not know the secret of success but 
I can tell you the formula for failure--try to please everybody.”
This writer believes that no Account ring Principles Board, no matter how 
appointed nor how constituted, is going to please everybody. Ue might take a 
more modest and realistic goal, such as that expressed by Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo in a complicated tax case when he said, “The assessor’s task is to find 
the least erroneous answer to an unanswerable problem."
It is recognized that the establishment of a multiassociation APB would not 
be easy and it would take some time to implement. This writer believes that 
there is a reasonable probability that the unfavorable aspects can be minimized. 
Some of the problems that might arise are:
(1) Some of the four accounting associations suggested above for inclu­
sion is the proposed APB might prefer not to take this responsibility. 
 
Presumably the first move should be made by the AICPA because of its 
full control of the present APB. Much would depend on how the other 
associations were approached.
(2) Some other associations of accountants not included might wish to 
participate. This writer believes that at least at the beginning it 
would be advisable to limit participation to the four well-known national 
734
20
accounting associations named, which have demonstrated over a long 
period of years interest and competence in broad areas of accounting 
rather than being devoted only to a specialized area.
(3) It has been said that war is too important to be left to the generals, 
and education too important to be left to the educators. In the last 
few years some critics have been saying that accounting is too impor­
tant to be left to the accountants and they have been urging member­
ship on the APB for nonaccountants from groups that use accounting 
reports, such as financial analysts, bankers, and credit men. An 
example of this is the proposal by Richard T. Baker described earlier 
in this presentation. This writer believes Chat representa fives of 
these nonaccounting groups should be invited to express their views 
on exposure drafts of Opinions but that only persons trained, experienced, 
and demonstrably competent in accounting should be on the Board which 
actually votes on the proposed Opinions on accounting.
(4) How many members of the proposed APB should be appointed by each of 
the four constituent associations? how many members of the Board 
should be in the public practice of accounting, how many in account­
ing positions in industry or commerce, and how many from university   
accounting faculties? Parenthetically, the answers to these two 
questions are not necessarily exactly the same. Should a stated 
mínimum percentage of the members have the CPA degree and, if so, 
what should that percentage be? It is important to note that the 
basic problems here arc not new but in the past they have been 
resolved by the leadership of the AICPA alone, Presumably, with 
four partners joining together to sponsor the new APB, agreement 
would be more difficult to reach, but if the principals recognize 
the desirability of an APB speaking for a united accounting profession, 
the difficulties should not be overwhelming. One specific suggestion 
which has been made publicly within the past two months is that of Ettore 
Barbatelli, immediate Past President of the National Association of 
Accountants. Speaking on a panel at the Annual Symposium of the 
Federal Government Accountants Association this June, Mr. Barbatelli 
criticized the present APB as being too heavily weighted with public 
practitioners and suggested that the 18 member board should be composed 
of 9 members from public accounting, 6 from business, and 3 from 
 
academia.22 This, and the previously mentioned actual makeup 
of the present board, might be taken as the basis for negotiations. 
Each association would probably, but not necessarily, confine the 
choice of its nominees to its own members. 




(5) Establshment of the proposed APB would not rule out Robert M. 
Trueblood's proposed 5 or 7-man full- time and fully compensated 
23 board. Such a board would simplify the questions just raised. 
Representatives of the four associations would meet and decide 
on the hiring of the best accountants available, without consideration 
of firm or society affiliation or other background. It seems, however, 
that it would be more in keeping with the spirit of a coalition 
organization representing a diversity of accounting backgrounds 
to have a volunteer board no smaller than the size of the present 
APB. It might be headed by a full-time, paid chairman supported 
by a strong staff of assistants larger than at present to lighten 
somewhat the burden of the volunteer members, and thus make member­
ship on the APB more attractive to highly competent individuals 
who feel they cannot devote an extremely high percentage of their 
time to work of the Board. 
 
(6) Decisions would have to be made as to how research would be per­
formed for the APB and how financed. It has been suggested above 
that it is believed that the preferred answer is a centralized 
Accounting Research Foundation which would receive funds from the 
23Opus cited, p. 9.
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four supporting associations as well as from outside sources.
(7) One of the important criticisms of the present APB is that it has 
been too slow in resolving problems and issuing Opinions. Would 
the proposed APB, presumably a less homogeneous group than the 
present board, find it even more difficult to reach agreement, 
and thus slow down the output of Opinions? I believe that this 
represents a distinct, possibility. Much would depend on the 
attitudes of the leaders of the four sponsoring associations and 
on the personal characteristics of the individuals chosen to serve 
on the new APB. The differences of opinion that might be revealed 
within the new Board would not be new differences--they would 
primarily reflect the differences which have existed all along 
within the widely diversified accounting profession but which in 
some instances have not had much representation inside the present 
APB. There might be a slowing down of the resolving of problems 
at first but also there might well be a better acceptance of the 
Opinions in the field because discussion within the APB would have 
a better chance of avoiding or reconciling certain objectionable 
features before publication of the Opinion. Further, certain 
Opinions containing rulings which might not be wanted by a 
particular segment might be accepted with somewhat greater
23
738
tolerance if the dissenters knew that their viewpoint was at 
least presented within the APB. All. members of the Accounting 
Principles hoard, whether the present or a proposed one, must 
maintain awareness that failure to make what would be accepted 
as "reasonable progress" may result in a governmental decision 
to take over the activity.
In closing, it is recommended that the AICPA take a careful look at a 
specific alternative to the present APB. Let us recognize that the APB of 
the American Institute of CPAs is a very powerful body in the world of finance 
Its rulings have an important, though usually delayed, effect on the reported 
earnings of corporations large and small, and eventually on stock market price 
in many cases. This APB exerts great effort to increase the accuracy and use­
fulness of financial reports for the benefit of the entire business community. 
The board members spend a great deal of time studying the available facts and 
figures, hold long discussions, read countless letters written by anyone who 
wants to do so, hold hearings (and this year there have even been public 
hearings, in contrast to the former hearings by invitation.) But let us 
remember that when all the material has been studied and the witnesses have 
had their day--when the moment of decision comes, the voting is done by only 
18 individuals, each one of whom must be a CPA, and must be a member of AICPA, 
and all of whom have been chosen by the group that control the electoral 
26
machinery of the AICPA. This is real power, in the hands of a very small 
group of men. On February 19th of this year at. the Conference Board session 
on "The Prospects for Agreement on Accounting Principles", Herbert C. Knortz, 
said in a speech24 that the AICPA was "a comparatively small private club." 
Some of us might think it rather strange to describe in this way the largest 
organization of accountants in the world, with over 80,000 members, and showing 
a substantial net growth in membership year after year. We should recognize, 
however, that this is the viewpoint of some who arc outside the AICPA.
On May 14th, 1970 at hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, the Chief Counsel of the Committee (Kenneth 
R. Harkins ) questioned the then Chairman of the SEC (Hamar H. Budge) about 
the close relations between the SEC and the APB and asked if this did not involve 
"a situation where the APB and the accounting profession arc engaged in an 
exercise of Government power for the SEC." The SEC Chairman assured the com­
mittee that this was not the case and, in answer to a further question, said 
the SEC’s policy of cooperation with the APB and the AICPA had been very bene­
  ficial to the public as a whole.25
In essence, this writer is suggesting that this power base be broadened 
somewhat, and thus be less vulnerable to criticism, by including some additional 
elements of the accounting profession. It is believed that this change should
24 “Referred to in footnote 1.
2591st Congress, 2nd Session, Investigation of Mergers and Acquisitions by 




also improve the usefulness of the Opinions of the Board.
Some of these suggested changes could be accomplished within the frame­
work of the present APB. The AICPA could drop its requirement that all 
members of the APB be CPAs and members of AICPA and specify that a certain 
number of members of the Board need not have these qualifications. It 
could name to the APB certain individuals who were chosen, formally or 
perhaps informally, by the other accounting associations named.
In the long road ahead which the accounting profession must follow to 
maintain and increase its service to the whole economy, the choice of individual 
steps is not clearly marked and the weary accountant traveler has many difficult 
decisions to make. The words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes remind us, 
however, that this situation is not unusual for human kind. He said 
"...certainty is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.”








Study Committee on Establishment
of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:
Although we appreciate the opportunity to make a presentation at the public 
hearings to be held in the Institute offices on November 3 and 4, we believe we 
can make our position known by letter and, thus, are taking the latter route.
Accounting principles are those rules by which accountants present the financial 
position of a business as of a date and determine the results of operations for 
a given period. The principles determine the type of events to be recorded, the 
bases on which events are measured, and the time periods to which they can be 
identified.
Generally accepted accounting principles have been developed over a long period 
of years on the basis of experience, usage and practicality. Such a basis 
does not necessarily indicate that these principles are sound but they do indi­
cate that substantial care must be taken in moving to other principles.
We believe it would be more accurate to continue to use the term accounting 
principles rather than adopt some other term such as standards. We particularly 
object to the use of the word standards because of its common acceptance as a 
method of inventory valuation and because of the very probable confusion with 
future edicts of the recently formed Government Cost Accounting Standards Board. 
We believe that such principles should be developed in sufficient detail to 
eliminate the possible confusion as to their intent and application.
The establishment of accounting principles must be done by a non-governmental 
body such as the Accounting Principles Board. We believe that the pronouncements 
of such a board can be enforced by members of the AICPA in their conduct of 
audits and by the SEC in its review of registration statements and annual 
reports.
As such reports and filings are the product of the business concerns whose names 
appear thereon, we believe that business should have a stronger and more active 
position in the establishment of the principles. Therefore, we recommend a 
substantial change in the mix of th Accounting Principles Board with no increase 
in its size. As a suggestion, the Board could total fifteen members, six of
TRW INC. • 23555 EUCLID AVENUE • CLEVELAND, OHIO 44117
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Mr. Michael Pinto October 25, 1971 -2-
whom are members of the AICPA and who are practicing public accountants, five 
who are members of the FEI, and two members each from the American Accounting 
Association and the National Association of Accountants. Although the board 
should welcome input from bankers, financial analysts, the SEC and other users 
of the products of accountants, the board membership should be restricted to 
those directly involved in the preparation and presentation of financial data.
Board members should be elected by their respective associations and serve for 
a period of six years with one-third being elected each two years. The board 
should have a full-time chairman elected for a period of six years. The chair­
man should have an administrative and research staff, the budget for which would 
be approved by the board. Financing should come from the public accounting 
profession and from industry.
The combined organization of industry and the public accounting profession 
should result in the board being more aware of developing problems and, thus, 
able to start its research at an early date. The research staff should solicit 
input from all interested parties to aid it in its study and the board should 
continue to circulate drafts of opinions before they are issued in final form. 
Although this procedure is rather cumbersome and certainly time consuming, it 
appears to offer a maximum of input and, thus, hopefully, a minimum of signifi­
cant objections on publication. The issuance of any opinion should continue 
to require a two-thirds vote of the members of the board.
We recognize that the brief outline presented here requires considerable co­
operative effort from many organizations and people, but feel that it is 
necessary if accountants are to retain control of their profession.
Very truly yours
R. H. Palenschat 
Assistant Controller
RHP:j
cc: C. R. Allen 
P. E. Priest
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In April 1971, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) announced the appointment of a 
special committee designated as the ’’Study on Establishment 
of Accounting Principles” (the Wheat Committee) with former 
Securities and Exchange Commissioner Francis M. Wheat as 
Chairman. The committee received its charge from President 
Marshall Armstrong of the AICPA as follows:
’’The study should examine the organization 
and operation of the Accounting Principles 
Board and determine what changes are neces­
sary to attain better results faster. This 
will involve study, for example, of all the 
many changes that have been suggested, 
ranging from minor procedural suggestions 
to complete replacement of the part-time 
volunteer Board by a full-time Board with 
a court-like appeal mechanism. It will 
also involve consideration of entirely new 
approaches.”
In July 1971, Mr. Michael A. Pinto, Administrative 
Secretary to the Wheat Committee, invited the Management 
Accounting Practices Committee (MAP) of the National Associ­
ation of Accountants (NAA) to meet with the Wheat Committee 
on September 21, 1971, to submit comments and suggestions 
with respect to its objectives. On receipt of this invita­
tion, the MAP Committee reviewed the general area of study 
by the Wheat Committee and concluded that this particular 
effort would be beyond its charge and responsibilities.
However, it recommended that the broad-based composition of 
-i-
membership of NAA would be ideally suited to respond 
because it includes prominent leaders from all segments of 
the business community, covering industry, commercial enter 
prises, public utilities, the Federal government, colleges 
and universities, public accounting and financial establish­
ments.
Accordingly, the President of NAA, Mr. J. G. 
Underwood, appointed a special committee as follows: 
Grant U. Meyers, Chairman of the Committee, 
and Chairman of the Board of the Oil City 
Iron Works, Inc., Corsicana, Texas
Ettore Barbatelli, President, The American 
Appraisal Company, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin
I. Wayne Keller, CPA, former Vice President 
and General Manager of International 
Operations, Armstrong Cork Co., Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania
James E. Meredith, Jr., CPA, Partner, 
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, New York, 
New York
Thomas L. Morison, CPA, President-Emeritus 
of Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts
J. G. Underwood, ex-officio member, President, 
Harsco Corporation, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
All of the appointees are former National Presidents of the 
Association.
In its deliberations this Committee was assisted 
materially by several prominent members:
ii-
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Joseph Bond, Executive Vice President, Crowell, 
Collier 8 MacMillan, New York, New York
R. Leslie Ellis, Vice President, Controller 
& Director of Management Information, Armstrong 
Cork Co., Lancaster, Pennsylvania
John J. Fox, Partner, Lybrand, Ross Bros. 8 
Montgomery, Chicago, Illinois
E. W. Kelley, President and Chief Operating 
Officer, Consolidated Cigar Corporation and 
President, Consumer Products Division, Gulf 
8 Western Industries, Inc., New York, New York
Alfred King, Controller, The American Appraisal 
Company, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Allen H. Seed, III, Vice President, New 
Business Development, Gillette Safety Razor 
Division, Gillette Corporation, Boston, 
Massachusetts
As a professional organization devoted to con­
tinuing education in the area of management accounting, 
NAA is deeply concerned by the recent criticism of the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) and its method of opera 
tion. Some of these criticisms include the following:
a. The APB is not truly independent and 
its members are not totally free from external 
pressures.
b. There are evidences of inconsistencies 
in the application of APB rulings by CPA firms.
c. In too many cases there is an inordinate 
time lag in the application of APB Opinions.




e. The APB has become a rulemaking body 
rather than one concentrating on accounting 
principles.
f. The interpretations issued by the AICPA 
are often more lengthy than the opinions they 
are attempting to clarify.
g. Decisions in the accounting field are 
usually private matters between the client 
and the CPA firm, compared to the legal pro­
fession, for example, where decisions are 
published.
h. There have been incidents where client 
organizations have ’’shopped” for a CPA firm 
which will agree to a predetermined accounting 
objective.
In August, NAA was invited to a Public Hearing 
of the Wheat Committee scheduled for November 3 and 4, 1971. 
Participants were requested to provide the Wheat Committee 
with written statements of their views prior to the Public 
Hearing. All such statements will be a matter of public 
record of the Hearing.
In compliance with the foregoing, this report sets 
forth the views of this special NAA committee appointed by 
President Underwood to respond to the pertinent questions 
raised by the Wheat Committee. It responds numerically to 
the five questions (refer to Appendix) posed by the Wheat 







1. Establishing Accounting Principles -- Scope of 
the Task
The NAA Committee concluded that its response 
covers only accounting principles and/or standards as they 
relate to financial reporting requirements and/or certifi­
cations by accounting firms. Also, it would be more accur­
ate and useful to refer to ’’financial accounting and 
reporting standards” than ’’accounting principles.”
In its discussion of what is meant by the term 
’’accounting principles,” the NAA Committee reviewed such 
areas as accounting concepts, principles, standards, rules, 
disclosures and regulations. It could not concur unanimously 
on the definition of these terms and agreed that they must 
be the subject of extensive future study.
Nevertheless, in general the NAA Committee 
determined that:
a) accounting concepts are relatively 
fixed with respect to the function 
of time,
b) accounting principles change relatively 
slowly over a somewhat shorter term, and
c) accounting rules must be relatively 
flexible with respect to changing 
economic, social and political 
conditions.
-1-
We (the NAA Committee) recommend that separate 
committees of a new body (refer to question 3, page 5 ) be 





2. Should the primary responsibility for establishing 
accounting standards reside in a governmental body 
or a non-governmental body?
The NAA Committee, with one dissenting opinion, 
recommends that the responsibility for establishing and 
enforcing financial accounting and reporting standards 
should reside in a non-governmental body.
The dissenting opinion was based not upon principle, 
but upon economic considerations; the individual believing 
that in full operation an effective body, adequately 
supported by permanent staff, facilities and research, would 
eventually become so costly that it would require govern­
mental financing to support an effective level of operation.
We recommend that:
a) the non-governmental body be supported 
by private funds. It must be so 
supported if it is to remain free of 
political pressure.
b) the body be sponsored by the AICPA, 
but that it be independent in its 
activities.
c) the body be housed in a facility 
contiguous to the professional staff 
of the AICPA to take advantage of the 
library, research and other services 
of the Institute.
d) close and continuing liaison be 
established and maintained with the 
SEC, the Congress and other interested 
governmental agencies.
-3-
The authority of the- body should be final, not 
because of authority vested in it by government, but by 
virtue of the background and stature of the individuals 
comprising the body. The pronouncements of the body should 
be binding on all publicly owned enterprises and all public 
accountants. These pronouncements must be enforced through 
the certifying authority of the public accounting firms 
auditing the statements of such enterprises.
Essential to the success of the procedures we 





3. Composition of a non-governmental standards board
NAA recommends that the non-governmental body
be comprised of approximately 18 voluntary voting members
with a suitably paid, full-time chairman serving on a 
long-term basis of about 10 years.
The volunteer members would serve three-year
rotating terms to provide continuity. We recommend that:
a) no more than 50% be practicing 
Certified Public Accountants
b) no less than 25% be those who 
actively participate in the 
preparation of financial statements 
and from the industrial, commercial 
or public utility communities, and
c) the balance of the members be selected 
from colleges and universities and the 
financial community, including 
financial service organizations.
The initial non-governmental body and subsequent
appointments to it, consistent with the foregoing recommen­
dations, should be appointed by the AICPA using its own 
rules of order.
The full-time chairman of the body should be
selected by the AICPA. We see the role of the chairman




The contemplated new body should be supported 
by a full-time staff. This staff should be headed by a 
professional and competent administrative officer. It 
would be responsible for:
a) researching areas where opinions are 
required,
b) developing background material,
c) making recommendations for the body, 
including research into the results 
of the applications of the standards 
or rules through simulation, models, etc.,
d) interpreting the pronouncements as 
issued by the body.
We recommend that the practice of using volunteer 
committees be continued. In appointing these committees, 
however, each should have representation from the three 
categories recommended above for the new body.
The financing of the body and its professional 
staff is treated in section 6.
We recommend that a new name be created for 
this body to make clear that there is a complete change 
in, and departure from, current procedures. Suggested is 
a designation such as:
a) Council on Financial Reporting Standards
b) Financial Reporting Standards Authority
-6-
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4. Methods of operation of a non-governmental standards
board
The NAA Committee believes that the APB has 
improved its operations through counsel with other profes­
sional associations and groups, the wide circulation of 
opinion drafts, public hearings and the analysis and 
compilation of responding statements and replies.
We have studied the ’’Guidelines for APB Committee 
Operations” issued by the Accounting Principles Board. We 
recommend that the new body consistently follow the steps 
outlined below as its method of operation:
Step One: The preparation of a public 
statement, explaining the 
terms, reasons and need for an 
opinion in a particular area.
Step Two: The distribution of the public 
statement to all interested 
individuals, groups or assoc­
iations, soliciting a response.
Step Three: Following an examination of 
these responses, preparation of 
a memorandum of opinion or 
’’point outline."
Wide circulation of the memo­
randum of opinion or "point 
outline” to governmental, 
business and professional 
communities, both on the basis 
of a representative distribution 
list and by definitive selection. 
Copies of the material should be 
mailed to everyone requesting 




Step Five: Open public hearings be held
throughout the country to 
encourage participation and 
contributions on a geographical 
basis.
Step Six: Following the public hearings,
there be a study and analysis 
of the input and the preparation 
of an opinion draft.
Step Seven: Empirical research to test the
effect of the proposed opinion. 
(see page 9)
Step Eight: The circulation of the exposure
opinion to interested parties 
indicated in Step Four.
Step Nine: The issuance of the final opinion.
Relative to the deliberations of the new body, we 
recommend that a two-third's favorable vote be required in 
order to issue a final opinion.
If swift action is required on a rapidly develop­
ing problem, Steps Two, Three, Four and Five may be omitted 
i.e., the distribution of the public statement; the prepar­
ation of a memorandum of opinion or "point outline”; the 
circulation of the memorandum of opinion or the ’’point 
outline”; and the public hearings, respectively.
We believe that the new body comprised and 
operating as final authority pursuant to the above recom­
mendations does not require an appeal procedure.
-8-
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5. Accounting research support for a non-governmental 
standards board
Two types of research are necessary for effective oper­
ation. The first comprises theoretical research, ranging 
from concepts and principles to broad conclusions.
The second and most important classification of research 
comprises the empirical research. We recommend that the 
most effective type of research would project the effect of 
a proposed financial accounting standard on the business 
community (a model), thereby supporting it or causing it to 
be changed before issuance. We strongly feel that formulation 
and testing of new opinions are mandatory to receive full 
cooperation of industry, the accounting profession and others.
In both types of research, the responsibility rests 
with the paid staff. The work should be accomplished by the 
coordination of prior research in the area and the use of 
the most effective vehicle for new research. Full advantage 
should be taken of the research capabilities of universities, 




6. Method of Financing the Non-Governmental Body
The entire operation of the body, as recommended, 
should be funded by the AICPA, as it is now.
Respectfully submitted by:
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS 
Special Study Committee
Per Grant U. Meyers,Chairman
Ettore Barbatelli
I. Wayne Keller 
James E. Meredith, Jr. 
Thomas L. Morison






Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles 
Memorandum of Pertinent Questions
1. Establishing Accounting Principles -- Scope of the
Task.
What is meant by the term "accounting principles?" 
Would it be more accurate and useful to refer to 
"financial accounting and reporting standards?" Should 
the body with primary responsibility for formulating 
such standards limit itself to fundamentals, should 
it develop detailed standards, or should it undertake 
to do both?
2. Should the primary responsibility for establishing 
accounting standards reside in a governmental body or 
a non-governmental body?
Should the SEC, or another government agency, take 
over the basic task? Or should it remain with a non­
governmental body, such as the Accounting Principles 
Board? If a non-governmental body, what should be 
its relationship to the AICPA? To the SEC? What is 
the nature of its authority and by what means can its 
pronouncements be enforced?
3. Composition of a non-governmental standards board.
Who should serve on the board? Should they all 
be CPAs? Members of the AICPA? What is its optimum 
size? In lieu of the present volunteer board, would 
it be preferable if the Chairman or the Chairman and 
some of the members, or all of the members, were paid 
and served full-time? If so, what should be their 
terms of office? What needs to be done about staffing? 
How should the board be financed?
4. Methods of operation of a non-governmental standards 
board.
The procedures of the Accounting Principles Board 
have evolved to the point where the Board now holds 
public hearings on subjects for proposed opinions. Are 
these proceedings satisfactory? How could they be 
improved? By what vote of its members should a non­
governmental standards board act? Majority? Two- 
thirds? Other? What procedures would enable such a 
board to take swift action on developing problems? Is 
the present procedure for obtaining unofficial inter­
pretations of APB Opinions satisfactory? If not, how 




5. Accounting research support for a non-governmental 
standards board.
What sort of research is necessary as a prelude 
to the establishing of financial accounting standards? 
Who should conduct it? What guidelines for research 
studies would improve their quality and shorten the 




President Peoria, Illinois 61602
October 26, 1971
Mr. Francis M. Wheat
c/o American Institute of CPAs
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Wheat:
The development of generally accepted accounting principles 
can be one of the most important factors in both national 
and international affairs in the next few years. Because 
the general public, investors, and Government rely so heavily 
upon accountants’ work to determine the trend of economic 
affairs, the need for meaningful principles grows constantly.
It has long been my contention, shared by my colleagues at 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., that it is very proper for the inde­
pendent public accountants to determine if businesses are 
following ’’generally accepted accounting principles.” It is 
my opinion, however, that businessmen should have a strong 
voice in determining what ought to be ’’generally accepted." 
The public accountants have always stated that the accounts 
to which they attest "...the client’s accounts -- not those 
of the auditor" but under today’s arrangement the businessman 
is being told by the auditor what he has to do.
Our Controller, R. A. Morgan, has reported to me the discussion 
which occurred at the Northwestern University-sponsored meeting 
on "Institutional Issues In Formulating Reporting Standards." 
I understand you also were present at this meeting. It is my 
understanding that many different groups believe they should 
have representation on any newly formulated Accounting Principles 
Board. There is no disagreement that users of financial state­
ments, viz. security analysts, regulatory agencies, bankers, 
and others should be given ample opportunity to indicate their 
opinions regarding accounting principles. Whether all of these 
groups should have responsibility for setting the principles is, 




Mr. Francis M. Wheat October 26, 1971
In my opinion, submitting exposure drafts to business people 
for their comments will be no more effective in making certain 
that the conclusions represent the opinions of the practicing  
management accountants and their employers than does having 
congressional hearings on any topic assure that the end legis­
lation reflects all points of view. To say it differently, it 
is my opinion that those whose statements are being reviewed 
must have a voice in setting the principles which are to be 
followed.
I appreciate the seriousness of your assignment. It has to be 
one of the most difficult projects undertaken by anyone in the 
profession in recent years. Please be assured of our best wishes 





HAYDEN Q. ANDERSON 
C. DOUGLAS REED
E. LEO BURTON  
JACK F. WRIGHT, JR.
Certified Public Accountants 
1202 Third Street, S.W.
P. O. Box 504 
Roanoke, Virginia 24003
MEMBERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
VIRGINIA SOCIETY OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
October 20, 1971
Mr. Michael A. Pinto
American Institute of CPA's 
666 Fifth Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:
In response to your committee's request for remarks relative to 
the Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles, I would like to 
make the following comments:
Definition of accounting principles - broad range of fundamental 
accounting rules when applied to financial transactions secure quality 
and effect. There is currently no substitute for the phrase "accounting 
principles". The term is broad based when applied to accountancy, yet 
is narrow and restrictive when applied by the accounting profession. 
A phrase such as "financial accounting and reporting standards" may in 
time develop its desired meaning but "accounting principles" belongs to 
the twentieth century.
Ordinarily the "body" with primary responsibility for formulating 
accounting principles should limit itself to fundamentals. However, the 
"body" should be cognizant of the fact that thousands of accountants are 
faced with the problem of not only recognizing but fairly applying 
principles developed. With this in mind, it would be helpful to have 
published the meaningful data, whether public or private, from which the 
principles evolved.
The primary responsibility for establishing accounting principles 
should reside in a non-governmental body so long as it assumes the res­
sponsibility in a manner responsive to the public needs. Such a body to 
function effectively would, among other things, have to be independent 
and experienced accountants.
Early this year I had the opportunity to visit with a regular meeting 
of the Accounting Principles Board and I was very impressed. These men 
appear to be outstanding accountants and are able to come to grips with 
the problems discussed. Any board whether governmental or non-governmental 
would be composed certainly of some of these same men.
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Mr. Michael A. Pinto
October 20, 1971
Sheet 2
I am not aware of the operational problems which the Board may 
be encountering. The number of opinions it has issued in the past 
couple of years indicate it is beginning to measure up to its intended 
purpose.
My only suggestion is that practicing accountants be invited to 




Anderson & Reed, Certified public accountants
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McIntire School of Commerce • University of Virginia
Rouss Hall Charlottesville, Virginia 22903
October 29, 1971
Mr. Michael A. Pinto 
American Institute of CPAs 
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:
I have been asked by Vernon Winquist, President of 
The Virginia Society of CPAs to coordinate some effort on the 
part of The Virginia Society to respond to the "Notice of 
Public Hearing” on the establishment of Accounting Principles. 
In this capacity, I submit the enclosed comments of Mr. Burton 
and myself with regard to this study.
My comments are in the form of an abstract of a 
paper which I have been working on concerning the establish­
ment of accounting principles. Though the paper will not be 
ready for the November 3-4 hearings, I hope to have the paper 
in a suitable form to submit to Wheat Committee at a later date.
Sincerely yours,





INCREMENTALISM: A POLICY SCIENCE INTERPRETATION 
TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES*
Abstract
The Accounting Principles Board is currently undergoing 
intense evaluation by accounting analysts. Some are calling 
for a reconstitution of the Board and have suggested, for 
example, that the Board should be smaller in number and con­
sist of full-time members. Supposedly, the output of this 
new Board would be increased as well as improved relative to 
that of the presently constituted Board. Such evaluations 
raise the following questions: Will the output increase and 
improve by changing the policymaking mechanism? Or, is it an 
idiosyncrasy of policymaking and the expert’s role therein 
which affects the output?
The literature of policymaking has been virtually over­
looked by accountants in their efforts to establish generally 
accepted accounting principles as well as in the subsequent 
evaluation of pronouncements of accounting principles. This 
paper draws upon the literature of policy science for the 
notion of “disjointed incrementalism1" to provide insights
*William G. Shenkir, Associate Professor of Commerce, 
McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, Virginia.
1David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy 
of Decision (The Free Press of Glencoe: 1963). 
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into the aforementioned questions. Incrementalism offers a 
point of view or frame of evaluation that accountants should 
at least consider in their efforts to meliorate the establish­
ment of accounting principles. This paper is exploratory in 
nature and, therefore, its content is tentative.
Incrementalism holds that the "expert" or policymaker 
faced with complex policy problems seeks remedial objectives 
rather than utopian ones. Consideration is given only to 
those alternatives which differ incrementally from current 
practice. In examining these alternatives, the policymaker 
does not even analyze all of their consequences. In this ap­
proach to policymaking, means and ends are adjusted, and data 
are reconstructed. Continuous interaction occurs between 
data, means, and ends, which causes policymaking to proceed 
serially. Hence, "problems are never solved; instead some 
analysis is done, a decision is made, unanticipated adverse 
consequences showup, more analysis is done and more decisions 
are made to remedy the adverse consequences, etc., ad 
infinitum."2
Following the discussion of the incrementalist point of 
view or frame of evaluation, this paper then proceeds to apply 
it in an evaluation of the output of the Accounting Principles 
Board. This exercise, though perhaps not conclusively
 2K. A. Archibold, "Three Views of the Expert’s Role in 
Policy-Making: Systems Analysis, Incrementalism and The 




persuasive, may be dissuasive with respect to suggestions of 
oversimplied approaches to the establishment of generally 
accepted accounting principles. An incrementalist evaluation 
of the Board’s output cast the Board in a more favorable light 
than other evaluations which have been offered. Discussion of 
the establishment of accounting principles in terms of incre­
mental politics can be defended as long as the objective is 
generally accepted principles, which implies consensus and 
places their determination in a political context.
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Certified Public Accountants 
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:
Thank you for your letter to our Executive Director, Mr. Robert M. 
Shelton, advising us of the public hearing to be held on November 
3-4, 1971 on the AICPA Study on Establishment of Accounting 
Principles. We are very interested in this study but due to the 
press of other activities will be unable to attend the hearing and 
have not prepared a formal presentation in time to meet the es­
tablished deadline.
The AICPA's standard setting role should begin with research, both 
scholarly and imperically, to understand the behavior of those 
things and activities being reported on and the methods and techniques 
of reporting. This implies a need for involvement by University 
scholars, practicing public accountants and industry practitioners. 
Those in a particular industry are the most knowledgeable about 
the resources and how they are utilized in that industry, and full 
use should be made of their knowledge.
A cooperative effort between AICPA and the various industries, assisted 
by scholarly research, will produce more meaningful descriptions and 
definitions of the "principle;" of accounting than could be established 
by a governmental agency. The authority of a non-governmental 
group will come from the basic truths exposed -- in contrast to 
official dictums from governmental bodies.
HFMA's 25th ANNIVERSARY • 1946-1971
Hospital Financial Management Association
Robert M. Shelton, FHFMA, Executive Director
M.A. Pinto 
October 29, 1971 
page 2
Please keep us informed on the deliberations of this study group. 
Should the opportunity be available to us, we would appreciate the 
possibility of offering some considerations for the committee in 
the future.  
Very truly yours ,
William Fill 





50 WEST 44TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036 AC 212 661-3150
November 3, 1971
Mr. Francis M. Wheat
Chairman, Study Group on.
Establishing Future Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Wheat:
Enclosed per your instructions relating to the submission of written 
statements as part of the record for the public hearings to be conducted 
by the Study Group on November 3-4, 1971, are 25 copies of the 
following:
1 . FEI policy statement on the operations of the APB and 
the establishment of "accounting principles."
2 . Unofficial memorandum summary of supplemental 
comments relating to the FEI statement.
The FEI spokesman who will be available to answer questions and make 
an oral presentation is Mr. J.O. Edwards, Chairman of the FEI 
Committee on Corporate Reporting.
In addition to the 2 5 copies requested, we will have extra copies available 
for participants at the meeting.
Sincerely,
CC: AICPA Study Group
Messrs: Biegler, Levine, Olson, Pryor, Solomons and Smith 




50 WEST 44TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036 AC 212 661-3150
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD"
AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUTURE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES"
November 3-4, 1971 Public Hearings
AICPA STUDY GROUP
ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
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OPERATIONS OF THE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD"
AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUTURE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES"
Financial executives and other members of management are responsible for all forms 
of public reporting of financial information, including the financial statements of the 
business enterprise. By virtue of their expertise and legal responsibilities, business 
management must actively participate in the process of developing financial reporting 
policies and practices which will communicate meaningful information to the public.
Financial Executives Institute's membership consists of the chief financial officers of 
substantially all major United States companies. One of the primary objectives of the 
Institute and its members is to promote the use of reporting practices and the related 
accounting methods which will assure the timely reporting of meaningful financial in­
formation to the public.
FEI believes that the public's increasing demand for financial information should be 
encouraged in the interests of a healthy economy, and that this demand cannot be 
treated lightly by management. FEI also recognizes that the apparent strains on the 
credibility of published financial statements has been due in part to a small minority 
of individuals who have abused their reporting responsibilities for personal gain and 
to the fact that management in general has not, as yet, fully grasped the full implica­
tions of the financial reporting controversy.
On the other hand, FEI believes that any decline in the public's confidence in published 
financial statements should also be attributed to the failure of the accounting profession 
to cope with the basic issues as to the process by which "generally accepted accounting 
principles" should be formulated and as to the manner by which "accounting principles" 
can be better accepted in the adjudication of specific business reporting situations.
Important questions have arisen in the financial community as to the appropriateness 
and applicability of recent promulgations of "accounting principles" and of current pro­
posals now under consideration with respect to other "principles" to be promulgated in 
the near future. FEI believes that some of these recent pronouncements do not serve 
to improve financial reporting to the public but may, in fact, obstruct the meaningful 
reporting of financial information, by eliminating the use of otherwise sound reporting 
practices.
Financial Executives Institute is, nevertheless, encouraged by and in agreement with the 
recent actions of the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants, and others who have shown concern for these problems by es­
tablishing independent study groups to develop recommendations for improving the finan­
cial reporting process. FEI believes, however, that financial and other business man­
agement - on the basis of their substantial interest in financial reporting as well as 
their ultimate responsibility for the reports - must necessarily take a strong role in 
pursuing all feasible avenues of cooperation with responsible groups to obtain basic im­
provements in the framework within which financial reporting practices can be developed 
to meet the legitimate information needs of the public.
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Financial Executives Institute believes that the financial community's lack of general 
acceptance and support for the existing process of determining "accounting principles" 
is the result of three basic deficiencies in the operations of the "Accounting Principles 
Board":
1. The lack of a broad representation on the Board, which mitigates 
against an adequate understanding and resolution of the practical 
operating problems confronting the financial community in their 
attempts to apply rigid "rulings" in diverse business situations. 
The recent addition of a financial analysts' representative on the 
Board, accomplished by eliminating one of the two remaining 
business representatives, cannot be considered a constructive 
response to the "representation issue. "
2. The failure to maintain adequate communications with the respon­
sible segments of the financial community; to solicit their early 
participation in the identification and evolution of proposed changes; 
and to avoid unnecessary delays in achieving their understanding 
and acceptance of financial reporting restrictions. The Board's 
introduction of public hearings in connection with their delibera­
tions is a progressive step, however, consideration should be 
given to the timing of the hearings and the need for initial inputs 
at the onset of their deliberations.
3. The failure to recognize and fully accept the critical role of re­
search; to develop empirical data on the effects of proposed 
changes in reporting and to utilize the corollary role of research 
as a means to condition the financial community to accept the pro­
posed financial reporting improvements.
FEI believes that the proper approach to restoring public confidence in published financial 
reports and judicial acceptance of financial reporting standards involves a departure from 
the existing process, as presently constituted in the "Accounting Principles Board" of the 
AICPA. FEI's recommended program to achieve an authoritative body with a member­
ship more representative of the financial community consists of the following major ele­
ments:
1. The body should be organized within the private sector; it 
should have an equal number of members representing the 
public accounting profession and the business management 
community, plus a lessor number of members drawn from 
public interest groups, such as financial analysts, the aca­
demic community, government, etc. In FEI's opinion, the 
body should consist of no more than twenty members, and 
both the accounting and the business groups should each have 
as much as 40% of the total membership of the body. Mem­
bership in the AICPA should not be a prerequisite for repre­
sentatives other than the public accountants, and the selection
- 2 -
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of those members not representing the AICPA must be made 
only after careful consideration of the recommendations of 
the appropriate associations or groups who are actively engaged 
in the area of financial reporting.
2. The terms of appointment for members of the body should be 
staggered so that the body can maintain continuity and have the 
benefit of new member appointments on an annual basis. For 
example, if appointments are for a three-year term of service 
with options for reappointments, one-third of the members’ 
terms should expire each year.
3. The members of the body should not necessarily be asked to 
devote full-time to this activity. It is, of course, possible to 
envision a body that would have both full-time and part-time 
members. FEI believes that the organizational aspects of the 
body can be resolved and that proper utilization of support ser­
vices, such as research, full-time staff, etc. , can effectively 
overcome the resistance to part- rime service on the body.
4. The body should be sponsored and funded by the financial com­
munity; those elements of business and public interests who are 
concerned with financial reporting should bear their share of 
the costs of operating the body and of providing support services 
and, in conjunction with the public accounting profession, be 
prepared to subsidize the appointment of public members.
5. The body should actively seek the advice and participation of all 
responsible parties at the earliest possible stage of its delibera­
tions and in the planning and scheduling of its program; it should 
involve professional associations, government agencies and, 
where appropriate, trade associations in the initial phase of each 
project, initiate in-house or outside research studies, utilize the 
services of knowledgeable people who are not members of the body 
to work on its various committees, hold public hearings and main­
tain a public record, issue exposure drafts, and otherwise solicit 
the participation of the financial community.
6. The body should anticipate potential accounting abuses or the use of 
innovative reporting practices and initiate early action to forestall 
these potential problem areas in financial reporting; an effective 
staff organization and a coordinated research program coupled with 
a responsive communication and feedback system with the public 
should provide the body with adequate lead time.
7. The operations of the body should provide for an appeals procedure 
whereby an interpretation and a clarification of the applicability of 
its pronouncements to unusual situations and events can be given a 
full hearing.
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8. The body's actions must, as a necessary prerequisite, be based 
on adequate research; the nature of the research required may 
encompass the evaluation of the existing knowledge in a specific 
area, conceptual and empirical studies, and an evaluation in 
actual case studies of the practical implications of the various 
alternatives under consideration. Since each of the professional 
accounting and financial management associations now have re­
search functions, it would be appropriate for the body to utilize 
these resources. Accordingly, FEI recommends that these asso­
ciations commit a substantial portion of their research efforts to 
the body and that they be responsive to the body's need to take a 
lead role in the planning, scheduling, and follow-up of the research 
studies to be undertaken.
In summary, Financial Executives Institute believes that business management can 
make a substantial contribution by participating in a viable program to improve re­
porting practices that meets the public's information needs. Moreover, it is FEI's 
conviction that management has a unique responsibility for all aspects of the reporting 
of financial information to the public and that that responsibility encompasses a major 
role in both determining the reporting practices to be used and in determining how 
these practices are to be developed.
FEI is, therefore, prepared to commit resources to support a representative body 
and to promote the participation of individual business managers and their corporations 
in contributing their expertise and capabilities to the task of developing and promulga­
ting financial reporting practices that will insure the timely reporting of meaningful 





UNOFFICIAL MEMORANDUM SUMMARIZING SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS 
RELATING TO THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE STATEMENT ON 
ESTABLISHING "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES"
I. ISSUE: New Authoritative Body vs. Restructuring APB to Achieve More 
Practical Representation
'The business community should maintain an elastic approach to the alternative 
of a new body vs. a restructuring of the APB. A push for a 40% representation 
for business on the APB itself leaves control within the AICPA---- I don't 
agree that this organization should necessarily be in a controlling position. 
However, the composition of the accounting profession representation may be 
composed of APB members or any other segment of the public auditing pro­
fession. Representation on the body should include academicians. This is a 
very vocal group and the body should have the benefit of their detached and 
objective ideas and viewpoints. Another group that experience suggests a 
need for representation and subsequent involvement is that of the government 
sector. "
"As a practical matter, restaffing of the existing APB to achieve a 40% business 
representation would probably be more acceptable to the AICPA than would its 
replacement by an entirely new body. This evolutionary approach might also 
represent the more efficient alternative----at least initially-------in maintaining 
the thrust of professional activities with respect to the GAAP issues currently 
under consideration. It would also assure continuity of jurisdiction over the 
development of accounting policy guidelines during the transition to a broader 
based organization. I would presume that the proposal to restructure the APB 
would be that academicians, financial analysts, and other persons outside the 
public accounting and business communities be represented to the extent of a 
20% participation in the total membership of this body.
Restructuring the APB entails some risks, however, as noted by Mr. Baker and 
the AAA. The APB has an adverse image in some quarters, which may extend to 
its reorganized successor and hamper its effective operation. Perhaps this image 
problem might be offset by renaming the successor organization. 'The Council 
on Accounting Policies, ' for example, might not call forth the emotional reaction 
which could attend the continued use of the Accounting Principles Board. Never­
theless, the question of the AICPA's control over the restructured and renamed 
'body' would remain, and it is questionable if the AICPA would readily accept an 
expansion of the number of non-certified representatives on the restructured board, 
as would flow from adoption of the proposal. Accordingly, I believe that an entirely 







"I subscribe to the new body concept because it is an absolute necessity that the 
private sector gain proper representation on the proposed rule-making body from 
a number of standpoints.
Among the most important benefits to be derived is for industry to have input to 
any deliberations at the very inception of the rule-making process rather than 
at a point in time 'after-the-fact' when the proposals set forth by organizations 
such as the APB are so firmly entrenched in the minds of the issuers as to render 
any changes and/or improvements thereto virtually impossible. Many of the in­
dustry viewpoints and/or objections could then be considered, debated, and re­
solved in the committee stage prior to exposure.
A second improvement which would result from this approach is the development 
of more practical solutions to the financial reporting/accounting questions cur­
rently under study. Too often in reading APB exposure drafts and SEC proposals, 
one gets the feeling that positions have been developed from an ’ivory tower' with 
little awareness of such factors as implementation problems or investor needs. 
Industry representation on such a body would go far toward injecting these points, 
whenever appropriate and applicable, into the rule-making process.
Other more obvious potential benefits such as improved setting of priorities, 
screening of less important efforts, and acceleration of needed opinions and regu­
lations could also result from the establishment of the proposed body. "
"I would be very reluctant to completely abandon the APB in favor of establishing 
a 'new authoritative body. ' There is too much to be done at this time to disrupt 
the progress they have made and to 'waste' the knowledge and experience this 
group has accumulated over the years.
I would support a move to a 'new authoritative body' as a long-term goal, ac­
complished gradually-----say over a 3-5 year period, and perhaps accomplished 
by a gradual change in the structure of the existing APB.
However, it has taken the APB several years to achieve the level of effectiveness 
which they now have. We can be critical of some of the actions, or lack thereof, 
they have taken in the past, but on balance I feel they have done a fine job and 
are improving their processes with each passing day.
Also, if an immediate move were made to create a 'new authoritative body' and 
if it failed to be as effective as the APB, I am afraid that the SEC would tend to 
take accounting matters more into their own hands, and we would soon find this 
government body promulgating more and more accounting principles. Put 
another way, the SEC seems to be willing to work with the existing APB, and 
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Nevertheless, I completely agree that management clearly has the responsibility 
to report meaningful financial information to the public, and thus must play a 
major role in determining the 'rules of the game.1 I conclude then that the only 
way to preserve public confidence, maintain 'expertise, ' maintain the existing 
relationship with the SEC, and at the same time accomplish more meaningful 
participation by management is to gradually move towards an 'authoritative body. ' 
I would think this could be achieved by going 'all out' to achieve - over a period of 
years - a 40% business representation on the existing APB. This, of course, 
would be accompanied by sharing of the combined resources and a strong business 
voice in specific appointments for board membership.
To sum up, my overall feelings on the subject are that I am not nearly as critical 
of the APB as some, but I have to agree that there is considerable room for im­
provement, and that one of the major weaknesses in the present process is the 
lack of meaningful participation by business financial executives. However, I 
can't think our past performance has earned us the right for a complete overhaul 
at this time, and we should instead push hard for gradual equal representation as 
we demonstrate that we are capable and willing to accept this responsibility. "
"I disagree with the new body concept. My reasoning stems from the fact that the 
SEC has sufficient authority to mandate accounting practices but has deferred to 
the AICPA. Also, the IRS is taking steps which tend to influence accounting 
practices. Complete governmental control of financial reporting is less apt to 
come about with the existence of a relatively independent organization establishing 
generally accepted accounting principles. I prefer that the AICPA maintain the 
lead role but arrange for a more positive and influential voice from business man­
agement. Business should be given 40% representation on the APB and the two- 
thirds majority vote rule should be continued. "
"In our opinion, a new body outside the AICPA is not a viable solution. Therefore, 
the goal should be to secure greater representation of the business community on 
a restructured APB. "
"We believe that the activities and policies of AICPA have helped to establish a 
general credibility level in financial and government circles. Establishment of 
a separate body could create confusion and lead to a loss of credibility. We be­
lieve that the activities and efforts of industry should be concentrated on increased 
business representation on the APB. We recognize past frustrations in attempting 
to achieve such increased representation, but believe this continues to be the 




Financial Executives Institute 
October 1971
"My personal reservation relates to whether a proposed new body to establish 
financial reporting practices is in fact a viable approach. I share the feeling 
that business representatives must assume greater responsibility and attain 
and active and participative role in establishing reporting standards. How­
ever, I feel that the proposed body is likely to prove too revolutionary to have 
much chance of success. Certainly, without the full and active support of the 
AICPA, I do not see how such a body could be established. Therefore, it is my 
feeling that greater numerical representation by business on the APB, however 
difficult to achieve, may be a more practical solution. "
"I strongly support the ’new body’ concept since to me it represents the only hope 
of getting greater business representation in the membership of the 'rule making 
body. ' This viewpoint is predicated on the fact that all efforts to date to obtain 
increased membership in the present APB have not only failed but, despite such 
efforts, the business representation has been reduced from 3 to 1 in recent 
years. Further, there is little assurance that the representation may not be 
entirely eliminated under the system whereby the AICPA president appoints all 
APB members subject to ratification by the AICPA Board of Directors. "
"I do not believe that there is much hope for the adoption of a new authoritative 
body by the AICPA. It has been responsible for making the rules for the 
accounting profession for the last 33 years and I believe it [AICPA] is desirous 
of continuing that role. Accordingly, I think a more realistic position would be 
to strive for greater [business] representation on the present APB.
Since concerns have been expressed that the present APB has too many members, 
perhaps the number of members should be reduced. An example of how the mem­
bers could be pro-rated to achieve equal representation from the public accounting 
profession and the business community with a smaller representation from public 
interest groups, would be to have the Board consist of 4 members from CPA firms, 
4 from business, and 2 from public interest groups. Assuming that the present 
APB two-thirds assenting votes requirement for the issuance of an Opinion, the 
assenting vote of 7 members would be required. Obviously, no single group would 
be in control. "
"The APB has progressed from a group whose primary mission was to distill 
'accounting principles' out of existing practice to one where it is a self- 
perpetuating body, responsible to no one but itself, engaged in writing rules of 
financial reporting that have a tremendous impact on entire industries. I sug­
gest that it is time that we try to determine what the APB is, to whom it is re­
sponsible, and its method of perpetuation. "
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"While not satisfied with APB performance, I am in favor of APB set-up with 
accelerated public hearings and stronger research effort. I am lukewarm on 
necessity of greater business representation on APB. Have seen little evi­
dence that business could do much better in solving problems. Change in 
organization at this time would add to credibility gap on financial reporting. 
Agree as to doubts that SEC would defer to such a body. "
"I question the feasibility of a ’new body' concept. The body would appear to be 
less independent and impartial than the existing APB, and therefore even more 
susceptible to charges of influence by the sponsoring organizations and business 
in general. I continue to think that finding widespread and continuing financial 
support for the body, sufficient to match the resources available to the APB, 
will be a serious problem. I believe that it is much more practical to strive for 
greater representation on, and communication with, some 'body' under the 
sheltering wing of the AICPA. "
"I am not sure what is meant by the proposal that a new body should be organized 
within the private sector of the economy. Certainly, someone is going to have 
to decide on the specific membership of the body and it must be vested with 
authority of some sort if it is to be effective. In order to be effective, I would 
expect that the AICPA members would have to agree to be bound by its pronounce­
ments --- and while this would not seem unreasonable so long as the AICPA mem­
bers represented 40 percent or more of the membership, the AICPA might think 
differently. Because of these practical problems, I guess I believe that we may 
end up with a considerably expanded APB with the increased business represen­
tation which we are asking. However, even though we may have to settle for 
less, I am willing to go along with the proposed new body. "
"I believe that a more viable solution is a modification of the present APB. I sup­
port the premise of equal representation from the business community and the 
accounting profession. It is extremely doubtful that the AICPA and the SEC 
would throw their support behind a completely new body. I believe the SEC will 
continue to defer to an authoritative body provided it is satisfied that the body is 
one relatively independent from the influences of limited interest business factions. 
It therefore appears that the most practical way to obtain the support of the SEC 
and thereby avoid government agency mandates on accounting principles is to 
modify an existing organization whose promulgations have been accepted as 
authoritative announcements. The business community can achieve the desired 







II. ISSUE: Part-Time Service vs. Full-Time Members on the Body
"The proposed full-time activity by the body members is in keeping with the 
basic deficiencies of the APB viz. , better communication with responsible 
segments, avoidance of lengthy delays in achieving necessary acceptance of 
financial reporting restrictions, and the need for more in-depth research. 
Also, the fact the existing APB has many important matters that are not 
even scheduled for review for another two or three years suggests the handi­
cap of part-time participation by the APB. The answer to this difficulty may 
be sufficient funding for the body to enable it to pay salaries commensurate 
with the abilities of the level of qualifications that members should have to 
serve on the body. "
"It is my opinion that public interests will not be best served if the body is a full- 
time activity; I doubt seriously that the caliber of people needed from the busi­
ness community would be available if there is a full-time requirement. My 
reasoning is that it will be difficult to get executives who are active to leave 
their company for a period of years. One of the reasons that business execu­
tives are needed on the body is that they are in touch with the practical problems 
of current-day financial reporting. If representatives sit full-time on the body 
for, say, five years, those individuals will rapidly lose touch with 'current 
practical problems'. "
'The problem of recruiting qualified business representatives on the body is 
unquestionably severe, and its feasible solution is absolutely necessary. In 
my opinion, the responsibilities of the business representatives on the proposed 
body cannot be effectively discharged on a part-time basis. The expanding in­
terest in corporate reporting and the increasing number of issues under con­
sideration at any given time suggest that the body will require both full-time 
representatives and the support of a subordinate full-time staff. I also believe 
that many qualified potential representatives may not be available for service 
as representatives by reason of their heavy work commitments within their 
companies and in other areas of activity. Other potential candidates might not 
be interested in such service by reason of its possible impact on the attainment 
of their personal career and financial objectives.
Two possible approaches suggest themselves to me as possible solutions to this 
business representative staffing problem:
A. The proposal might stipulate a relatively short term of service 
on the body, such as 18-24 months. This approach would have 
the merit of spreading the burden of service among a larger 






deprivation to be expected through the 'loan' of financial execu­
tives to the body.
An unknown potential career impact would still exist on this 
basis for the individual representative, but his corporate 
'prospects' might be better than under a longer term of pro­
fessional service, by reason of his shorter absences from 
his company. Such professional service might, in fact, serve 
as a broadening opportunity for high potential individuals----- 
similar to Harvard's advanced management program-----which 
companies might be interested in using for their 'seasoning' 
prior to promotion to a position of higher responsibility.
Under this approach the business representatives on the body 
might be still in the dynamic growth period of their careers, 
and their performance as representatives might be expected to 
be maximally vigorous and beneficial to the profession. On 
the other hand, such individuals might not yet have attained the 
breadth of experience and maturity of judgment possessed by 
more senior executives, who very likely could not easily be 
released for such service by reason of their heavy personal 
responsibilities. One other adverse aspect of this alternative 
would be that it would necessarily involve some loss of 
effectiveness, as compared with an approach involving a 
longer term of service, resulting from the increase in start­
up and shut-down time involved on this shorter-cycle basis.
B. The proposal might suggest the recruitment of business repre­
sentatives from the ranks of the newly retired financial execu­
tives. Such individuals would be able to serve for the longer 
term which would seem to be required to meet the continuity 
criteria for the body. These 'financial executives emeritus' 
might also be expected to have the greater breadth of experience 
and maturity of judgment that younger executives, still actively 
employed in the financial management function, have not yet 
attained. On the other hand, these older representatives would 
probably be less vigorous, more subject to absence due to ill­
ness, and less in touch with current problems and topical issues.
On balance, I believe that the body would be more effective if its business represen­
tatives were financial executives still actively employed in the financial management 





"I doubt that it would be possible to obtain business representatives of the caliber 
that this job would require who would be willing and able to serve full-time. "
"The advantage of  part-time representatives is the ability to bring a continuing 
practical approach to business problems. I support those who feel that full- 
time appointees might well become isolated from day-to-day problems. Per­
haps the body could have a full-time chairman and a full-time staff with the 
members of the body on a part-time staggered basis. "
"I think that the main point to be made is that the body should be made up of 
individuals who are close enough to the operating facts of a business to be com­
pletely conversant with what would be the normal resulting impact of the appli­
cation of a theory. I say this because it seems to me that the 'Accounting 
Principles Board' has in some of its recent opinions gotten out of touch with 
operating reality.
If this is accepted as a reasonable premise, then it is likely that the body would 
be increased in size inasmuch as it would have to include representatives from 
various industries.
I know that this is a far cry from a Supreme Court of Accounting concept which 
many people are advocating. I feel that such a court would aggravate the con­
dition that presently exists inasmuch as it is likely to be composed of theoreti­
cians responsible to no one. I think another point to be made is that whereas 
the U. S. Supreme Court interprets laws, the Supreme Court of Accounting would 
be in fact called upon to make laws. Further, since the trend seems to be toward 
extreme codification of accounting rules, such a Supreme Court would be required 
to make extremely detailed laws. This, lacking a background in operating prac­
tices within an industry, would verge on the disastrous.
I feel it would be a mistake for anyone to serve as a full-time paid member of 
the Accounting Principles Board for the reasons I recite above.
The only additional significant comment that I feel may be appropriate is that I 
feel that there could be a variety of industrial groups represented on the body 
who would deal with problems as they might relate to their industries. This 
would overcome the objection that it would be impossible for responsible execu­
tives to devote full-time to the body since it is unlikely that a single industry 
group would be involved in all of the problems all of the time. It might also 
make the point that the only way one can reasonably codify accounting principles 
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”I am concerned about the full-time vs. part-time make-up of the body because 
I cannot visualize top business candidates being willing to give up three to five 
years of their business career to work on the body full-time. As you can ima­
gine, there are many problems which relate to home life, career objectives, 
credits for retirement pay, etc. It would be a shame to require full-time 
service only to end up with second rate candidates.
In order to obtain top representatives of industry, the accounting profession 
(public auditors), and others, I do not believe there should be a requirement 
that membership on the body be on a full-time basis. I believe the commitment 
should be for a given period of time such as five years and, perhaps, on a half­
time basis. If it subsequently turns out that the ideal representatives could 
serve on a full-time basis, then it could be reconsidered. I do believe that the 
body should be supported by several full-time professionals who could do much 
of the work under the guidance of the body. "
”I join those who have previously expressed concern on whether or not qualified 
financial executives would be willing and able to serve on a full-time body. The 
suggestion of a substantial but subordinate full-time staff working for part-time 
body members seems to be a start in answering this concern. "
"I agree with those who believe that a part-time body (as opposed to full-time 
members) would be more responsive to the practical considerations of new 
accounting issues and therefore would best represent actual business situations. "
III. ISSUE; Financial Support to Fund the Body's Operations
"It seems to me that the cost of supporting the body should not be funded in pro­
portion to the representation of the various interested parties. Academic and 
government representatives should be on the body without any requirement that 
their organizations pay the freight - business wants the body to have the benefit 
of their views. The business community ultimately will pay the freight for 
itself and the CPA's anyway, so this might as well be recognized in the form of 
some means by which collections will be both mandatory and automatic - but in 
a form in which business will know that it is paying for part of the cost. Today 







"There is a negative connotation to the proposal that the business community 
underwrite an equal share of the cost of operating the body, including subsi­
dies for public and governmental representatives. The danger is that this 
could be misinterpreted as 'muzzle power'. "
"There is one side of the financial funding support question (which applies equally 
to the representation issue), and that is - despite the fact that the business com­
munity should, and probably would be willing to, pay its fair share of the costs, 
the system to accomplish this has to maintain integrity of independence in both 
directions. That is to say, not only can there be no way for business to apply 
economic pressures on the body, but the business community and its various 
elements must retain their right of dissent and have an open forum in which to 
air their views with respect to proposals by the body. "
"The body should be sponsored and funded by the several elements of the financial/ 
business community represented on the body. I do not agree that it is either 
necessary or desirable to subsidize all public members. While this may be 
appropriate for members from the academic community, I do not believe it is 
appropriate for the financial analyst member(s). Most important is the question 
' How can the body be funded without undermining its independence?' I'll have to 
leave it to those who are more familiar than I with the structure and mode of 
operations of the present APB and the financial needs of the new or revised body 
to come up with a workable solution. "
"Despite the assurances to the contrary, I think that finding widespread and con­
tinuing financial support for the body, sufficient to match the resources of the 
APB, will be a serious problem. "
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Accounting now stands at the threshold of fundamental changes which will 
alter not only its role in society, but also its very definition. An 
early sign of these changes is the appointment of the Wheat and Trueblood 
Committees, which can also be important catalysts of these changes. The 
public accounting profession can elect to resist change and wind up as a 
peripheral, barely relevant institution, or it can elect to capitalize on 
it for the ultimate benefit of society.
We are concerned, when studying the proposals submitted to this Committee, 
that some persons are motivated primarily by a desire to quell criticism 
of the present Accounting Principles Board, and have no desire to consider 
real change. If their mean and narrow view of the role of accounting 
prevails, the profession will surely reap derision in the future.
A much preferable approach would be to analyze the proper role of accounting 
in society and then deduce a system for establishing accounting principles 
which is consistent with that role. The remainder of this statement follows 
that approach, and concludes that the current Accounting Principles Board 
provides a ready foundation on which to build an appropriately broadened, 
socially responsive instrument for establishing accounting principles.
The Role of Accounting in Society
A national economy is a more-or-less loosely organized, goal-directed 
system, in which the goals include meeting the physical and cultural needs 
of the people. In order to meet these goals, society organizes into 
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functional units of manageable size, each of which takes responsibility 
for certain sub-goals. For example, businesses provide goods and services, 
universities meet the need for education, and the Federal government 
provides for national defense. The fact that there are national goals implies 
the necessity of a control system to measure and correct discrepancies 
between actual results and hoped-for goals.
An important component of any control system is the information feedback 
loop -- the system which measures physical results and reports them to 
the decision makers. The sensitivity of the feedback loop is of critical 
importance to the efficient functioning of the whole goal-directed system. 
Consider, for example, a heating system with no thermostat. It would 
supply heat without regard to temperature conditions, and would be 
absurdly inefficient in achieving the goal of constant temperature. Now 
consider a heating system with a thermostat, but a system in which the 
signal took six months to travel from the thermostat to the furnace. In 
this case, the heat supplied by the furnace would be governed by actual 
physical conditions, but the result would be to intensify temperature 
extremes instead of eliminating them. Clearly, an effective feedback loop 
in any control system must work quickly and accurately. In fact, the 
efficiency of the feedback loop will unfailingly serve to limit the 
efficiency of the entire system in attaining goals.
Accounting is the feedback loop in an economic system, and the efficiency 
of the accounting system will have a tremendous influence on how effectively 
society can meet its goals. It is therefore vitally important to national, 




The public accounting profession, through its function of establishing 
accounting principles and attesting to financial results, has effective 
control of this feedback loop, but it will surely lose this control 
unless it recognizes and accepts the responsibility implicit in such 
a vital position. Preparing the profession to meet this responsibility 
is the challenge facing the Wheat and Trueblood Committees.
The Need for Establishing Accounting Principles 
Because accounting is principally concerned with reporting physical results, 
it is not obvious that there is a need for establishing accounting principles. 
No august body established the law of gravity; it was there for Newton to 
see. The layman would be apt to think that an accountant need only observe 
th 'facts ' and then report them. This, however, is a simplistic view:
- The number of physical events during an entity’s existence 
is immense. It would be impossible to communicate them 
all. The accountant is therefore faced with the need to 
decide which events to communicate and which to ignore, 
and of those communicated, how they will be recorded, 
summarized, and reported. These decisions necessarily 
impose upon the accountant the responsibility for interpretation, 
and make total neutrality all but impossible. The accountant, 
therefore, records those facts which in his judgment are most 
relevant to the users of the information, and records, 
summarizes, and reports them in the most relevant fashion, 
according to his judgment. For example, accountants 
typically report the depreciated cost of fixed assets, but 
not their current worth, age and condition.
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- Modern enterprise has developed business methods which are 
exceedingly complex. In many cases, complicated transactions 
are resolved only over extended periods of time. The 
economic substance of many of these transactions is by no 
means obvious. Two equally competent, neutral accountants 
may observe the same phenomenon and disagree on the economic 
substance. For example, a contractual stream of payments in 
return for the use of property may be a financing arrangement, 
a sale of property, or a mere rental. The accountant is 
saddled with the responsibility of interpreting the economic 
substance of complex transactions.
The immense amount of interpretation involved in accounting may be suggested 
by pointing to the common three or four page set of financial statements 
of commercial enterprises; these reports are typically the synthesis 
of millions (in some cases billions) of individual transactions, many of 
which may be quite complex.
If accounting is implicitly an interpretive discipline, and if equally 
competent interpretations of given events may differ, what is implied about 
the need for accounting principles? In the absence of accounting principles, 
each accountant would be free to select his own decision rules, and the 
wholly predictable result would be a confusing disarray in financial 
reporting. Persons using financial statements would have multifarious, 
noncomparable, nonconsistent reports to deal with. It is highly probable 
that this state of affairs would seriously detract from the efficiency of the 
accounting feedback loop in the overall economic control system.
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In view of the complexities of accounting, it is inconceivable that any 
system of individually interpreted general rules could work. Therefore, 
given the practical need for a reasonable degree of uniformity in 
accounting, some body with authority and credibility must set rules to 
  
be consistently followed.
Who Should Establish Accounting Principles?
If practicing lawyers do not establish the law, why should practicing 
accountants establish the accounting principles?
The law, which at a point in time is the codification of contemporary 
social standards, is intended to govern action. It is a legitimate 
exercise of government power to establish and enforce the law.
Accounting reports, however, are merely bundles of information, which, 
by its nature, is morally and ethically neutral. The need to regulate 
this information is neither legal nor moral, only practical. If one 
accountant sees a particular transaction as a lease and another sees 
it as a sale, neither can be said thereby to be corrupt; neither 
interpretation is morally superior. It is simply impractical to have 
divergent reporting for similar events. 
 
Because the need for accounting principles is neither legal nor moral, it 
need not be a government function to establish accounting principles. 
In fact, most persons are in agreement that it is an exceedingly dangerous 
exercise of government power to intrude in the flow of information.
Government control of information flow is rightly resisted on other fronts, 
and should be in accounting also.
One of the principal aims of the first amendment to the United States 
Constitution was to prohibit government from interfering with the flow 
of information. Government control of accounting information flow would 
be about as desirable as government control of the press. The establishment 
of accounting principles should be a function solely of the private sector.
Any body establishing accounting principles must act with a view toward 
the public interest. In fact, since the accounting feedback loop is a 
component of the goal-directed system serving the public interest, the 
efficiency of that loop can be measured only in terms of the public interest. 
It frequently occurs that the narrow interests of those being reported on or 
specific users of financial information conflict with the broad interests 
of society. In these cases, it is obvious that the broader interests of 
society must unfalteringly predominate. This implies two requirements: 
the body establishing accounting principles must be imbued with broad 
social concern and resistant to pressures from narrow interest groups.
Because of the vital importance to society of an efficient accounting 
feedback loop, any body establishing accounting principles must ultimately 
be responsive to public interest and desire. Whether the body is appointed 
or elected, the selection process must be sensitive to public pressures. 
Not only must it be sensitive to public pressures but it must also appear 
to be sensitive as a logical condition for public acceptance and support. 
Whether or not public pressure is expected, there must be formal machinery 
to recognize and react to it.
Even if members are appointed to an accounting principles body, rather than 
elected by a broad constituency, it is possible to build some safeguards 
into the appointive process simply by permitting the appointments to be 
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made by diverse and heterogeneous groups. In no case should a single 
person or organization have effective (or apparent) control over the 
appointive process. A heterogeneous appointive process may not guarantee 
a diverse range of opinion in the principles body, but it would certainly 
improve the chances of achieving that result.
Accommodation to public interest can also come through heeding the voices 
of public criticism. Criticism should not be lamented and abhorred, but 
rather embraced as an essential force for reform. In fact, only the total 
lack of criticism should be lamented, for that would surely signal a public 
judgment of irrelevance.
Because accounting is a highly complex technical discipline, any body 
establishing principles must have a solid core of technical expertise, 
or the principles established will be naive and impractical. Only accounting 
experts could have the detailed knowledge of what is possible or practical 
in the field of information recording and reporting. It would be a grievous 
mistake to entrust the establishment of accounting principles to any body 
wholly innocent of technical expertise.
A final requirement for any effective body establishing accounting principles 
is that its decrees must be enforceable. There appear to be only two 
practical enforcement mechanisms: legal controls, and the ethical self­
regulation of the public accounting profession. To rely on legal controls 
is to involve government in the information control business, and that is 
unacceptable. Fortunately, self-regulation by the profession has proven highly 
effective. (Only one Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board has failed 
to receive unanimous application by the profession, and that case was 
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aggravated by the intervention of the Federal government.) If the 
profession is to enforce the decrees of a principles body, that body will 
need to be an arm of the profession, for it is unlikely that this profession 
(or any other) would unconditionally commit itself to carrying out the 
regulations of a totally independent entity in the absence of a legal 
requirement to do so.
Any body constituted to establish accounting principles must have the full 
support not only of the public accounting profession, but also such authorities 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the stock exchanges, various 
governmental agencies, and other professions. These authorities have 
placed their confidence in the public accounting profession to assure the 
fairness of financial reporting. It is unlikely that any public or 
governmental body could achieve or hold that confidence. Furthermore, 
the resources and support of the public accounting profession are essential 
to an intelligent formulation of accounting principles, and these resources 
and support are most easily available to an arm of the profession itself.
The ideal accounting principles body should meet all of the requirements 
outlined above. Unfortunately, some of them are in partial conflict. For 
example, the requirements of technical expertise and enforceability imply 
that the body should be primarily made up of expert public accountants, 
but the requirements of public interest and independence from pressure by 
narrow interest groups suggest a group more representative of society and 
less closely associated with finance and industry. Similarly, a professional 
group may be, or may appear to be, less responsive to public pressure and
interest.
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Perhaps the theoretical ideal would be to establish two bodies: the first, 
made up of members of the public, would articulate the broad objectives of 
accounting principles; the second, made up of expert public accountants, 
would translate those objectives into detailed accounting principles. As 
a practical matter, however, such a two-body solution is probably not 
feasible at the present time. The lack of agreed social objectives and 
competent advocates for them would surely reduce the public body, if it could 
be staffed at all, to interminable philosophical debating, with very little 
practical output to guide the professional body in developing detailed rules.
A practical compromise solution would be to constitute a single body, under 
the aegis of the public accounting profession, with a dual membership: on 
the one side would be expert public accountants, on the other, representatives 
of the public. In this way, the technical expertise of the accountants could 
be melded with the public interest in a practical working arrangement. The lack 
of a fully coherent social philosophy would not prove an insurmountable barrier 
to such a group, as it would be free to move toward such a philosophy in small 
discrete steps. Furthermore, the work of such a body would not be inordinately 
delayed while the public representatives defined and learned their duties. In 
order to assure that such a body would be as responsive as possible to public 
interest, the accountants should be nominated by a heterogeneous process (e.g., 
by their own firms) and the public members should be nominated by organizations 
(or persons) totally independent of the accounting profession. This process 
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would reasonably assure that the body represented a sufficiently wide 
range of views, since its appointment would not be in the hands of 
any single group, such as the officers of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Nevertheless, veto power over 
nominees should be given to the profession to reduce the possibility 
of capricious choices being inflicted upon the principles body. The 
terms of all members should be staggered and limited to provide for 
reasonable evolution of views, but not too brief to permit continuity 
of operations.
Some critics have questioned the ability of public accountants to remain 
completely independent in the face of client pressures with respect to 
establishing accounting principles. However, there is a wide range of 
client interests bearing on any public accounting firm, and a considerable 
amount of diversity among firms themselves; therefore, it is unlikely that 
significant pressures could be brought to bear on such a principles body 
by a single narrow interest group. In the event they were, however, the 
public members of the body would be a sufficient foil for these pressures.
Proposals of Others
A number of proposals have been advanced by others for the composition of 
an accounting principles body, including such recommendations as these:
- Establish a small, full-time accounting principles body, 
staffed, perhaps, by ’’elder statesmen” of the profession.
- Turn the function of establishing accounting principles 
over to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
- Turn the function of establishing principles over to
investors.
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- Give equal representation in establishing accounting 
principles to financial executives.
- Abandon the attempt to prescribe uniform accounting 
principles, and rely instead on full disclosure.
- Establish a three branch structure for formulating 
and enforcing accounting principles: constitutional 
(to determine broad objectives), legislative (to make 
the detailed rules), and judicial (to hear appeals).
- Establish appeals courts.
- Elect the members of the body.
- Broaden the composition of the Accounting Principles 
Board to include lawyers, economists, and/or other 
financial experts.
Several proposals feature a body with paid, full-time membership, independent 
of public accounting practice. These plans raise a number of important 
questions:
- Would remoteness from public practice mean that such 
groups might develop isolated and irrelevant stances 
on practical issues?
- Could the Institute, or any other financing agency, 
afford to hire members of the caliber of those who now 
serve voluntarily?
- What accounting principles would be considered "generally 
accepted" if a majority of the largest accounting firms 
deemed a pronouncement of such a body irrelevant and 
agreed to apply different rules?
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- How would such a body be selected to assure acceptance 
by both public accountants and the users of financial 
information?
- How would the public interest be represented in such a 
board?
- How would such a board be responsive to public pressures?
If the answer to any one of these serious questions is unsatisfactory, 
that would be sufficient to disqualify the proposal. In the absence 
of demonstrated, satisfactory answers, however, we believe that the 
answers to all of these questions are unsatisfactory with respect to 
the public interest.
As to the proposals of some to staff such a body with "elder statesmen” 
of the profession, who, being retired, would serve for nominal stipends, 
we do not believe that age is a logical qualification for such a job, nor 
that failure to attain such an age is a logical disqualification. Staffing 
such a body solely with retired experts would probably lead to a very 
competent board of unimpeachable integrity; but it would surely exclude 
the substantial majority of those who could make a great contribution.
Proposals to turn the function over to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
blithely ignore the dangers of turning the control of information over to 
the government. They also ignore the fact that when the government turns 
to regulatory matters, it tends to be highly conservative and noninnovative; 
these qualities are precisely the opposite of the creative innovation which 
is so necessary in accounting.
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Proposals to turn the function over to investors, or to include other 
representative users of financial information in a principles body, 
suffer two infirmities: not only would these persons lack the 
accounting expertise to make practical rules, but they would not even 
be very good representatives of the public interest. The interests of 
financial statement users are, if anything, just as parochial as those of 
the entities being reported upon. By including users instead of producers 
of financial information on the body, we might alter the bias of the body, 
but not necessarily in consonance with the public interest. For example 
the interest of corporate officials may be to adopt accounting principles 
which permit smoothing of income and disguising of poor results, in order 
to justify high salaries and assure job security; investment bankers and 
brokers may prefer to adopt accounting principles which encourage many new 
issues of securities; lenders may prefer principles which minimize their 
credit risks; investors may favor principles contributing to boom-time 
psychology so that their investments will appreciate. Any or all of these 
parochial interests may conflict with the real needs of society. Not only 
is there no real need for these interests to be represented on the principles 
body, but there are excellent reasons to exclude them.
The proposals to give equal representation to financial executives are 
especially callous to the public interest. They would not only give 
representation to one exclusive narrow-interest group, but they would 
virtually hand control of the body to that group.
Proposals to abandon the attempt to prescribe uniform accounting principles 
seem impractical. No one could seriously argue that this approach would 
improve the understandability and efficiency of financial information. If
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accountants are unable to untangle the complex accounting issues, what 
hope is there that a typical user could supply a better interpretation, 
upon merely being given the ”facts”through voluminous disclosure?
A formal, three-branch structure to establish and enforce accounting 
principles must of necessity be a rather cumbersome affair, lacking in 
efficiency and rapid responsiveness. Final resolution of complex issues 
would invariably depend upon the results of the appeals procedure, which 
could not even begin until the detailed rules were promulgated, a time­
consuming stage, which, in turn, could not begin until objectives had been 
clarified. This whole lengthy procedure could break down entirely if the 
three groups became deadlocked. It seems highly unlikely that such a 
system would prove practical.
The notions of an accounting court and an accounting appeals board (or court) 
are borrowed from the law. In legal cases, the losing party is subject to 
harsh penalties (such as imprisonment, fine, or monetary judgment), so the 
law provides for appeal to maximize the probability of a fair result. 
However, in governing information flow, there is no similar threat of 
penalty. A company which is ruled against must merely adopt the same 
accounting methods that its competitors are using. Not only are such courts 
not needed, but they could well have the practical effect of vitiating the 
public interest, because they would predictably hear appeals mainly from 
aggrieved corporations or user groups, as it is unlikely that the public 
could focus its interest sufficiently to take up appeals proceedings. The 
result would be to abet precisely those pressures that should be minimized. 
And finally, appeals procedures would nearly certainly be time-consuming, 
formal affairs which would leave the financial results of appellants under
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a cloud until cases could be resolved. At what price, then, would stock 
trade while a company's financial results were in question? The result, 
most certainly, would be decreased confidence in accounting principles 
and financial reports.
The proposal to elect members of the body does not seem to offer much promise. 
If the voters were public accountants, there would be no significant change 
from the current composition of the board. If the voters included various 
narrow-interest groups, such as corporate officers and user groups, the 
interests of society would not be enhanced, and would probably be harmed.
Public election is, of course, impractical. In any case, election of 
members would suffuse the whole process with undesirable political overtones.
We can enthusiastically support the proposals to broaden the composition 
of the body, provided, however, that members selected for that purpose 
represent solely the public Interest.
Our Proposal
In recognition of the logical requirements discussed above, we propose the 
establishment of a single body with the following characteristics to 
establish accounting principles.
Membership
The body should have twenty-one members, distributed as follows:
International and national public 
accounting firms 10
Regional and local public accounting firms 2
Distinguished professors of accounting 2
Technical experts (subtotal) 14





To assure a broad range of interests in the body, a heterogeneous 
selection process should be publicized and used. The public accounting 
members should be nominated by their firms; the nominees should be 
expert technical accountants with the authority to implement the 
decisions of the body within their own firms. The distinguished 
professors of accounting should be nominated by a prestigious 
academic society, such as the American Accounting Association. The 
public interest members should be nominated by designated persons or 
organizations totally independent of government and the accounting 
and financial world;for example, a lawyer, if included, could be 
nominated by the American Bar Association; these persons should 
be selected for their intellectual breadth and ability to recognize 
and serve the public interest. All of these nominations should be 
subject to confirmation by the AICPA.
Although no particular area of specialization would guarantee that a 
member would best serve the public interest, expertise of the following 
types could be of great value to the body in its deliberations: 
behavioral science (the only measure of the 
effectiveness of accounting is the way it 
changes behavior)
law (accounting reports affect formal relationships 
among organizations)
economics (accounting is the feedback loop in the 
overall economic system)
history (broad social goals must be considered in 
a historical context)




Sociology (the whole economic system is a social structure) 
political science (all human activity occurs in a 
political matrix).
Other specialties would undoubtedly be relevant also.
The omission of government, business, and financial members does not 
mean that the interests of these groups would be ignored in the 
deliberative process. Indeed, their opinions should be vigorously 
solicited in the research stages; there should be adequate opportunity 
for all interested parties to present their views. However, it is not 
necessary to go one step further and give special interest groups 
voting power as well.
Many persons who would be otherwise highly qualified to serve on 
the accounting principles body might be disqualified by reason of 
their membership in some special interest groups. If these persons 
had expertise in one of the disciplines relevant to the public 
interest members of the body (as outlined above), and a broad outlook 
on the nature and function of accounting, there could be no objection 
to their membership in the body, provided they severed their connections 
with their special interest groups and became independent representatives 
of the public interest. Such members should then be compensated through 
the AICPA or other appropriate organizations.
Voting
Decisions of the body should be by two-thirds majority. This would 
be a large enough majority to assure general acceptance by accounting 
practitioners, but not large enough to give effective veto power to 
the public interest bloc (which would represent just one-third of the
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voting strength). To give veto power to this group might conceivably 
make progress impossible and put the body completely out of business. 
The public interest bloc would not need voting control to exercise its 
function. If its positions were truly in the public interest, it would 
be most probable that it could win support among the practitioners. 
However, even in the event the practitioners refused to recognize 
valid objections of the public interest bloc, there would still be the 
right of dissent. A stream of rulings issued by the body, all carrying 
the unanimous condemnation of the public interest members, would cause 
a prompt crisis of confidence in the body and lead to some type of 
reform.
With an organization and voting structure of this nature, the public 
interest members could gradually lead the board to a more enlightened 
philosophical approach without having the ability to obstruct 
production completely or force change at an undigestable rate. And 
this structure would ultimately leave technical decisions in the hands 
of qualified technicians.
Term of Membership
Members should be appointed to the body for staggered, nonrenewable 
terms of five or six years. This would permit gradual evolution 
without unduly disrupting continuity.
Full-time Chairman (and Planning Committee)
The chairman, and perhaps a three-man planning committee, of the 
body could well serve full time, to permit efficient organization, 
timely follow-up on pending matters, continuous liaison with re­





The AICPA should fund adequate research programs to provide the 
board with high quality decision-making information. These research 
programs should be both empirical and theoretical. In funding re­
search, adequate recognition should be given to such relevant dis­
ciplines as behavioral accounting, operations research, decision 
theory, cybernetics, etc., with regard to both the technical and 
broad social goals of the body. All of the theoretical and per­
haps many of the empirical studies should be conducted by academic 
personnel. In addition to securing high quality research, this 
practice would have the salutory effect of bridging the lamentably 
wide chasm which now exists between practicing and academic 
accountants. This move, by itself, should cause a dramatic improve­
ment in the quality of accounting research, because more superior researchers 
would obviously be attracted into a discipline in which they could 
aspire to have some measure of influence over the actual course of 
events.
One important advantage of this proposal is that the present structure 
of the Accounting Principles Board provides an existing, functioning 
base on which to implement these reforms, without disrupting current 
progress, and without the need to establish credibility in a completely 
new institution.
★ ★ ★
The implementation of this proposal would, I believe, be an enormous
step toward broadening the consciousness of accountants and creating a
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socially relevant and responsive role for accounting during the remainder 
of the twentieth century. I implore the members of the Wheat Committee to 
reject all proposals which take a narrow and static view of the role of 
accounting in society.
STATEMENT BEFORE THE STUDY GROUP 
ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
on November 4, 1971
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To Francis M. Wheat, Chairman 
The Study Group on Establishment 
of Accounting Principles
I appreciate this opportunity to present my views on the subject 
under study by your Group. No attempt will be made to offer solutions 
to the problems that exist. However, this presentation should afford a 
better understanding of the present problems and thus aid your Study 
Group in arriving at sound and lasting solutions.
Attached as Appendix A is a paper entitled "A Critical Analysis 
of the Present Institutional Framework for Formulating Financial 
Reporting Standards, " that was presented by me to the Northwestern 
University Center for Advanced Study in Accounting and Information 
Systems Conference. It includes, among other related matters, a candid 
review of the Accounting Principles Board’s role, its history, its 
strengths, its weaknesses and its relations with other groups. This 
information is relevant as there is much to be learned from the present 
system, its struggle to cope with changing conditions (pages 14 to 19) as 
well as its problems (and failures in some areas) in so doing (pages 19 
to 27).
For example:
Loss of Confidence in Financial Reporting
I believe the primary cause of loss of general public confidence 
in today’s system of financial reporting stems from the actions of a very 
few managements (page 2) and the independent auditors’ inability or 
unwillingness to cope with these situations (pages 3 and 4).
Independence of the Board (pages 26 and 27)
I firmly believe that independence of the Board is a false issue 
and has had little to do with either the loss of general public confidence 
in financial reporting or the Board’s inability to operate more satisfactorily.
The Board’s Voting Rule (pages 22 and 2 3)
The necessity for a two-thirds majority vote to issue an opinion 
or a statement has taken its toll on both the quality of opinions and the
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efficiency of the Board's operations. On a number of occasions, periods 
of constructive analysis, consideration of the input of others and 
meaningful debate on the issues, was followed by voting which left the 
Board short of a two-thirds majority. There was then no other course 
but to redebate the issues and seek compromise solutions. It is my 
estimate that the rehashing and compromising on Opinions 16 and 17 
added at least six months to the time schedule and caused a 180° shift in 
the purchase/pooling conclusion.
If lack of confidence in the present Board - due either to its 
organizational structure or its performance - is such that it cannot be 
trusted with a simple majority vote, then I would favor whatever changes 
are necessary to create an organization that could be so trusted.
Small Full Time Paid Board (pages 21 and 22)
I am concerned that the proponents of this solution may not have 
given it as much study in depth as it must have. This, of course, is now 
the responsibility of your Study Group. My chief areas of concern follow:
1. It is assumed that better, sounder opinions will flow 
from a small Board. Is this a safe assumption? 
If so, why?
2. No matter how sound future opinions may be, nor how 
efficiently a new organization performs, nor how 
it is constituted, nor whether it is inter-disciplinary 
or AICPA sponsored, its actions will affect many 
and it will be subjected to criticism and pressures. 
Under these circumstances, will acceptance of a 
small Board in the private sector last longer or 
evaporate faster than acceptance of a broader based 
Board?
3. If a degree of disenchantment in the small Board develops 
at some later date, will the source of its operating 
funds continue or dry up? Today, the major portion 
of operating costs represents donated time and out of 
pocket expenses, borne by Board members or their 
firms. In my opinion, a larger firm would be 
extremely reluctant to withdraw from the present 
Board. To do so would put it at a competitive 
disadvantage in serving its clients.
4. Much has been made of the "off again-on again" operation 
of the present part-time Board and the greatly added 
efficiency that a full time Board would have in being 
able to continuously consider a matter. Neither type
2.
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Board can give continuous thought to any one subject. 
Both must pause for gestation periods, while others’ 
views are being sought, while the results of public 
hearings are being tabulated, while decisions are being 
drafted, while an opinion is out for exposure, etc. 
On balance, though, I believe a small Board would 
spend less time in deliberation than would a large one.
5. The manner of selecting members for a small Board must
be given careful consideration to avoid any suspicion 
of "packing the court. " My seven and one-half years 
on the Board convinced me that the experiences and 
natures of individual members (and firms to some extent) 
had molded them so that their voting patterns were 
predictable to some extent. Some were basically 
"conservative" (less susceptible to change) while others 
were "liberal" or "progressive" (far more willing to 
consider new approaches).
Research
The problem of realizing more support from the research effort
(page 20) must be solved and will represent the same challenge regardless 
of the structure of the Board itself.
One final observation - the Board is currently moving at the
fastest pace in its history (page 28). Four opinions have been issued in 
8 months, at least 13 projects are on its current agenda and 10 research 
projects are scheduled for publication in the next 3 years. Any changes 
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR FORMULATING 
FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS
My selection for participation in this conference and the 
request that I cover "a critical analysis of the present institutional 
framework for formulating financial reporting standards" undoubtedly 
stems from 7-1/2 years experience (to December 31, 1970) on the 
Accounting Principles Board, the last 2-2/3rds years as its chairman. 
Accordingly, I shall concentrate on the role of the APB, its strengths, 
its weaknesses and its relations with other groups. This is not to 
suggest, however, that other groups are any less interested in 
financial reporting standards.
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES FOR ACCOUNTING
Paul Grady1 observed that in our country both governmental 
and economic institutions reflect systems of checks and balances against 
abuses of power and other human weaknesses. Similarly, the 
responsibilities and authorities for accounting and financial reporting 
of business enterprises constitute a mosaic in which:
o The primary responsibility and authority rests with 
the board of directors and management, and
o is supplemented by secondary responsibilities and 
authorities of independent certified public accountants, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, regulatory 
commissions and stock exchanges.
1
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The Board of Directors and Management
Management’s primary obligation for the fairness of its financial 
statements is well established. However, it has not been fully understood 
in all cases. Recent litigation, with claims of astronomical damages 
for the issuance of allegedly false and misleading financial statements, 
has done much to promote an increased awareness of the duties and 
obligations of management and corporate directors for financial reporting 
of the entities in their trust.
Most managements, in attempting to present their companies’ 
financial results in the most meaningful manner possible, have contributed 
very appreciably to the continued improvement of reporting standards 
over many years. Some managements, in attempting to take advantage 
of favorable alternatives, have used many of accounting's fine points to 
improve earnings per share. Occasionally, a few managements have 
taken an attitude of "going for everything" and have depended on their 
auditors to draw the line between the acceptable and the unacceptable. 
This can be dangerous as that line sometimes is difficult to determine. 
Also some managements may have been too persuasive for their own 
good. This attitude has done little towards improving financial reporting 
nor enhancing management's image.
A number of organizations, representing various segments of 
those who prepare financial statements, have been very active in 
programs to improve financial reporting. Their programs have included 
research studies, pronouncements, written articles, etc. as well as 
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cooperation in the development of APB Opinions. The latter will be 
touched upon later when these organizations' relationships with the 
APB are covered.
The Independent Certified Public Accountant - Attest Function
Though secondary in nature, the independent auditor's 
responsibility for those financial statements he has examined and on 
which he has expressed an opinion equal management's. At times the 
financial consequences of misstatement for the auditor has actually 
exceeded the consequences to management. Auditing firms are acutely 
aware of this and the even greater potential consequence of loss of 
reputation.
There is no way of measuring the cumulative beneficial effect 
that the attest function has had upon financial reporting, but it must be 
tremendous. A constant dialogue exists between management and the 
auditor on specific financial reporting problems. In most instances 
that dialogue results in improved financial reporting.
Sometimes, however, decisions or actions of commission or 
omission are taken, the later disclosure of which shakes confidence in 
the system of financial reporting. These tend to surface quite quickly 
and make lurid news. Certainly it is fortuitous for those who make 
their living in reporting the news and for those who feel they need the 
publicity. The danger, of course, is that it has and will continue to 
cause an over reaction by many who in turn have the potential to effect 
the evolutionary process of improved reporting standards, i. e. the
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public, members of the judiciary system, the regulatory bodies, members 
of federal and state legislatures, etc. By "over reaction” I mean 
precipitous action based on a belief that conditions are so bad that 
drastic cures only will solve the existing problems of financial reporting. 
I am sure that one drastic cure -- the idea of transferring the attest 
function from the private to the public domain -- has occurred to a 
number of our civil service minded public officials.
CPA firms must improve their performances. Most are 
already spending large sums on recruiting, training, developing and 
supervising professional staff. These programs apparently need to be 
more effective. Each firm should consider having key decisions and 
work papers reviewed by or under the control of an independent partner 
prior to issuance of reports. Accounting gimmicks (innovative accounting 
approaches, apparently within the confines of generally accepted 
accounting principles but of questionable soundness) should be reported 
to the AICPA as part of an early warning system rather than be used 
to enhance client relations first. The expression of an opinion on an 
accounting treatment currently under consideration by the client of 
another auditing firm can and should be put under much more effective 
constraints than now exist. In those rare instances where management's 
real reason for changing independent auditors is that they have found 
the old firm too tough or exacting, more difficulty should be experienced 
in finding a replacement. It has been my experience that the eager new 
firm rarely contacts the outgoing firm before agreeing to take a client.
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Securities and Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission has played a vital 
role in the financial reporting picture. The four principal statutes 
administered by the Commission are the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935 and the Investment Company Act of 1940. The SEC exercises 
its authority over financial statements filed with it by the issuance of 
regulations, Commission rulings and Accounting Series Releases.
The Commission consistently has taken the following positions: 
o Management has the primary responsibility for their 
financial statements.
o The independent auditor's opinion is necessary as 
a check on management's accounting.
o The Commission's review of financial statements 
accompanying filings with it, may require changes 
but is not intended to add authenticity to the financial 
statements.
o It would not be in the public interest for the Commission 
to undertake extensive accounting rule making and the 
accounting profession should take the lead in the 
development of improved accounting principles and 
reporting standards.
The Commission has had a very considerable influence in the 
improvement of reporting standards since its creation. One factor in 
this gain is the many informal decisions of the Chief Accountant's office
- 5 -
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concerning their review of financial reports filed with the Commission.
There are those who decry the fact that most of these decisions have 
never been reduced to writing and codified. Possibly the Chief 
Accountant feels that this would have inhibited his office to some extent. 
At present, these decisions are communicated throughout the accounting 
profession somewhat on a "grapevine" basis.
Regulatory Authorities
A number of industries are so vested with the public interest 
that they have been subjected to regulation by Federal or state commissions. 
Where monopolistic or near monopolistic conditions exist (electricity, 
gas, communications, transportation, etc. ) the authorities have the 
power to approve rates to be charged for services. Where the public's 
concern rests mainly in financial stability (banking, insurance, etc. ) the 
authorities have the power to prescribe capital, reserve and liquidity 
safeguards.
Both types of authorities have been granted the power to prescribe 
accounting procedures and the exercise of this power has had considerable 
effect on accounting in these industries. However, the authorities have 
been prone to use accounting to accomplish their regulatory ends and 
the development of generally accepted accounting principles for broader 
stockholder reporting has been hampered rather than aided in a number 
of instances.
In the last several years many of the regulatory authorities 
have become more aware of and involved in the efforts of the Accounting 
Principles Board. This is welcomed, as a better understanding of the 
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differences between special regulatory accounting and stockholder 
accounting must, in the long run, bring improvement to both.
Stock Exchanges
The New York Stock Exchange participated with the accounting 
profession in the early 1930’s in establishing the foundation for generally
2 
accepted accounting principles. At about that time the Securities and 
Exchange Commission was created and they rather than the Exchange 
became the arbiters on the question of what constituted reasonable 
 disclosure.3
However, the Exchanges have continued to exert an influence 
in the development of improved financial reporting by their:
o Listing requirements,
o Continuous review of annual and interim reports of 
listed companies,
o Recommendations to listed companies that they follow 
promulgations of the accounting profession.
Other Influences
There are, of course, many other sources of influence in the 
process of improving standards of financial reporting, i. e. the 
pronouncements of other professional societies and industry or trade 
organizations, written views of individuals and the impact of income 
tax statutes, to name a new.
The new Cost Accounting Standards Board, created under an 
amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, will exert an influence 
on reporting standards, particularly in the defense industries. However,
7
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it is too early to predict with any certainty the role that it will play in 
the establishment of generally accepted accounting principles.
THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION’S EFFORT 
Broad Effort
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has 
been very active in its efforts to improve financial reporting for more 
than four decades. For example:
o A Committee on Accounting Procedure issued fifty-one 
Accounting Research Bulletins and four Accounting 
Terminology Bulletins until its demise in 1959.
o Its successor, The Accounting Principles Board, has 
issued twenty-one Opinions and four Statements since 
then.
o An Auditing Procedure Committee has issued forty-six 
Statements on Auditing Procedures to date.
o These are only two of about one hundred and ten 
committees of the AICPA all of which are dedicated to 
increasing the proficiency of the accounting profession. 
The bulk of this effort concerns, directly or indirectly, 
the improvement of financial reporting and the auditor's 
role in attesting to the fairness of financial statements. 
For example it includes extensive staff training and 
professional development programs, a code of
- 8 -
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professional ethics to govern actions of its members, 
practice review procedures to encourage compliance 
with accounting and auditing standards, a consultation 
service to assist members with difficult technical 
questions on a timely basis, etc.
o The AICPA has a permanent staff of approximately
330, that includes a sizeable number who possess 
excellent technical backgrounds and its current total 
budget exceeds $11,000, 000.
THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
Origin and Authority
There was a belief by a number of leaders in the profession in
the late 1950's that:
o There had to be a greater commitment by the Institute 
toward the improvement of financial reporting, and
o The promulgation of improved accounting principles 
had to be changed from a "piecemeal" effort of solving 
immediate problems to an effort, based on research, 
that would develop an integrated, consistent and 
comprehensive set of basic principles in support of 
improved procedures.
Council of the AICPA approved the APB's Charter in early 1959, 
stating the Board's authority as follows:
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"The Board shall have the authority and the duty to 
issue, in its own name, pronouncements on accounting 
principles. It may, in its discretion, revise or 
revoke, in whole or in part, or issue interpretive 
statements as to any pronouncements previously issued. ” 
Nature and General Purpose
Also covered in the Board’s Charter was the following concerning 
the nature of the Board’s pronouncements:
"Such pronouncements are expected to comprehend basic 
postulates, broad principles, and rules or other guides 
for the application of accounting principles in specific 
situations, such rules or other guides being developed 
in relation to basic postulates and broad principles 
previously expressed. They are to be based on what 
the Board determines to be adequate research and are 
expected to be regarded as authoritative written 
expressions of generally accepted accounting principles. " 
Further, one of the basic purposes of the APB was incorporated 
in the Charter and reads:
"The general purpose of the Institute in the field of 
financial accounting should be to advance the written 
expression of what constitutes generally accepted 
accounting principles, for the guidance of its members 
and of others. This means something more than a 
survey of existing practice. It means continuing
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effort to determine appropriate practice and to 
narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency 
in practice. In accomplishing this, reliance should 
be placed on persuasion rather than on compulsion. 
The Institute, however, can, and it should, take 
definite steps to lead thinking on unsettled and 
controversial issues. ” 
Early History
The Board held its first meeting in September 1959, amid great 
expectations and with the enthusiastic backing of most of the profession. 
How could it help but succeed? Top partners of the largest firms were 
on the Board. Both industry and the academic world were represented. 
Funds were available for research and staff support. The two-thirds 
majority vote requirement would force careful consideration until the best 
solutions were reached and would assure more solid support in practice 
for its opinions.
And then---------nothing seemed to happen. However, this was 
not unusual. As in any drastic overhaul of procedures, interruption of 
visible progress was inevitable. The Board had to establish operating 
procedures and had to initiate specific research studies.
A Challenge
Then, two years later, came a change in the Federal income 
tax law, a reduction in tax based on facilities acquired. The purpose 
of the tax act was to encourage expansion of industrial capacity. It 
required a quick answer by the Board and the Board found itself split 
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between: (a) immediate reflection of the tax savings in income and 
(b) reflection of the benefits over the life of the assets on which the 
tax reduction was based.
After bitter debate, the Board approved the latter by a bare 
two-thirds majority. The largest CPA firms were split and three of 
the dissenting firms decided to defy the majority and go their own way. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, noting the difference of 
opinion in practice and under heavy pressure from industry and the 
Administrative Branch of the Federal Government, decided to accept 
both methods. Two procedures, alternatives, were born for absolutely 
identical situations; obviously only one should have survived.
This event had far greater impact than the birth of a relatively 
minor alternative.
o The profession was forced to examine the proposition 
that the Board's opinions should gain force through 
persuasion and gradual acceptance, as provided in 
the Charter. The alternative was to provide for some 
sort of compulsion and this was abhorrent to most.
o The investment credit battle demonstrated to the news 
media that accounting principles could be newsworthy. 
They haven’t forgotten it since.
o Also, industry began to realize that the APB would be 
influencing their financial statements in the future.
Up to this point they had taken little note of the Board's 
existence; the Investment Credit Opinion was only the 
second Opinion issued.
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The challenge to the authority of APB Opinions, brought on 
by the investment credit, simmered for two years and came to a head 
in 1964.
Disclosure of Departures from Opinions
A three-day debate by the AICPA's Council led to adoption 
4
in October 1964 of a Special Bulletin dealing with departures from
Opinions of the APB. This stated, in part, as follows:
"If an accounting principle that differs materially in its 
effect from one accepted in an Opinion of the Accounting 
Principles Board is applied in financial statements, the 
reporting member must decide whether the principle has 
substantial authoritative support and is applicable in the 
circumstances.
a. If he concludes that it does not, he would either qualify 
his opinion, disclaim an opinion, or give an adverse 
opinion as appropriate. Requirements for handling 
these situations in the reports of members are set 
forth and in the Code of Professional Ethics and need 
no further implementation.
b. If he concludes that it does have substantial authoritative 
support:
1) he would give an unqualified opinion and
2) disclose the fact of departure from the Opinion 
in a separate paragraph in his report or see that 




The Special Bulletin also concluded that for the immediate 
future the failure to disclose a material departure from an APB Opinion 
would be deemed to be substandard reporting rather than a violation of 
the Institute’s Code of Ethics.
This Bulletin, and the controversy that led to it, has had a 
salutory effect. All firms seem to have committed themselves to follow 
Board Opinions and I know of no instance where disclosure of departures 
have had to be made.
Present Organization
The Board today has 18 members each of whom is a member
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, two are 
academicians, one is a financial analyst, one is from industry and the 
balance are in public accounting practice. Written approval by at least 
two-thirds of the members is required before a pronouncement may be 
published. The Board operates under:
o A charter, which was revised by vote of the AICPA’s Council 
in 1969 and
o Written operating policies, which can be changed by majority 
vote of the APB, subject to approval by the AICPA's Board 
of Directors.
Adapting to Change
The Board has had to make a number of changes in its operating 
methods to cope with changed conditions and an ever-increasing work 




At first, Opinions were developed by the full Board.
Now they are developed by small, 3 to 5 man committees 
of the Board. This permits a heavier concentration by a 
few and the concurrent development of several Opinions. 
However, it has resulted in a much heavier work load 
for Board members as each generally is on 4 to 6 
committees.
Recently non-Board members have been placed on 
committees so that members’ time can be spread further.
2. Advisors
A majority of members have involved partners as advisors. 
Advisors: (a) attend both full Board meetings and committe 
meetings with or for members, (b) help with the mountain 
of homework that must be done between meetings, and 
(c) as noted above are members in their own right on some 
committees.
Many Board members have involved additional partners 
and professional staff from their firms on numerous Board 
projects, particularly when they are committee chairmen.
3. Opinion Development Procedures
The use of carefully developed point outlines and questionnaires 
was initiated about five years ago. They help identify the 
more important facets of each project and facilitate meaningful 
discussions by committees, the full Board, and others outside 
the Board, who provide input to the Board's deliberations.
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4. Stepped-Up Pace
There has been an ever-increasing tempo in the Board's 
activities. In the initial years the Board met 2 to 3 times 
per year for 1 or 2 days each. This increased soon to 5 
or 6 times per year for 2 or 2-1/2 days each. For the 
past several years the Board held 8 meetings per year, 
a number of which lasted 4 full days. Nine meetings are 
scheduled for 1971. Many days have started at 8:00 a. m. 
and finished at 7:00 p. m. and one went to 10:30 p. m.
5. Increased Staff Support
Initial staff support, 12 years ago, consisted of 2 men in 
research. Today this has been increased to:
o 6 Professional and 4 clerical staff in research.
o 5 Professional and 3 clerical staff in
administrative support.
Included in this support is one staff member who is 
engaged in writing unofficial interpretations of Opinions.
6. Involvement of Other Groups and Organizations
As the result of a program started several years ago, the 
Board has been able to involve other organizations to a 
much greater degree in its deliberations. For example:
a. The Financial Executive Institute (FEI), 
representing the top financial executives in 
industry, has a Committee on Corporate 
Financial Reporting that is somewhat 
comparable to the APB. They have appointed 
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subcommittees that parallel APB committees 
on each project in which they are interested 
and liaison between committees is established 
early in the development of an Opinion. This 
cooperative effort has worked well on some 
projects and not as well on others.
b. The Financial Analyst Federation (representing 
stockholder users of financial statements) and 
the Robert Morris Associates (representing the 
credit grantor users of financial statements) 
have structured themselves somewhat similarly 
to the FEI.
c. Other groups such as National Association of 
Accountants (NAA - the accountants in industry), 
the American Accounting Association (the 
educators), the Investment Bankers Association 
(the underwriters), the stock exchanges, the 
American Bar Association, the American Bankers 
Association, the American Petroleum Institute 
and many other trade or industry associations, 
have expressed a keen interest in the work of the 





d. The SEC has always been directly interested
in the Board’s deliberations and there has been 
continuing close cooperation with them at 
many levels.
e. These interested organizations are receiving 
APB committee point outlines and questionnaires, 
used in developing the foundations for Opinions, 
and their answers and viewpoints are being 
considered along with those of Board members.
f. Conferences or symposiums of representatives 
of these organizations have been held during the 
development of Opinions. While the interplay of 
divergent ideas and viewpoints has been helpful to 
each group in understanding the problems of the 
others, it was felt that these meetings were not 
broad based enough. The Board has now turned 
to public hearings in which any interested individual 
or group may participate.
g. The Planning Committee of the APB has met 
periodically with its counterpart of the FEI, the 
NAA and the Financial Analyst Federation to discuss 
the effectiveness of lines of communications and 
other problems of mutual interest.
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h. Several of the groups including the FEI and NAA 
have initiated research on areas under Board 
consideration.
i. Each organization has expressed a desire to be 
heard at an early stage in the deliberations and 
APB Committees are trying to accommodate them. 
Most of these organizations are constructively 
critical but helpful during the period that Opinions 
are being developed. Some, however, turn to 
lobbying once an Opinion is exposed and go to 
considerable lengths to put pressure on the Board.
7. Changed Nature of the Board
The Board, as conceived, was a private, rather judicial arm 
of the AICPA. It has grown into a quasi public (though still 
just as closely identified with the AICPA) legislative-like 
body. This has its effect on the pronouncements, though 
it is believed that the net result will be an improvement 
in quality.
Current Problems
If the above sounds like I was pleased with the organization and 
the results, while I was the Board’s chairman, I was not. Our output of 
Opinions, was painfully slow, although the pace has quickened in the last 
12 months after Opinions 16 and 17 were issued. I will review the 




The Board has never been able to realize as much support 
from the research studies as was initially expected. Ready 
answers to knotty problems just do not roll forth. Possibly 
the initial expectations were unrealistic.
The research studies that have been started, whether they 
were assigned in-house, to CPA firms or to academicians, 
all have taken much longer than originally planned. This 
has forced changes in long range scheduling and has meant, 
in some instances, the development of Opinions before the 
benefit of complete research was at hand.
I am not being as critical of the AICPA’s Research Division 
as it may sound. They, particularly the director, have been 
of invaluable help in developing, writing and rewriting a 
number of Opinions and Board Statements. Filling the 
Board's needs in this area has delayed, of course, progress 
in their regular work.
The APB has recommended to the AICPA's Board of Directors 
that consideration be given to a greater commitment of funds 
and manpower, including:
o Increasing the full-time paid staff.
o Borrowing experienced men from accounting 
firms and industry for one or two year terms.
o Greater use of researchers in the academic field 
for the more theoretical studies.
o Financial support from outside the profession.
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2. Board Manpower
I don't believe that much more time can be wrung from the 
APB's members. They probably are close to the breaking 
point now. Several suggestions have been made.
a. Increase in membership. An increase in membership 
would increase the total capacity of Board committees, 
which represents its capacity to develop Opinions.
Personally, I would like to see the use of an associate, 
non-voting membership which would be available to 
qualified CPAs who could afford to contribute as 
much time as full members. This would afford 
increased capacity in the APB and would broaden 
the number of firms directly involved. It would 
permit the involvement of all large firms without 
the necessity of granting permanent voting privileges.
b. Drafting talent. Much of the drafting is done by Board 
members. Some make good authors but others do not. 
Writing styles are different. AICPA staff drafting 
talent needs to be increased and more is being 
sought; however, this skill is not easily found.
c. Full time, paid Board. Several critics have suggested 
that a change be made to a 5 to 7 man full time, paid 
Board. I personally do not favor this for a number 
of reasons, the most important of which is the 
possibility of lack of involvement and continued 
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commitment by firms handling publicly held clients.
In that event a serious question would exist about 
the general acceptability of its pronouncements. A 
full time, paid Board would not increase the overall 
manpower, as the present Board logs well in excess 
of 5 to 7 man years per year; but it would materially 
increase costs. Further, the manner of selection 
of members would be of concern to prevent "packing 
the court", particularly if a simple majority vote 
were permitted.
d. Full time paid Board Chairman. A full time, paid 
Board Chairman was discussed by the full Board 
and has been recommended to the AICPA's Board 
of Directors, if the right man can be found. This 
might represent a first experimental step towards 
a full time, paid Board. It also might enable the 
Board to operate without loss of momentum during 
a period of organizational transition.
3. Board's Voting Rule
As Chairman, I found the two-thirds majority voting requirement 
to be most vexing. Our present age of challenge and dissent 
seemed to rub off on the members just enough to result in many 
11 to 7 votes. It did not matter that the dissenters were on 
completely opposite sides; some of them wanting to go further 
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than the proposed positions, while the balance of the 
dissenters wanted less.
The two-thirds rule, I am sure, was designed as a safety 
factor to force continued consideration of each matter until 
a substantial majority were sure that the best solution had 
been found. This has been the result in some cases. In 
other cases, it has forced compromises that leave very 
few completely satisfied and which represented poorer 
answers, at least from the standpoint of the majority. 
This was the case in the long, drawn out battle on the 
Business Combinations Opinion, where the voting rule 
linked with the absolute need for improvement - forced 
the final compromise position. Contrary to popular 
belief, it was not outside pressures that carried the day 
for the pro-poolers.
While the effect of the voting rule on the quality of the 
Opinions is of greater importance, a by-product of the 
rule is to increase very substantially the time it takes 
to issue Opinions.
4. Quality of Opinions
The APB has been criticized for writing cookbook Opinions 
by some, and for not including enough guidelines by others. 
While these two criticisms sound contradictory, probably 
both are legitimate to a degree.
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I believe the Opinions will continue to appear complicated, 
although some simplification will be possible. Procedures 
for covering many Opinion details in unofficial interpretations 
have been worked out in the Board's Administrative 
Director's office. The first attempt in this area was a 
pamphlet of 100 interpretations of the Earnings Per Share 
Opinion. Accumulation and publication caused delay, so 
the unofficial interpretations of the Business Combinations 
and Intangible Assets Opinions are being issued on a 
piecemeal basis. When reasonably perfected, the unofficial 
interpretations are included in the printed, codified loose- 
leaf service along with the Opinions and Statements.
Many believe that the lengthy written dissents by individual 
members of the Board detract from the Opinions and are a 
disservice to the profession. A majority of the APB 
members do not favor eliminating the dissents. However, 
I hope that this matter will continue to be studied and that 
dissents can be eliminated eventually. Possibly they can 
be carefully drafted and made part of the unpublished, but 
public records of the Board.
5. Need for Quick Decisions
The Board was conceived and created to develop Opinions 
deliberately, generally after research, with public exposure 
and under definite rules for balloting. There just is nothing 
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hasty about this process. However, because the profession 
has taken the lead in developing improved standards of 
financial reporting, the APB is finding it increasingly 
necessary to consider emergency action. Both the SEC 
and stock exchanges check the APB’s attitude towards a 
practice they believe objectionable, particularly when 
they know the practice is under current study by the Board. 
These emergencies usually are fielded initially by the 
Institute's Executive Vice President. It would be easy to 
tell the SEC or the stock exchanges that the Board should 
not be solving their current review problems. However, 
their requests are legitimate attempts to cooperate with 
the profession in its effort to establish improved 
standards.
Several procedures have been used to cope with the need 
for relatively quick decisions:
o The unofficial accounting interpretations referred 
to earlier.
o On a number of occasions, the matter for decision 
was already under consideration by an AICPA 
industry or audit guide committee. If that 
committee had reached a conclusion on the matter 
in question, its position was then reviewed quickly 
but unofficially by all or a majority of APB 
members. The APB chairman then has permitted
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the publication of that committee’s position. This 
procedure does not represent an APB pronouncement 
but does afford sufficient authoritative support for 
the SEC.
o On two occasions, articles in the Journal of 
Accountancy have been reviewed in advance, again 
unofficially, by a majority of APB members and 
an understanding established that the SEC and the 
profession would follow the method or principles 
prescribed in the Journal article.
None of these methods fully solves the problem and the study 
must continue.
6. Early Warning System
Board members are asked periodically for a list of developing 
problems they think the APB should be considering. This 
should act as an early warning system but it has not been too 
effective. In other words, a better system is needed for 
spotting trouble areas well before they are introduced in the 
financial press. This should not be too difficult as firms of 
the APB members audit the great majority of publicly-held 
clients.
7. Appearance of Independence
The 18 month struggle with Business Combinations and its 
final conclusion have subjected the Board to the criticism 
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that it was too responsive to the wishes of management. Some 
elements of management, however, have been equally critical 
that the Board was not sufficiently responsive to their 
expressed viewpoints. From my personal experience, I 
reject flatly both criticisms as being completely groundless.
I appreciate that the "appearance of independence” is another 
matter, although I recommend strongly against making any 
changes solely for appearance sake.
Some Personal Conclusions
There is no question that continued improvement in financial 
reporting is needed and will be accomplished, if not by an arm of the 
private sector, then by some agency or board of the government. There 
is also no question in my mind that the initiative should stay in private 
hands. To accomplish this, there are two basic prerequisites:
o There must be general acceptance of the changes 
that are promulgated, and
o There must be some method of enforcement.
At the present time, the APB strives for general acceptance through:
(a) close cooperation with other organizations whose interest in accounting 
principles is just as great as theirs and (b) its structure which provides 
broad representation to firms who handle the bulk of publicly-held opinion 




The enforcement factor is a tenuous linking of the Accounting 
Profession’s discipline, which binds practicing public accountants to 
its official pronouncements, and the insistence of the SEC and the 
stock exchanges for clean opinion audit reports. At the moment, I 
can see no substitute for this in the private sector and, therefore, 
believe that the Board should stay under the control of the AICPA.
One further observation - the APB is currently moving at 
the fastest pace in its history and has just issued its fourth Opinion 
in 8 months. It has at least 13 additional projects on its current agenda 
in varying degrees of development. Also, there are 10 research 
projects scheduled for publication in the next 3 years. While most 
critics want faster action, there is a limit as to how fast the preparers 
of financial statements can safely absorb intricate changes in accounting 
principles. I hope that recommendations of the Wheat Study Group 
will assure that this momentum be maintained.
THE CURRENT STUDIES
Accounting Principles Study Group
The Wheat Study Group has set public hearings for November 3 
and 4, 1971 in New York City. I urge all with constructive suggestions 
on how accounting principles should be established, regardless of the 
thrust of their suggestions, to pass them on to the Study Group. Also, 
I would urge all to place their confidence in the Group and to accept and 
support their final recommendations, whether they are in accordance 
with or contrary to our personal or firm's views.
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Accounting Objectives Study Group
The Trueblood Study Group has asked for written presentations 
by December 31, 1971 on the objectives or functions of financial 
statements and general or specific recommendations for their 
improvement. While this project may not seem as spectacular as 
the other, I believe it is the more difficult and for the long run may 
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Corporate Accountability Research Group
1832 M STREET, N. W. - SUITE 101 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
(202) 633-3931
The Accounting Profession provides a vital service. 
Accountants interpret, translate, and communicate to the 
public the financial state of a corporation. Investors, 
creditors, government regulators, and the public as a 
whole rely oh certified financial statements. In return 
for this reliance, the profession must be responsive to 
the public interest.
The Corporate Accountability Research Group would like 
to present four challenges to the Accounting Profession. 
In brief: 1. A greater degree of accounting uniformity
must be strived for so that certified 
financial statements will be comparable and 
thereby useful.
2. Accountants must regain their independence, 
even if this requires accounting firms to 
divest themselves of their management 
consultant divisions.
3. Accountants must accept responsibility for 
their work.
4. Accountants must take a leadership role 
in Innovating for the public good.
I
The debate between uniformity and flexibility has been 
raging for decades within the accounting profession. Which­
ever side an accountant might take, he must accept the 
conclusion that without uniformity of accounting procedures, 
financial statements of different companies will not be 
comparable. Without comparability, no investor will be able 
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to make wise investment decisions, no creditor will be able 
to gauge the credit worthiness of a corporation, and government 
regulators will find it impossible to compile meaningful 
aggregate data.
Therefore, if financial statements are to be of use, 
some greater uniformity of accounting procedures is in order. 
If uniformity is not feasible on an across-the-board basis, 
the AICPA must at least require firms within the same Industry 
to adhere to uniform procedures. Industrial classification 
could be based on the Standard Industrial Classifications 
or some refinement thereof. If an individual company objected 
to its assigned classification, it could appeal to the APB.
II  
The courts have held that an accountant’s principal 
loyalty is to the public, not to the company which hires 
him.
An observer of the profession is forced to ask himself 
two questions. First, can an accountant hired by a particular 
company’s management be truly Independent? Second, can any 
individual who suggests a course of action objectively evaluate 
the result of following his own suggestion?
The first question closely relates to the issue of 
uniformity. If an accountant is restricted in his choice 
of accounting procedures, he cannot succumb to management 
pressure to choose a procedure that, although generally 
acceptable, will deceive those who will rely on the certified 
statement.
2
The second question relates to the present state of affairs, 
where all the large accounting firms, and several others, offer 
management consulting advice as well accounting services. 
The consulting advice is not restricted to suggestions relating 
to accounting systems.
A potential conflict of interest situation occurs 
when one is asked to evaluate the results of one's own work. 
Yet this is what happens when the CPA firm which gave a 
company advice is called on to certify statements reflecting 
what happened when its adviced was followed. The present 
lack of available and disclosed information makes it impossible 
to analyze whether potential conflicts of interest have become 
actual conflicts of interest. If the AICPA is to perform its 
public role, it must not refuse to exercise jurisdiction 
over the consulting divisions of accounting firms. In exercising 
this jurisdiction, the AICPA should:
1. Require accounting firms to disclose the 
names of those clients to whom they give 
consulting advice.
2. Flake routine examinations of those companies 
who use the same CPA firm for consulting and 
accounting services, to ascertain whether the 
financial statements of those companies are 
in any way Influenced by the fact that the 
CPA firm evaluating the companies’ performance 
was the same firm that suggested the course of action.
III
The trend in the past few years has been for the accounting 
profession to try to restrict the areas where an accountants 
can be held liable. The AICPA disclaimed liability
- 3 -
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because an accountant’s work was performed in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles, despite the fact 
that the work was misleading to reasonably prudent men.
In the short run, it seems wise from an accountant’s point 
of view to cover himself, always knowing that as long as he 
chooses from among the many generally accepted accounting 
principles, he is free from potential liability.
In the long run, however, from the public’s and the accounting 
profession’s point of view, accepting liability is the better 
approach. If an accountant knows he will be held accountable, 
his own professional standards will be foremost in his mind 
during every assignment. Should an accountant be asked by 
management to present a misleading financial picture, he can 
assert his own potential liability as an impartial reason for 
refusing the request.
IV
Accountants are privy to the financial goings on of the 
large corporations, the very corporations which today have 
such an enormous impact on the communities in which they exist. 
Consequently, the accounting profession is in an unparalleled 
position to take a leadership role to innovate for the public 
good. Specific ways the profession can Innovate include:
1. Developing new interpretive indices to analyze 
the social costs of corporate action. For instance, 
what is the cost in terms of lives in failing 
to implement safety features in cars, and what is 
the cost in terms of health in falling to curb 
pollution?
2. Joining in the fight for greater corporate disclosure- 




3.Serving as an Ombudsman to encourage corporate 
honesty. Accountants can attempt to curb fraudulent 
practices before they have a chance to hurt innocent 
consumers.
The ways the accounting profession can innovate to serve 
the public are innumerable - accept the challenges.
5 -
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, on 
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In its 1 2-year history the Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
has produced four Statements, 21 Opinions, and a thousand 
critics. Criticism of operations of the Board comes from 
many sources. Too often, perhaps, the criticism veers from a 
constructive to a superficial base. Even within our own pro­
fession we hear some strident cries of a few who wax vocal 
whenever their pet theories are rejected — or their viewpoints 
fail to withstand the two-thirds vote of the Board.
I am happy today to set the record straight, as I see 
it, since, in all hearings of this nature, those not seeking 
radical changes rarely come forward.
I think it essential that this study group examine the 
current status and operations of the APB, and the promise 
they hold for the future, rather than to concentrate on the 
past. The APB has had a tumultuous history in its short 12 
years; it has dallied, procrastinated, erred, and even reversed 
itself. But, in all of this, it has achieved maturity through 
experience.
It would be foolhardy, indeed, to dismantle a 
machine that is now coming into its own. Further improve­
ments are, of course, necessary and will be made unless the 
present forward thrust is seriously interrupted.
THE PRESENT
Both the responsibilities of the public accounting profession 
to the American investing public and the need for improving 
financial reporting to fulfill that obligation are well docu­
mented. Although the American investing public is the best 
informed, much still needs to be accomplished in the area of 
standardizing and restructuring the accounting principles 
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upon which our capital markets must depend. In this respect 
I am in agreement with much of what has been said at these 
hearings. I am convinced, however, that the present APB — or 
a simple modification of it — is the best vehicle for the task. 
The reason is simply that the Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board and the monthly Interpretations now pub­
lished under its aegis are generally accepted and followed by 
business, the SEC, and the profession.
This is because the Board includes representatives 
from all the major accounting firms and most other large 
firms, and these practitioners operate with a sense of dedica­
tion and objectivity that cannot be surpassed. By virtue of 
their involvement, their firms in recent years have naturally 
committed themselves to adherence. Despite threats to the 
contrary, recent Opinions have not been judicially chal­
lenged.
Moreover, the SEC has indicated publicly — and 
proven in practice — that it will support the Opinions and 
Interpretations. This has not always been the case, but has 
come about in recent years only because the Board has 
demonstrated its ability to cope with the issues. For many 
years the SEC was critical of the Board’s reluctance to move 
rapidly or even adequately. In those years the Commission 
went so far as to threaten to exercise its legislative right to set 
accounting principles. It must be remembered that the ulti­
mate authority for establishing accounting principles for 
most publicly held companies does rest with the SEC. The 
Commission has in effect delegated this authority to the APB 
(with some strings attached), and I believe that it is satisfied 
that the Board is now moving along rapidly enough to merit 
that delegation.
Also, the financial executives of this country — no 
matter how much they may disagree — consider the Opinions 
and Interpretations as generally accepted and adhere to them.
2
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They know that the SEC is backing the Board, and they now 
have reason to be confident that the Opinions will neither be 
far out nor incapable of reasonable implementation.
Finally, the publishing of Opinions and Interpreta­
tions is no longer inordinately delayed. The Interpretations, 
although they are American Institute publications, frequently 
receive the attention of the full Board. These are issued on a 
timely basis, and give prompt assurance that practices will 
not diverge. The procedure assures quick answers to knotty 
questions. In a business environment that is becoming more 
complex and innovative daily, this promptness is essential.
THE PROBLEM
What, then, is the problem? Some critics, particularly 
financial analysts, refer to the accounting transgressions that 
occur through the use of allegedly liberal (vs. conservative) 
principles. They do, however, concede for the most part that 
the disclosures are such that they can spot these and adjust. 
Some analysts consider it more important to expand and 
improve disclosures than to create rigid conformity. Of 
course, this is not good enough for the typical investor, and 
financial reporting needs our attention even if, in some cases, 
we must become somewhat arbitrary in establishing greater 
uniformity.
In my view, much of the furor about accounting prin­
ciples and the Board’s alleged failures are, in many instances, 
the red herrings of publicity-seeking critics that divert atten­
tion from other and more serious problems, many of which 
are not directly related to accounting principles. Those 
problems fall within the purview of the Institute’s auditing 
procedure committee, which is trying valiantly to catch up. 
For example, many of the “horror” stories of accounting — 
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those involving lawsuits and accusations of fraud against the 
auditors by the SEC — are not as much a matter of account­
ing principles as a matter of auditing and reporting standards. 
These involve independence of auditors, valuations of re­
serves and realizability of assets, material accounting changes 
that are not disclosed because they offset, and interpretation 
and disclosure of relevant facts regarding transactions. Many 
of these are auditing questions, not questions of accounting 
principles.
In some instances, the issue may be one of materi­
ality. The Board is criticized for not speeding up its study 
and issuing an Opinion on this subject. But materiality is 
more a matter for the conscience and integrity of the auditor 
than pure theory, and no amount of study or opining will 
alter that.
I feel that however important criticisms of the ethics 
of the profession and the enforcement mechanisms of the 
Institute are, they simply have no place in a discussion of the 
procedures by which accounting principles should be set. 
These are separate issues, and they merit the attention of 
those within the Institute who have the responsibility for 
dealing with them.
ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC CRITICISMS
Objectives
It is said that the APB has failed to fulfill one of its primary 
charges: to develop a Statement of basic objectives and con­
cepts of financial statements upon which all Opinions could 
rest. (It is generally conceded that the Board is working hard 




In the early years of the Board — soon after the first 
research studies — the debates on this subject quickly indi­
cated that there was widespread confusion about the con­
cepts as they existed vs. what they should be. The urgently 
needed brush-fire Opinions got mired in this debate. The vex­
ing question was: On which premise should these Opinions 
rest? The Business Combinations Opinion was one that 
bogged down on this point. The Board committee that was 
formed in 1965 to formulate a Statement on future concepts 
ultimately decided that it first needed to reach agreement on 
present concepts. And so it did. In 1968 another committee 
was formed to study future concepts. The latter, headed by a 
vocal critic of the Board’s procrastination on this subject, 
awaited the results of the first committee’s work and only 
recently began to work itself. But agreement on present con­
cepts did not come easily. And so far, no one, not even one 
of the vocal critics, has come forth with any reasonable, 
well-integrated approach to future concepts.
It seems eminently clear that we need to narrow the 
alternatives and firmly establish present concepts before we 
move into a futuristic approach to accounting. While it is 
generally recognized that the historical cost basis of account­
ing falls short of presenting economic reality, we cannot 
move into an uncharted area without considerable esoteric, 
empirical, and implementary research. The underpinnings of 
our economic stability cannot be tampered with until the 
new foundation is firmly laid. Our recent attempts to give 
greater recognition to market values in accounting for 
marketable equity security portfolios is ample evidence of 
the profound effects such attempts can have.
In the meantime, the APB should continue its efforts 
to further the evolution of accounting principles. This can be 
done within its structure or through timely special efforts 
such as the Trueblood Study Group. The important element 




The Board is scored for its long discussions and delay in 
issuing Opinions. Arguments are repeated and changed; drafts 
and redrafts made. But anyone who has observed this process 
cannot help but acknowledge that no matter how time- 
-consuming it may be, it ultimately provides the most work­
able answer. I have seen responsible people change their views 
radically through this process. The give-and-take debate 
among the top technicians of the country produces a far 
superior product than that which would result from a quick 
vote based on briefs. (Here, again, one should be realistic 
enough to expect intemperate criticism from some of the 
dissenters.) When a better result is obtainable through reason­
able debate, then I am all for it.
The Board is assailed at times for operating too 
slowly and at other times taken to task for moving on a 
“crash basis.” Again, this “damned if you do and damned if 
you don’t” attitude is something that must be accepted and 
dealt with. As Truman said, “If you can’t stand the heat, get 
out of the kitchen.” When you’re charged with decision­
making, the heat is an occupational hazard. Actually, when 
time permits, ad hoc committees of other Institute members 
are formed to produce a specialized paper or industry guide, 
as has been done in the land development and real estate 
fields. The results can be implemented with deliberation. 
When events create an urgency to move faster, the Interpreta­
tion route is taken and the effect immediate, as in the case of 
computer leasing. This procedure is a recent development in 
the Board’s operations, and many critics have not yet 
digested the full significance of it.
Anticipation
It has been said that many of the Opinions involve matters 




Board, by not dealing with the issues earlier, let too many 
things get away from them.
This is true. But we are living in an imaginative and 
innovative business environment where things change very 
fast. Who, for example, could have anticipated some of the 
“funny preferreds’’ of the Sixties? During that go-go era we 
did not have the mechanism of the “official’’ Interpretations 
of the Institute to which the SEC could refer its questions 
and problems, as it now does.
Appeals Procedure
It has also been charged that there is absolutely no appeal 
from an APB Opinion. In point of fact, in our country there 
is an appeal for everyone from anything. Rulings of regula­
tory agencies, for example, are constantly being challenged in 
the courts. In accounting we" have a built-in appeals 
mechanism in the SEC. The SEC, as indicated previously, has 
the legislative right and responsibility to set accounting prin­
ciples, and it has informally delegated this to the APB. Thus, 
appeals from APB Opinions can be made directly to the SEC. 
This was done officially once, resulting in the issuance of 
Accounting Series Release (ASR) 96, which permitted flow- 
through accounting for the investment credit despite APB 
Opinion No. 2, which forbade it. However one might feel 
about the merits of that issue, he must concede that the 
appeal worked. I know, too, of other cases where the SEC 
has issued rulings which departed from APB Opinions be­
cause of unusual circumstances, and I feel that in most of 
these cases the decisions were justified.
Furthermore, rulings of the SEC can be taken to the 




Much is made of the fact that the Board members are volun­
tary, part-time people who, because of their responsibilities 
to their firms, cannot devote adequate time to the task. What 
is overlooked is that these people, when not attending Board 
meetings, are just as deeply involved in Board matters as 
anyone could be. By virtue of their positions, these execu­
tive practitioners are making decisions hourly on all aspects 
of the issues confronting the Board. This hands-on experience 
adds a practical dimension to the theoretical, and provides 
insight that assures the workability of Opinions. Board 
members who take this broader view of their efforts readily 
concede that they are, in reality, full-time members.
Independence
Are the Board members pawns of their clients? Are the Big 
Eight a united fraternity functioning as an arm of business? A 
quick look at the voting records should quickly dispel any 
such notions.
Let’s examine the independence question more 
closely. When the size test for pooling was being debated, it 
was claimed that the Board “backed down’’ because of client 
pressure. Of course, clients were outspoken, and they had 
every right to be heard. But in this case, the exposure draft 
that called for a size test lacked the necessary two-thirds 
support when it was published. It was inevitable that it could 
not be passed without modifying or eliminating the size test. 
As a result of this experience, the Board’s policy now pre­
cludes exposure of a draft before it has the necessary vote. 






Some say that the top rule-making authority should limit 
itself to formulating broad principles and leave their imple­
mentation to a lesser group. One suggestion would require 
the senior group to approve pronouncements of the lower 
group. This sounds fine — but it won’t work. Under this 
system, broad pronouncements would need to be delayed 
until it became clear that their implementation was sound, 
practical, and feasible. The Board has frequently gone down a 
wide path only to back away when it was realized that 
practice could not follow. Once the Board unanimously 
issued an Opinion embodying a very fine theoretical concept 
requiring allocation of the proceeds of convertible debentures 
between debt and conversion features, only to rescind it 
when the Board found that it was impractical and, in some 
instances, produced bizarre results. Since that time the Board 
has stressed detailed procedures.
THE DEFECTS OF THE PROPOSALS
Perhaps the most alarming of all the new proposals is that 
calling for a small full-time super-Board. This proposal is 
categorically unsound.
First, this super-Board implies a politics of selection. 
The biases of prominent accountants are pronounced and 
well known. Will we have a “Nixon Board’’ or a “Warren 
Board,’’ or will we have a “balanced group’’ so that 4-3 
decisions will set the future of financial reporting? The con­
cept of a small group further implies decisions by an elite. I 
would rather have a larger group of the best volunteers — all 
peers — so I could rely on the safety of numbers to balance 
off the strong biases.
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Second, the small super-Board would slow, rather 
than speed, resolution. The small isolated group, withdrawn 
from the practice arena and restricted by new administrative 
rules, would have more difficulty than the present Board in 
obtaining the necessary input. The result would be a need for 
expanded hearings and virtual dependence upon the sub­
mission of briefs and counterbriefs. Those being “regulated” 
by this process would require more opportunities to be 
heard. A look at the “speed” of our regulatory bodies and 
our courts should be convincing.
Third, it is the participation of all segments of the 
profession in the present body that provides an in-depth 
democratic support.
Fourth, a small courtlike body does not make for 
economies of either time or money. The efforts presently 
expended by accounting firms in the rule-making process 
would need to be increased in order to monitor the Board’s 
activities, prepare formalized briefs, request hearings, see 
what others are doing, respond to client requests for briefing, 
etc.
Finally, I would prefer that those formulating the 
Opinions be deeply involved in day-to-day decision-making. 
The crucible of practice is the only test which tempers the 
most extreme theorist. And, in accounting, principles and 
practice cannot be separated. (The term “generally accepted 
accounting principles” has been deemed to include the 
methods of applying them.) This has been discussed before. I 
have also observed over the years the frequent meta­
morphosis of the charged-up theoretician into the pragmatic 
practitioner through close association with those Board 




I have said earlier that much still needs to be done to improve 
the rule-making function. Here are my recommendations:
Research. A broader research program supporting the 
present Board is needed. The emphasis should be on both 
empirical and experimental research designed to satisfy the 
implementation demands of new Opinions. Researchers re­
cruited for a period of from one to two years from the major 
firms could augment the present research group. Drafting 
assistants are also needed. This follows closely the recom­
mendations made by the APB to the Institute’s board of 
directors in late 1970.
The chairman. A full-time chairman would be able to moni­
tor the research program more closely, be available for meet­
ings with interested groups, and generally guide the Board 
better than a part-time chairman. Not that the chairman 
presently isn’t almost, in fact, full-time; but some of his 
APB-related time is devoted to his firm and its clients, a 
responsibility he cannot completely shake off. This is not 
suggested to indicate that there is the need for him to be 
independent of practice; rather it is a matter of concentra­
tion. It should be possible to obtain at least one prominent 
accountant — at the peak of his career — to accept a full-time 
term of three years, with possible renewal. Apart from having 
occupied the top technical position in his firm for many 
years, he should be a good administrator and leader. This is a 
tough combination to find, but I am sure one can be found 
every three to six years.
The Board
Size and composition. Because the resolution of an account­
ing problem requires complete exposition of all its aspects 




is undesirable to limit the number of those charged with the 
decision-making obligation. Some limitations must of course 
be set, as it would be impossible to accommodate an overly 
broad spectrum of views that could arise on some issues. 
Consequently, I am recommending both a fixed and a flex­
ible Board membership, with wide representation, one that 
will provide for expansion and contraction, as need dictates. 
A frequent criticism from industry is that it is inadequately 
represented. I am sympathetic to this complaint.
Permanent membership. I feel the Board should consist of 
21 members, rather than the present 18, as follows:
• One full-time chairman.
• Thirteen practitioners — selected to include people 
from the major national firms at all times, the lesser 
national firms and the regional firms (on a rotating 
basis), and one small firm.
• Three CPAs occupying responsible accounting posi­
tions in industry.
• Two academicians well known for their qualifications 
and interest in accounting theory.
• One financial analyst.
• One investment banker or practicing attorney active 
in securities registration work (alternately).
Supplementary membership. When the Board undertakes an 
issue that is concentrated in a particular industry or involves 
a specialized area requiring an expertise that may not be 
found among the regular Board members, the membership 
should be temporarily enlarged by the appointment of four 
ad hoc members, viz.:
• Two practitioners who are specialists in the area 
under study, selected to bring varying views to the 
Board.
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• Two industry accountants drawn from the affected 
industry, or who have had similar industry ex­
perience, chosen from the related industry or ad hoc 
committee, also to bring varying views to the Board.
These four members would join the three permanent 
members of the Board designated by the chairman to form a 
committee of the Board to oversee research, drafting, hear­
ings, discussion, etc., needed to publish an Opinion. For this 
purpose, the four added members would be considered as 
voting members of the Board.
Qualifications. Most Board members should be CPAs, be­
cause many of the discussions and decisions require a pro­
found understanding of the technical accounting and auditing 
procedures underlying the issues. This might seem to dis­
criminate against some highly qualified non-CPAs in industry 
and universities, but since their qualifications are more diffi­
cult to assess, it had better be played safe. There is an ample 
supply of highly qualified CPAs in industry and in univer­
sities, so I consider it better to maintain this requirement at 
present.
Obviously, the practitioners chosen should be the 
best technicians their firms have to offer, with years of 
decision-making under their belts. Accounting decisions are 
frequently predicated upon a keen comprehension of the 
relevant facts and the ability to ferret out those facts. And a 
sharp auditing sense is a prerequisite.
Selection. The permanent members of the Board should be 
named by a standing committee of the AICPA consisting of 
the president of the Institute and the four most recent past 
presidents. This would provide for considerable continuity in 
the selection group, making possible an in-depth survey of 
possible candidates in ample time before selection.
13
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Nominations should be solicited regularly from all the appro­
priate sources, and the candidates for selection should be 
investigated and interviewed in order to ascertain their avail­
ability, attitude, and competence for the task.
The ad hoc members should be selected by the execu­
tive vice president (technical) of the AICPA, with the 
approval of the chairman of the APB and president of the 
Institute.
Tenure. The present rule providing for a maximum of two 
full three-year terms seems appropriate. Interim appoint­
ments may sometimes extend a person’s tenure to about 
eight years, but this, to me, is the outside limit. In rare 
instances, it may be appropriate to re-elect a highly qualified 
person who has had maximum tenure after an absence from 
the Board of at least one year.
Board operations. In light of the recent record of progress, it 
is decidedly preferable that the Board continue operating as 
it is at present. The public hearings are developing well and 
our procedures are continually improving. (It should be 
noted that hearings of some sort or other were begun in 
1966.) The “official” Interpretations aid in improving prac­
tice although they occasionally take too much of the time of 
the full Board. Committee delegation should ease this load 
and expedite issuances.
Voting procedures. The present two-thirds rule is a great 
safety valve, providing the essential safety in numbers I 
referred to earlier. I would not like to see far-reaching 
changes in accounting made on the strength of one vote. On 
the other hand the two-thirds rule may strengthen the 
opposition unduly. I would recommend a 60 percent 
approval vote (i.e., 13-8 for a 21-man body; 15-10 for a 
25-man body). I would insist on similar proportions for votes 




Dissents and qualified assents should not be published 
or voters identified. These serve no useful purpose, and just 
provide a forum for tirades that are not only frequently 
irrelevant and demeaning, but also definite impediments to 
progress.
In summary, I believe that the Accounting Principles 
Board is a workable vehicle, that it has proven eminently 
progressive, and that it offers the financial community and 
the American investing public a good chance for bringing 
financial reporting up to a new level of dependability. I hope, 
in this spirit, that my own recommendations are weighed 






Graduate School of Business Administration
and School of Business Administration 
Office of the Dean
October 29, 1971
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles 
c/o Mr. Michael A. Pinto, CPA 
American Institute of CPAs 
666 Fifth Avenue 
New York, New York 10019
Dear Sirs:
It was my privilege recently to become acquainted with a memorandum which Mr. A. Carl 
Tietjen addressed to you under date of October 7, 1971. Mr. Tietjen is a Partner in 
Price Waterhouse in New York.
Having given considerable thought to the mode by which accounting principles are 
currently established in the United States, I have developed a strong conviction 
that the present approach of the APB is disaster bound because of its ever-increasing 
reliance on mechanistic technicalities rather than broad issues of philosophies and 
standards. I feel very strongly that prudent-men-type of standards are required 
before procedural details should be worked out and that the former is presently 
missing from our professional machinery. Hence I find myself in complete agreement 
with the statement submitted by Mr. Tietjen and would like to urge you as strongly 
as I can to give this statement your most careful attention and consideration.





CORPORATION 1250 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019
J. FRANK FORSTER 
Chairman
November 2, 1971
Mr. Francis M. Wheat
Chairman, Study on Establishment
of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Wheat:
I would like to emphasize the need for the 
creation of an Advisory Committee of top corporate 
management to the Accounting Principles Board as 
outlined in the presentation by the Machinery and 
Allied Products Institute. May I address myself only 
to that portion of the memorandum of pertinent questions 
pertaining to the composition of a non-governmental 
standards board and the method of operations of such 
a board.
The actual membership should be composed of 
highly qualified professional accountants. While their 
experience may have been derived from time spent in 
government, in business or the profession, present 
affiliation should not demand a stance that represents 
their employer's point of view.
The study bears on the development of accounting 
standards but this only relates in a narrow sense to 
the broader problem of its contribution to the 
preservation of the free enterprise system. The 
increased interest of stockholders, security analysts, 
administrators of the federal security acts and the 
enlargement of public interest makes it highly 
important that the growing public cynicism toward 
financial accounting cannot become a serious weapon 
in the hands of those that wish to attack the present 
system.
Mr. F. M. Wheat - 2 - November 2, 1971
In general, most of the abuse has been generated 
and a great deal of the controversy has arisen because 
of the particular self-interest of a sector that has 
used flexible accounting practices to foster short-term 
expedients. The solicitation of views on "exposure 
draft” of APB Opinions necessarily reflect the views of 
the specific interest of financial executives, analysts 
and others but generally there is a cross section of 
views that pertain to a particular self-interest. 
The question remains as to how to best obtain a broad, 
unbiased and long-term view. So often the financial 
executive does not have the freedom to comment broadly 
if the viewpoint is divergent from his own company’s 
specific interest.
I share the belief that only the chief executive 
officer sees the enterprise in its entirety thus 
enabling him to discern and assess the impact of APB 
Opinions on a business enterprise as a whole.
This suggests that, beside the criticism that 
is being directed against public accounting firms, 
there are similar movements against Directors. The 
trend toward audit committees of the Board of Directors 
suggests that an additional qualification of an 
Advisory Board member might be experience on a Board 




The Financial Analysts Federation
TO: STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
FROM: FINANCIAL ANALYSTS FEDERATION
1. Establishing Accounting Principles - Scope
The need for defining principles has obviously been recognized 
with the establishment of the Trueblood Committee. There has 
been a virtual failure of the existing institutional structure. 
It is our opinion that the most important function of any group 
charged with establishing accounting standards is to set an 
explicitly defined body of accounting principles.  The contin­
uous drafting of rules to cover leaks in the system is not only 
time-consuming but seems to be self-destructing. Some unify­
ing concepts such as fair value, matching of income and taxes 
appear more fruitful than the present patching of the. opinions, 
guides and accepted practice.
2. Governmental or Non-Governmental Body
The responsibility of establishing standards should only in­
directly be a governmental function. The cooperation between 
an accounting standard-setting group and the SEC should be made 
more explicit. Through SEC adoption of rules, these will be­
come part of securities law, so that there is no question as 
to the authority and effectiveness of the opinion. The stan­
dard or principle setting procedure should remain private but 
intimately interwoven with the SEC practice. The relationship 
with the SEC should be formalized in some fashion by law, if 
necessary.
3. Composition of the Board
The board should be highly competent professionals with full- 
time, limited tenure of perhaps two or three years. The number 
 of people should be adequate to perform the task of setting up 
a body of principles. The group should have a permanent staff 
of research people of high caliber training and ability with 
economic, financial, statistical as well as accounting back­
grounds. These do not necessarily have to be CPA’s. In addi­
tion the Board should have the right to commission research 
input from outside the organization.  
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• Method of Operation
The operation of the Board should emphasize participation by 
interested parties. The circulation of exposure drafts at very 
early stages of the decision process would be helpful for 
participants. The vote on all questions should be a majority 
of the Board. The two-thirds rule has been limiting.
The Board needs a procedure to publicize a coming action or to 
alert accountants and clients to dissatisfaction with current 
practice. An informal procedure appears universally required. 
The present procedure is cumbersome and time-consuming. Some 
method must be devised so that all are aware that a specific 
practice is misleading and violates the basic body of principles, 
before it becomes ingrained in annual reports. Change then be­
comes too painful and is fought vigorously. If the interested 
parties are notified at early stages that a specific treatment 
is likely to be banned or altered, then we would prevent the 
development of vested interests in poor accounting practice.
An appeal procedure is vital for the working of any system to 
alert a board to changes in the economy - national, international, 
sociological, as well as technological. These should be published 
with the testimony, supporting data, and decision.
5. Payment for Research
Accounting research should be financed by the dues of the mem­
bers plus a specific tax on all corporations; e.g., $5 myn. or 
more in assets. This could probably be as small as $100 per 
company.
Research studies should be tied into the overall development 
of guidelines. This should not only search past history, but 
simulate changes and project potential effects.
An overall study and codification of practices, opinions and 
audit guides would be helpful as well as clarifying for accoun­
tants, security analysts and management. The result could be 
less abuse of GAAP and in addition, such actual and potential 
abuses could be cited at that time.
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Additional Commentary on 
Establishment of Accounting Principles 
by
William C. Norby, C.F.A.
AICPA Public Hearings for
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles 
New York
November 4, 1971
In this commentary I will attempt to illuminate some of 
the opinions and attitudes of our Officers, Directors, and Com­
mittee members who have discussed this important subject from 
time to time, both within our organization and with the Study 
Committee. These attitudes are concerned more with matters of 
responsibility than details of organization.
The problem of establishing accounting principles may be 
divided into two parts: (1) Who will have the responsibility; 
and (2) how will they be organized. Members of The Financial 
Analysts Federation have expressed conservative views on both 
of these issues.
Who will be responsible? The FAF has consistently held 
the view that professional accountants should establish account­
ing principles. There is a particular fear of government res­
ponsibility for this function, having in mind the political 
pressures, legal and bureaucratic road blocks to progress, and 
the usually slow pace of change that characterize government 
bureaus. This is not to deny that government agencies have 
not made many contributions to corporate reporting or have not 
sometimes prodded the private sector to action on accounting 
matters. But we believe that an organization in the private 
sector will over the long run have greater flexibility and 
show more responsiveness to the needs of investors and busi­
ness.
When we say professional accountants should have the 
responsibility, we mean exactly that. Not only do they have 
the professional competence, but they have independence from 
the various special pleaders. Numerous commentators on this 
subject have suggested that The Financial Analysts Federation 
or financial analysts should have a role in decisions. We 
are complimented, but we do not think it appropriate. By the 
same token we do not believe organizations representing busi­
ness management should have a role in decisions either. Busi­
ness is the subject of accounting measurement and therefore should 
not be a participant in establishing the standards of measure­
ment.
We believe financial analysts, business management, and 
other parties affected by accounting rules should participate 
in the discussions and take positions of advocacy. In this way 
they can make an effective contribution to the development 
of accounting principles. But they cannot be both advocates 
and judges or decision makers.
This is not to say that if your committee recommends partici­
pation in some way by other organizations, we would not cooperate. 
Under those circumstances we believe that financial analysts 
must be involved.
Linked to the determination of responsibility is the problem 
of enforcement. The APB and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
have a relationship developed through custom and practice, and it 
is this relationship, derived from the SEC’S legal powers, that 
give implied force to APB Opinions. Perhaps this relationship 
could be strengthened or made more explicit as we have suggested 
in our statement. The principle of the securities industry self 
regulatory agency as related to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission may provide a model. Admittedly the self regulatory 
concept is currently being questioned in the securities business, 
but the circumstances of accounting principles are somewhat dif­
ferent,
I would also suggest that the SEC’S authority in accounting 
matters be primary among government agencies, so that other re­
gulatory bodies do not require public companies to issue statements 
that are not consistent with general principles. The separate 
ways of the several agencies in the past has been a disservice 
to investors.
Organization of the Board. Voluntary membership organizations 
have different and difficult problems of organization. They are 
not really equipped to respond promptly to increasing demands, nor 
are fast decisions usually feasible. We believe the APB in recent 
years has made extraordinary progress in the pace of its opinion 
issuing relative, that is, to these inherent organizational limit­
ations. Yet the problems seem to be multiplying and greater speed 
is demanded from all corners.
The reformation of the organization structure thus is very 
important. Our Accounting Committee has recommended full time 
membership of professional accountants for limited terms. We 
all recognize that the present voluntary members of the APB are 
devoting practically full time to the task now, but from an 
organizations point of view the full time compensated member would 
appear to have two advantages: (1) better continuity of effort; 
and (2) complete independence of employer or client relationships.
-2-
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We do not wish to imply in any way that present members 876
have not been faithful to their mission on the APB but the 
independent stature would give the APB increased creditability 
in many quarters, we believe.
Within our organization, as in others, there is a diversity 
of viewpoints. Many of our senior members, including our Directors, 
prefer the present voluntary type membership of the APB. This 
preference is based on the idea that voluntary members will be 
closer to the current practical problems through their firms 
and their decisions will carry more acceptance than decisions 
made by. an independent group which might tend to become too 
"academic.” They believe the establishment of accounting prin­
ciples is a pragmatic, quasi-legislative process and that it 
is not necessarily bad if the members are close to the pressures 
of practical problems.
We also have different views as to the composition of a 
full time independent board, I should mention the excellent 
paper by Mr. Ellis at the recent Northwestern University Symposium 
on "Institutional Issues in Formulating Reporting Standards." 
Mr. Ellis is a member of our Financial Accounting Policy Com­
mittee. He proposed a broader group than professional accountants 
but nonetheless .would require independence. No member would 
retain any employer or vocational tie. The purpose would be 
to bring to bear a wider range of viewpoints to the total problem 
of corporate reporting. This is not at great variance from 
the Committee’s recommendation.
I should state that my own view, based on observation 
of voluntary organizations over a number of years, favors a 
full time, compensated board. I believe this is the only way 
the APB will be able to keep pace in the next few years, and 
achieve full creditability as an independent agency. I believe 
board members can be selected in a way which will insure a 
continued responsiveness to practical problems.
The criticisms of the APB seem to arise in part from the 
desire for speedier action. Naturally, once a problem is iden­
tified we would all like to have a prompt solution. However 
there are many parties at interest and their acceptance of 
final opinions rests on their opportunity to present recommendations 
and listen to argument. This takes time and will be difficult 
to speed up no matter how the APB is organized. These other 
parties at interest are also voluntary organizations. Accounting 
is not their primary objective or concern, although it may be 
very important to them. We at the FAF recognize that we must 
expand our capability to provide input to the APB from financial 
analysts, because it is desirable to settle accounting issues 
more rapidly. But ours will be an evolutionary expansion.
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877 Consequently, I believe I reflect the preponderant opinion 
of our organization that we are suspicious of some of the grand, 
sweeping reorganizations of the accounting principles setting 
process that have been proposed. An evolutionary change and 
improvement, building on what has already been developed by 
the AICPA and other organizations is the more practical approach. 
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November 9, 1971
Mr Francis M Wheat, Chairman
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr Wheat:
We would like to offer our views for consideration by the Study Group on 
Establishment of Accounting Principles .
Some observations on which our conclusions are based are:
1. The Accounting Principles Board has been subject to criticism 
from both within and without the profession. A considerable 
part has been unjustified and represents either a lack of knowl­
edge or prejudice stemming from self-interest. At the same 
time, we believe that changes are in order and that the time is 
ripe to reconsider constructively the whole area of development 
of accounting principles and standards, but on a reasoned and 
informed basis.
2. The Board has operated in an atmosphere in which it is almost 
impossible to avoid criticism.
a. It has become a quasi-regulator but has had to rely 
for enforcement too heavily on the loyalty of the AICPA 
members and on its own ability to convince through the 
text of its Opinions. In fact it has, with help from the 
SEC, gained considerable stature since it was established 
on September 1, 1959. Its Opinions have been generally 
accepted, however grudgingly, even though they lack legal 
sanction and departures from them are not even a violation 
of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics .
b. The source materials, such as "generally accepted account­
ing principles”, do not provide the broad framework of 
fundamental accounting authority within which the Board, or 




c. Because of the dynamic nature of American business 
and the necessity of accounting for novel types of trans­
actions and for old transactions in new settings, the 
Board has had to expend much of its efforts in dealing 
with immediate problems. Had it done otherwise, the 
entire program would have fallen into disrepute.
d. The Board started with a virtual mandate to move in the 
direction of uniformity in an atmosphere in which diverse 
accounting was widespread. Understandably, it took time 
to reverse the flow into the desired direction, because 
every attempt at change was met with determined and 
well-entrenched opposition.
f. During recent years accounting firms have been made 
defendants in legal actions for substantial money damages, 
and some members have even been subjected to criminal 
prosecution. It was in this environment of erosion of 
public confidence in financial reporting that the Board has 
had to function.
e. A number of different governmental agencies have the 
authority to establish accounting practices . This inevit­
ably has created diversity of practice. Diversity was 
also furthered by tax requirements and considerations .
It is our view that considering these conditions, the Board has performed 
admirably.
Many of our conclusions are based upon the assumption that a group estab­
lished to promulgate timely accounting pronouncements must give first priority to 
current problems and cannot devote much time to the development of basic concepts. 
This should not be read to imply that there is no need for a broad framework of basic 
authority. It is our view that a new and separate group should be constituted with that 
as its only mission. We consider this to be a long-range and possibly permanent activ­
ity because we have grave doubts that even with the best of talent the progress will be 
rapid or that its output will meet with ready and general acceptance. Formation of this 
group should await the formal report of the Trueblood Committee.
We have reached the conclusion that the establishment of accounting princi­
ples and standards must be the province of the accounting profession. The Institute has 
the largest reservoir of accounting experience and talent. The fact that the AICPA is 
a cohesive group and can achieve a certain measure of compliance through its attest 
function provides an initial thrust to the Board’s Opinions which is not obtainable else­
where. The importance of the foregoing in terms of the composition of the Board and 
the representation on it from the laity should not be underestimated.
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We would like at this point to express our views as to a full-time or a 
part-time Board. We would rephrase the question to be whether the Board members 
should or should not be paid for their efforts and furloughed by their firms. We 
believe that we have, for all practical purposes, a full-time Board now. We do not 
believe it would be possible to get the same dedicated effort from a paid Board that 
is being furnished by the volunteer members . All of those accepting membership 
should do so on the basis of a first priority commitment to furnish whatever time 
is needed to accomplish the Board's activities. For example, there should be no 
reason for not extending a three-day meeting to a full week or more when necessary.
While we believe that a full-time paid Board would be undesirable and 
even less productive, we strongly recommend a full-time paid chairman, indepen­
dent of any firm or company. He should be selected primarily on the basis of his 
executive ability, personal prestige, judgment and wisdom rather than on his 
accounting capabilities.
In our view, one of the Board's deficiencies has been the lack of breadth 
in thinking, experience and expertise stemming from the dearth of members from 
other disciplines . There is, at present, only one corporate executive on the Board, 
and only in the past year was a financial analyst appointed to Board membership. 
Groups such as economists, investment bankers, and the legal profession are not 
represented. We believe that the composition of the rule-making body should be 
approximately as follows:
A Board of 21 persons of whom 13 should be practicing public accountants 
and members of the AICPA. Industry should be represented by three members and 
the academic world by two members. The remaining representatives should be from 
investment banking, security analysts, economists and the legal profession The 
objective is to give the Board the breadth which it now lacks both in operation and as 
a matter of image. Organizations such as FEI, NAA, IBA, and FAF should be con­
sulted with respect to the selection of non-practicing members, and such members 
should not be required to be CPA's or members of the Institute.
The practice of retaining a permanent seat for a particular accounting 
firm should be abolished. When it was established there may have been good reasons 
for this caste system. It is our view that those arguments no longer are compelling, 
and the practice cannot be defended. In our experience this has been the principal 
factor cited in the charge (which we strongly condemn as false) of lack of independence 
on the part of the Board.
We believe that the conduct of the Board’s meetings leaves something to 
be desired. The Board should operate in a manner similar to a political, delibera­
tive body. There should be a requirement to sit until all of the important and timely 
agenda items have been cleared. For example, the recent meeting of the Board in 
Houston, Texas, should have been held in session until an accounting interpretation 
on foreign exchange could be approved for issuance, and thereby made available for 
use in the preparation of financial statements for the third quarter.
HURDMAN AND
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Further, the presently required two-thirds affirmative vote for issuance 
impedes the effectiveness of the Board. It has not only resulted in compromises which 
are satisfactory to no one, it has also necessitated last minute, hurried redrafting 
with resulting obscurity of language and failure to clearly set forth the Board’s intent. 
We grant there are hazards in permitting issuance on the vote of a simple majority. 
However, we do not believe the criticism that a simple majority vote would impede 
general acceptance is a valid one. The combination of the prestige of the Board, co­
operation of the SEC and the posture before a court of the company and its accountants 
in a law suite which involved a question of deviation from a Board Opinion, would all 
mitigate against that. At the same time, we do acknowledge that for this and other 
reasons, departures from Board Opinions need to be included among the violations of 
the Code of Professional Ethics . We believe that a 12 of 21 votes requirement (11 of 
18 if the latter number is continued) would best accommodate all of the pro and con 
considerations which have been raised.
Among the gross inadequacies in the present operation of the Board have 
been insufficiencies in research staff and drafting talent. The basic work of the Board 
should be performed by subcommittees. Toward this end the number of persons sup­
porting the Board's effort should be expanded. We recommend above that there should 
be an increase in the number of Board members. Under the present method of operation, 
projects are delayed unduly because too many of the subcommittees are manned and 
chaired by the same individuals . Essentially, a Board member should serve as chair­
man of a subcommittee and rarely serve on other subcommittees, although his special­
ized talents and experience would be available to any subcommittee.
Each subcommittee should draw on non-Board members who, together with 
its chairman and the research and drafting staff, should furnish the full Board with a 
position paper based upon substantial study and research. This mode of operation 
should effectively increase the input of pertinent data and result in obtaining a broader 
spectrum of views. Presumably they could also maintain closer liaison with other 
organizations. They should be in a position to provide ready answers to questions 
raised by individual Board members. Once the Board has reached its fundamental 
position, drafting should be done by those having appropriate skills working with the 
chairman of the subcommittee. Only upon completion of this phase should a draft be 
passed along to other members of the subcommittee for comment and ultimately to the 
full Board. The subcommittee should be free to call upon other Board members and 
non-Board members for views and comments.
Turning to another point, we believe that the relationship between the APB 
and the Committee on Auditing Procedure should be studied. Accounting principles 
and the presentation of accounting information in financial statements cannot be fully 
divorced. Recent examples of troublesome situations are the evolution of SAP No. 47, 
"Subsequent Events", and the proposed statement on reporting on the statement of 
changes in financial position. In this connection we believe that it is urgent that the 
standard short-form report be appropriately revised without delay. The one presently 
in use does not adequately describe the auditor's role and the responsibilities which he 
purports to assume.
HURDMAN AND
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In order for the Board or any similar organization to be effective, it is 
necessary to have the support of its code of professional ethics, albeit, the relevant 
provisions must be couched in language which permits departures in order to render 
the financial statements not misleading. Nothing should inhibit "full and fair disclosure".
Finally, it is our view that the present practices of conducting public hear­
ings before drafting and issuing controversial Opinions and of providing interpretations 
subsequent to issuance are satisfactory. At the same time, we believe that they will be 
modified from time to time as experience dictates. We also believe the present appeal 
procedures are adequate and no new avenues are needed.
Summarized below are what we consider to be our major recommendations:
1. A full-time paid chairman, independent of professional or business 
affiliations .
2. Increased research and drafting supporting staff.
3. Increased input of data and views on each project.
4. Broadening of the bases of membership of subcommittees .
5. Abolition of permanent seats .
6. Elimination of the two-third voting rule.
7. Combination of the activities of the accounting and auditing 
committees.
8. Stiffening of the Institute’s Code of Professional Ethics and other 
disciplinary procedures.
We have attempted throughout to make our comments brief. At the same 
time, we recognize that some of them may provoke questions on your part. If so, we 
will be glad to elaborate, either orally or in writing, at your convenience.
In closing, we would like to state for the record, that whatever the recom­
mendations of your Committee may be, they will have the full support of this Firm as 
will the action taken on them by the AICPA.
Very truly yours,
HURDMAN AND









To: The Study Group on Establishment 
of Accounting Principles
This letter tries to summarize my perception of the present role of the 
APB, particularly with respect to its power and its relation to the SEC. 
After serving nearly four years on the Board, I think much of the criticism 
of the present APB is attributable to at least some misunderstanding of the 
Board’s basic function. This misunderstanding is compounded by the Board’s 
and the SEC’s public relations stance; Loth seem reluctant to admit that 
they set principles in close concert.
From time to time, I have heard grumbling by various APB members that we 
do not have to consider the SEC — that we will decide what is right and that 
is that. But that is wishful thinking, a clinging to the false idea that a 
private body is determining accounting principles. The SEC has all the ul­
timate power, and the APB formulates principles subject to whatever con­
straints the SEC exerts. This point may be obvious to individuals who are 
well acquainted with APB activities, but it is not at all clear to many others. 
As a result, the APB has endured some undeserved flak.
In my view, the (informal) organizational relationship is similar to decen­
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The dashed line indicates the over-all organization. The objective of the 
organization in this context is (or should be) the "maximization of society’s 
welfare” in the form of optimal financial reporting to investors. That is, 
principles (you may prefer rules, concepts, or some other amorphous words) must 
be devised in order to specify how measures of financial performance and posi­
tion can best serve users.
Top management (the SEC) has all ultimate power to set principles for 
financial reporting. It has minimal resources and central staff to do the job, 
so it delegates the duty to front-line management (APB). As in all organiza­
tions, decentralization is adopted when top management believes that lower 
management has more information and capability to make decisions that achieve 
the over-all goals of the organization (in this case, optimal financial report­
ing to investors). Lower management (APB) is given great freedom to make 
decisions because it is deemed sufficiently objective and more knowledgeable 
about the technical aspects of the job. Moreover, lower management works for 
zero salary and investigates nearly all of the topics chosen by top management. 
Obviously, lower management is also free, to investigate many topics of its own 
choice.
Of course, as in all decentralized organizations, top management can set 
over-all policies and constraints. It can exert veto power. On certain topics, 
it may heavily constrain the freedom to make decisions (e.g., the investment 
credit and, more recently, marketable securities). But top management cannot 
be too heavy-handed too often. Frequent interference with the freedom to make 
decisions means that decentralization with its many benefits (for example, the 
handy buffer against direct pressure by reporting companies on top management) 
is undermined. Often top management (the SEC) can take the convenient stance 
that lower management (APB) makes the decisions and that top management merely 
implements them!
As I see it, the SEC (top management) has used decentralization with a 
master’s touch. Its lower-level management (APB) does an enormous amount of 
work for no salary and has just enough freedom to want to continue the arrange­
ment. Moreover, it is dominated by practitioners, the individuals responsible 
for implementing the principles chosen. There is an evident efficiency here, 
because the work consists of both the formulation of principles and their 
implementation --an immensely complex task that will not be performed easily 
under any institutional arrangement.
The buffer role is clear:
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The lines represent the probable relative volume and direction of requests, views, 
suasion, pressure, etc., among some of the important parties regarding the for­
mulation of accounting principles.
I do not claim that the APB insulates the SEC from all pressures or criticisms*  
however, the Board has been unjustifiably criticized for timidity or vacillation on 
several occasions when the basic explanation for the Board’s behavior has been no 
assurance of support from the SEC. How many lower-level managers will proceed on 
critical issues without obtaining reliable assurance of top management support?
The above description is not flawless. Nevertheless, it is time to dispel the 
oft-heard myth that a private group is setting the accounting principles which are 
then enforced by the policing agency, the SEC. The job of devising accounting prin­
ciples is a joint-effort, a private-public institutional arrangement that should be 
explicitly admitted and publicized forthrightly by both parties along the top-lower 
management lines described above.
I leave it to others to suggest alternative institutional arrangements for the 
incredibly difficult task of formulating accounting principles. The focus of this 
letter is more narrow; it assumes that the SEC will continue to maintain the ultimate
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power. If so, a modified APB, or some similar successor thereof, necessarily 
must work as a lower-level management unit with only as much latitude as the 
SEC permits.
Whatever the form, I hope that business executives do not have any larger 
direct role in setting accounting principles than they now possess. Their 
views should be heard fully, but there is an inherent conflict between their 
role as managers and the task of measuring their own performance. An analogy 
might be having the baseball batter calling the balls and strikes.
Many business executives have vociferously stated that the APB does not 
pay sufficient attention to the views of industry. In my opinion, that is just 
not so. If anything, the Board is swamped by industry views. First, industry 
has direct representation on the Board. Second, the practitioners who dominate 
the Board listen carefully to the views of their clients. After all, in their 
everyday work practitioners talk mostly to business executives and to other 
practitioners, not to financial analysts and college professors. The opinions 
of financial executives come through loud and clear -- and they are given pain­
staking consideration. For example, every recent APB Opinion has been changed 
considerably in response to industry reactions.
Let me stress that I am grateful for having been a member of the Board. 
Under the current setup, considering its many constraints, I think the APB has 
performed admirably. Admittedly, I am speculating, but more speed and objec­
tivity might result if there were some full-time group that uses majority rule. 
This would be a deliberative body that would listen fully to all interested 
parties before reaching a decision.
I look forward to seeing your group’s recommendations.
Sincerely,
CTH/acf
cc: Accounting Principles Board
